


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JPRS Report



Soviet Union

Military Affairs
SOVIET MILITARY MORALE AND
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

SOVIET MILITARY MORALE AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

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20 March 1990

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SOVIET MILITARY MORALE AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM

Marshal Akhromeyev Open Letter to Ogonek Editor, Korotich Response

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[“Open letter” from S. Akhromeyev, Marshal of the Soviet Union, to V.A. Korotich, Chief Editor of OGONEK, and V.A. Korotich response: “What Kind of Armed Forces the Soviet Union Needs”.]

[Text] What kind of Army and Navy does the Soviet Union need today? This question has now become, without exaggeration, a national issue. There are reasons for this. The military danger to the Soviet Union has declined. It has become possible to reduce military spending and the numerical strength of the Army and Navy: personnel have been cut by 500,000 and up to 100,000 officers and warrant officers are being retired; and compared to 1989, 1990 military spending has been reduced R6.4 billion (more than 8 percent), and compared with the 5-year plan, 1990 spending has been cut by more than R12 billion. Conversion of the defense industry is proceeding apace. In 1990, 49 percent of its capacities will be producing consumer goods. It is clear that this kind of abrupt turn for the Armed Forces is not taking place painlessly.

Naturally, showing concern for the Army and Navy, most of our people are worried that during a period of radical transformations in the system of political power in the country and of the economic foundations of our society, these transformations, which are shaking society and even creating crisis situations within it, may affect the Armed Forces and lower their combat readiness. This is a legitimate concern, the more so since even within the Army collectives there are shortcomings for which the Army and Navy are being justifiably criticized.

Proceeding from this far from simple situation, other questions also arise: what kind of numerical strength, organizational structure, and combat personnel are necessary for the Soviet Armed Forces? How should they be manned? Is it not now obsolete to man the Army and Navy through a universal draft, just as many other things in our society have also become obsolete?

Answers must be provided for these questions.

I am writing this open letter to you, the editor of the journal OGONEK. The impression is being created (at least in me) that the journal of which you are editor is often inadequately competent and correct in its surveys of military problems. A number of articles and letters with which it is impossible to agree have been published. I am convinced that the stance assumed by OGONEK

with respect to the Armed Forces is doing us great harm. Increasingly one is forced to consider why (intentionally or unintentionally) the editorial board of the journal is pursuing a line aimed at discrediting the USSR Armed Forces.

At first the attack on the Army and Navy evoked incomprehension and puzzlement among military leaders. It was all too unusual for our reality. This is really why it has taken the military so long to respond. Now, when our position and yours have been defined, nothing remains but the question of how to correct this negligence.

You have repeatedly offered opportunities to speak on fundamental issues concerning the development of the Army and Navy to authors writing for the journal who have only a poor knowledge of their actual status and who often have never even served in the ranks. I think that you will have no justification for refusing to publish my letter. I am a professional soldier, have served in the Armed Forces for 50 years and took part in the Great Patriotic War as enlisted man and as an officer. After the war I worked for 30 years as a career soldier and have worked for 15 years on the General Staff in posts connected directly with the development and use of the Armed Forces.

One thing more. Your journal has its own position with respect to the Army and Navy. But for soldiers such as ourselves (and the views that I am expressing are shared by hundreds of thousands, I would say most career servicemen), we also have our position. There are, of course, military people who do not share all my opinions. As I understand it, your sociopolitical journal is obliged to publish not only the material that is in line with the views of the editorial collegium but also material that reflects the views and opinions of the various strata of society that disagree with you.

But before reviewing the questions that have been raised, it is necessary to define whether in general it makes sense for the Soviet Union to have large Armed Forces. Is there a danger to our country today? Does our country have a putative enemy.

I

It has already been said that considerable results have been achieved in reducing tension in the world: the danger of war has been reduced for the Soviet Union. But it has not been eliminated. The U.S. Administration and the leadership in all the other countries of the NATO bloc still regard the Soviet Union as a putative military opponent. U.S. Secretary of Defense R. Cheney spoke again in September and October about the military threat that the Soviet Union poses for the United States. M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with G. Bush on 2 and 3 December of this year, off Malta was of great importance for the future. It showed that the two sides are reconsidering the situation and trying to understand each other's policies, and they recognize that the confrontation

between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO bloc is gradually becoming a thing of the past. There can be no return to that. Similarly, the United States is starting to rethink its own strategy. It is beginning to understand that "you do not get far in a carriage from the past."

But in the military field there is a fundamental difference between our practical actions and those of the United States and its allies.

We are acting in accordance with a new military doctrine. We are making real transformations, altering the lineament of the Warsaw Pact and making it defensive in nature, and we are reducing the military forces in our military alliance. The United States and its allies, while recognizing our transformations as something very important and approving of them, are not themselves taking any similar realistic steps to transform their own military doctrines adopted decades ago, or to reduce the military power of the NATO bloc. As before, they will not agree to start talks on reducing the naval forces of the sides. It so happens that it is in precisely this military field that for their part they have a great many words but no deeds.

But what, then, are in fact their deeds? It is common knowledge that their military budget for 1990 has been confirmed at \$350 billion. The American Armed Forces today are made up of 3.3 million men, including the National Guard (with us, similar components are part of the Armed Forces), while the NATO bloc has 3.6 million men in Europe alone. They are all equipped with modern weapons and are maintained in a high state of combat readiness. These armed forces are not being reduced. As before the United States surrounds the Soviet Union with many hundreds of its own military bases, including bases on the territory of Japan, the Philippines, on islands in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, in the countries of Africa, the Mediterranean, and West Europe. Fifteen carrier strike forces that include almost 1,500 U.S. combat aircraft are maintained in readiness for deployment to our shores. The U.S. Administration refuses to hold talks with us on reducing naval forces.

Moreover, we have developed a new defensive military doctrine based on defense sufficiency. Our Armed Forces are being structured and trained in accordance with this doctrine. We have pledged never, under any circumstance, to start a war, and never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. But for more than 20 years the United States and the NATO bloc have been guided in Europe by the strategies of "flexible response" and "nuclear deterrence" which provide for the first use of nuclear weapons. The United States and the NATO bloc in general are pursuing a policy from-a-position-of-strength with respect to the Soviet Union and our allies, and the socialist countries, and they talk about this directly at the highest levels. Everything that I have set forth is not invention but fact. If you do not agree with them, try to refute them. I am ready to enter into a polemic with you and I will prove that everything set forth in this letter is the truth.

Moreover, although it has become quieter in the world today, Japan is, without the necessary basis [bez dolzhnykh na osnovaniy], making territorial claims against the Soviet Union. In the FRG questions concerning the "Reich in its 1937 borders" are periodically raised. I think that its borders are known to all of you. Calls are heard more frequently for a revision of the system of treaties in Europe that define the territorial arrangement of the states existing today. The Soviet Union entertains territorial claims against no one. Of course, today everyone says that territorial problems should be resolved only by peaceful means, and this is correct. We are in favor of that. But the experience of history confirms that with changes in the situation the tone of territorial claims can also change sharply. This has happened in the past and has led to an about-face in relations between states. Must this be taken into account? Of course. Thus, while fighting for peace, reducing the danger of war and cutting back on armaments, the Soviet Union must today have strong and modern Armed Forces. The situation demands this.

But what kind of Armed Forces should they be? Let us answer this question.

II

Here, several of the components characterizing the Armed Forces are important.

First, the numerical strength of the Army and Navy. It is common knowledge that in his speech in London in April this year M.S. Gorbachev named this number—4,258,000 men. At the end of 1988 it was decided to reduce our Armed Forces by 500,000 men during 1989-1990 (a reduction of 250,000 has already been made). On 1 January 1991 the total numerical strength of our Armed Forces will be 3,760,000. However, the question arises: Is this a large number or a small number? Perhaps they should be reduced by more than 500,000, or, perhaps, the 500,000 reduction is too large? On this issue alone I am receiving numerous letters. Obviously the matter needs clarification.

In mid-1988 the political and military leaders of our state jointly concluded that the improvement in the international situation and the reduced military tension and threat of war make it possible for us to cut back our Armed Forces. The military leadership is tasked to work out a specific number for these cutbacks.

During the latter half of 1988 a great deal of research work was done: Command-staff and staff exercises were conducted at various levels, calculations were made of the balance of military forces in the future, the possible course of arms reduction negotiations was critically analyzed. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms, scientific research institutes and the military academies were involved in this work. The necessary calculations were performed in sectors of the defense industry. As the result of all this work, by late 1988 the figure of 500,000 men emerged—the number by which the Army and

Navy could be cut. This cutback was approved by the leadership of our state and then confirmed by the USSR Supreme Soviet. Therefore, the numerical strength of the USSR Armed Forces—3,760,000 as of 1 January 1991—is the result of studies done by many collectives. Here there is no place for arbitrariness by the military, as some comrades think. Their actions are strictly controlled by the state leadership. Any major decision in the military field has always been reached collectively and controlled by the government, and now the USSR Supreme Soviet. Further cutbacks in the Army and Navy are possible, but only as a result of negotiations with the United States and the NATO bloc as a whole and only on a bilateral basis.

It is, of course, possible to call this opinion into question. But then it will be necessary to assess in a different way the military and political situation in the world and conduct the necessary studies.

Second, concerning the structure of the Armed Forces.

The structure of the Armed Forces of any state is developed historically as a function of many conditions, particularly military, political and geostrategic, conditions.

The Armed Forces of the USSR are made up of five branches of the Armed Forces, namely, the Missile Forces, Ground Forces, Air Defense Forces, Air Forces, and Naval Forces. The Armed Forces of the United States are made up of three branches, namely, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Army. But there is no need to accuse the Ministry of Defense leadership of extravagance and of having an unwise force structure. Let us look into it a little.

In terms of its geostrategic position the USSR is unique. It covers an area of 22.4 million square km. The land border is 20,000 km long, the maritime borders 47,000 km. Those who call themselves our putative enemy—the United States and the NATO bloc as a whole—possess enormous air power. In the west the NATO bloc countries abut directly on the territory of the Soviet Union, in the east the United States (Alaska and the Aleutian Islands) and its ally Japan with its territories, do the same. We must, therefore, be organized in accordance with a unified plan and an appropriately managed air defense system for the country. The United States finds itself in entirely different conditions. Its neighbors are Canada and Mexico. Most U.S. territory is separated from us by oceans. Essentially its territory is protected against air strikes by its geographical position. It is for this reason alone that we need air defense forces as a separate branch of the Armed Forces. The United States simply does not have this need.

Now the Strategic Missile Forces. These forces were formed in the fifties. N.S. Khrushchev announced their creation as a separate branch of the Armed Forces in 1960. There were arguments about whether they should be independent or included as part of the Air Force. But N.S. Khrushchev intended to eliminate the Air Force

completely as a branch of the Armed Forces since he considered them obsolete (life has shown that this was a big mistake). It was erroneously suggested that the missions accomplished by the Air Forces in time of war could be assigned to the Missile Forces. Accordingly the Missile Forces started to develop rapidly, and by the mid-sixties, when N.S. Khrushchev was no longer in the government leadership, as an independent branch they had already created their own systems for command and control and material-technical supply. Funds, considerable funds, were wasted. Calculations done at that time showed that it was irrational to alter the structure again and would cost more than developing and improving the existing structure. All the other requirements of the structure existing at that time were satisfied.

The missile forces are now the basis of our strategic nuclear forces and they guarantee the military balance in those forces with the United States, and the security of our country.

The Ministry of Defense also has many difficulties in the organizational structure, which depend on the material capabilities of our state. For the armed forces in the capitalist countries the entire infrastructure is created by private construction companies whose services are paid for. Here, the state cannot do that. The Army and Navy are deployed for understandable reasons mostly along borders and in remote parts of the country where there is little manpower. Accordingly, by government decision we have created military construction units that build both purely military projects for the Armed Forces (bases, various kinds of installations for military command and control systems and material-technical supply) and sociocultural projects—military housing for officers and warrant officers and all other sociocultural projects. There is more. Hundreds of thousands of military construction workers build plants and factories and housing and other projects for the national economy, for the Soviet people.

The Ministry of Defense does a great deal to build apartments for officers, and is trying to build more. But its opportunities to do this are limited by the funding for capital investments (concrete, metals, plumbing items, timber, and so forth), which is allocated centrally by the government. Possibilities for these allocations are limited. It is unfair to blame only the Ministry of Defense leadership for their slow construction of housing for officers, as the journal OGONEK (No 24) does.

But there are also shortcomings for which the military leaders are to blame. In fact, there are more violations of military discipline and more of the "dedovshchina" in military construction units. And for this justifiable claims have been made against the Ministry of Defense. The officer corps is doing much work to strengthen discipline but things are moving slowly. For we also need help. Even if it is only that a correct determination be made of the reasons for it, and of the essential nature of the issue, and also that what is written about it be

truthful. Why does the journal of which you are editor not do this, or is it that it has so many other urgent problems to deal with?

Third, the military budget. Many fantastic things have been written in OGONEK about our military spending. You will probably say that the official figures have not been published and the journal was forced to publish figures even though they were estimates. But without knowing the essential nature of the problem, this is dangerous. For decades the appropriate organizations of the U.S. Department of Defense have been systematically and deliberately overstating the Soviet Union's military spending. And OGONEK has swallowed the bait of these Pentagon concoctions. I ask you to read the article by Professor Holtzman "Policy and Conjecture" published in the American journal INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. You will note that the Ministry of Defense has the greatest interest in publishing the figures on military spending so that the people may know its real size. For it is much lower than the figures the Americans are shouting about all over the world, and much less than the science fiction published by OGONEK (No 9). We have published the figures for military spending in 1989 and 1990.

Fourth, can the Soviet Union have a "volunteer" army, that is, an all-volunteer army?

It must be said that this question has never before been raised in our country. It was obvious to everyone that under our specific conditions the defense of the Motherland is a matter for all the people. This started three centuries ago under Peter the Great. After the Great October Socialist Revolution, during the course of the civil war, using the method of trial and error (in theory it was otherwise) V.I. Lenin concluded that it is essential for a socialist state to have a universal military draft.

This principle has been adopted in all the major, not only socialist but also capitalist, states of the world (the FRG, France, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and so forth) except for the United States and Great Britain. They are in a special position. The United States is separated from Europe and Asia by oceans. There is no military threat to its borders. Great Britain brings up the rear in the NATO bloc and it is separated from Europe by the English Channel. They understand clearly that a surprise aggression against them by land is impossible. They have, therefore, developed volunteer armies. They will have time to train the necessary reserves while being covered by their allies at the start of a war.

Why will a "volunteer," that is, all-volunteer, army not be suitable for the Soviet Union?

The history of our motherland—the Soviet Union—is such that there has virtually always been a danger of war. Large groupings of armed forces of military alliances and states opposing us have always been deployed along our borders and the borders of our allies. Of course, the question arises: why has this situation taken shape? Who is to blame? As we again look back we see that beginning

in 1917 plots have been hatched and wars waged against our socialist state. Suffice it to recall the policies of Churchill, Chamberlain, and Daladier, of Hitler and his satellites, of Truman and Dulles. This all happened. But there was also something else. There were our wrong decisions and actions, which also added fuel to the flames of the threat to peace. But that is another question that, if you wish, can be discussed separately on the pages of your journal. Today it is important to establish that there was a threat of the danger of war. And today, even though it is less, there is still a real threat of war.

How should the Soviet Union act in these specific, real conditions? First, it must have a minimum cadre Armed Forces in peacetime. This has been discussed. Second, it must have trained mobile reserves and resources ready in the event of aggression against us. Due consideration must be given to the fact that in any state a peacetime army is 2.5 to 3 times smaller than in wartime. This means that we need many trained reserves. And reserves ready in event of aggression can be trained only by an army made up on the basis of a universal military draft where the personnel doing their compulsory service are systematically changed. In an all-volunteer army a soldier or junior commander may serve 10 or 15 years without being replaced. Here it is impossible to train military specialists for a reserve. This is the main reason why in the USSR it is impossible to have an all-volunteer army. The military-political and geostrategic situation does not allow us to go down that road. If we achieve a radical cutback in the armed forces in Europe on a mutual basis with the NATO bloc, both military blocs really reduce their own forces, and then by agreement both the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Pact is dissolved, a completely different military-political situation will emerge. Then it may be possible to switch to having an all-volunteer army. But this is evidently not a matter for the immediate future.

In addition, due consideration must be given to the fact that an all-volunteer army costs much more than an army based on a universal military draft. Suffice it to say that the wages for a soldier or junior commander in an all-volunteer army will be at least 70 or 80 times higher than today. Moreover, a switch to an all-volunteer army will affect the national economy because it will be necessary to move more than 1.5 million soldiers and sergeants who have families or start families out of the barracks and into apartments. It will be necessary to build these additional 1.5 million apartments, and also medical and trade facilities, schools, nurseries, and kindergartens, that is, the entire sociocultural infrastructure. Today the country simply cannot do this.

True, some young scholars offer a solution to this problem: they propose that the numerical strength of the USSR Armed Forces be halved, and with the money thus saved it will be possible to resolve all problems at one stroke. But in that case then let the United States and the NATO bloc cut their armed forces 50 percent and remove the threat of war for our country and our allies.

The state and military leadership cannot proceed on the basis of such bold but fantastic plans. They proceed from the actual military-political situation in the world, from the real actions of the United States and the NATO bloc.

The decision has, therefore, been reached today to cut the USSR Armed Forces by 500,000 men and by 1 January 1991 have an Army of 3.76 million men, and to act, subsequently, depending on the course of the arms reduction talks with the United States and the NATO bloc in Europe. This is a realistic, serious, and responsible decision. Perhaps, here too you have objections? So tell us what they are and we can review them.

Fifth, from the moment of the birth of the Red Army and Navy, at V.I. Lenin's initiative, political organs were set up in the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee to lead party work. Today they ensure that the CPSU political line is followed and they rally their personnel around the party and instill in the soldiers a spirit of loyalty to the motherland, and work to consolidate the unity of the Army and the people. Why does OGONEK approve the line of eliminating the political organs? The Army cannot stand aside from politics. But who apart from the CPSU can today handle the political education of personnel in the Army and Navy? Explain it, please.

I disagree with the claim made by OGONEK (No 25): "The Army is enveloped in a smoke screen of secrecy. It seems to be a convenient cover for hiding from outside eyes the shortcomings and ailments of our Armed Forces." I consider this assertion unfounded.

Sixth, there is one other thing that bears directly on the Army and Navy—our attitude toward our past. The Armed Forces are the child of the people and the state, and at the same time their defender. The assessment of our history since October 1917 made by OGONEK is presented in an extremely tendentious way, in an impenetrable black light. The scheme is clearly drawn: our socialism, which does not have a positive past (and this is precisely what you depict), has no rights in the Soviet Union now or in the future. According to your assessment, ever since the twenties there has been nothing except Stalinism and stagnation.

I disagree with this. In the twenties and thirties there were indeed gross distortions in the newly built society, and a debauch of repressions, organized by Stalin and his minions. The people were deceived and their trust abused. But despite this, socialism was built. The economic basis for the new society was laid. People endured enormous deprivation and self-constraint for the sake of a better future. A new generation of Soviet people was brought up—selfless and devoted to the cause of socialism. And it grew. How else can we explain our victory in the Great Patriotic War (you at OGONEK are reluctant to remember that)? Why did the Soviet people fight and die in the war against the fascists, and labor, not counting the cost? For the Motherland and for socialism. You try to depict us—the generation that grew

up in the twenties and thirties—as a gray, faceless mass submissive to tyranny. But this is not true. Gray and submissive public life would not fight as we did at Leningrad and Stalingrad (I know about this not from the journals; I fought there). I was born in 1923. So, 8 out of every 10 children born that year died in the war. A gray and submissive people could not restore their country so selflessly and furiously as we did after the Great Victory. You try to depict our generation as something quite different from what it in fact is. I am striving to have our children and grandchildren know us not the way that you are trying to depict us, but as we really were.

The people need the whole truth. Along with serving the Soviet people, we have made, as is stated, many mistakes. The delay in switching management of the economy from command-administrative methods to economic methods was our mistake and our fault. We, the communists, are answerable for the lag in the development of the political system and national relations, most of all the communists of the older generation. The turn in foreign policy might have been initiated in the mid-seventies, when we achieved military parity with the NATO bloc, rather than in the mid-eighties. This is our omission. This all led to great losses for the Soviet people. The people should see where we have justified their trust and where we have not. The CPSU is not afraid of this. The CPSU itself laid this truth before the people and is trying to correct the mistakes and move forward.

But you are not doing this. In my opinion, you are trying, unconsciously or deliberately, to overturn everything that we did and depict the entire epoch from the twenties to the eighties in only dark tones.

And one thing more. It so happens that the journal OGONEK is devaluing the values that for centuries were indestructible for the Russian Army, and that were passed as a legacy to the Soviet Armed Forces. I would like to say to the young reader: Some of the concepts about which I shall dispute below may, unfortunately, seem to a young person to be to some degree just high-flown words. But for me they have never been that, they have had for me specific and enduring meaning. What are these values? They are love for the Motherland, devotion to one's flag, courage, honor, dignity. Not everything can be bought and sold for ready cash. There are values that an honorable man and patriot cannot assess in mere rubles or dollars. Why does your journal sidestep this? In my opinion it is just because it does not suit those values that you are trying to thrust on our society. I have a fundamental disagreement with you here.

I cannot let pass a problem that you have dealt with on more than one occasion in OGONEK, namely, the possibility of a military coup in the Soviet Union. The journal (No 31) calmly discusses a military coup, that is, an action by forces under the command of military leaders, against the socialist system that exists in our

society in order to overthrow it. A military coup can be understood only in this way—the overthrow of an existing order.

And so the assertion that a military coup is possible in the Soviet Union is an ill-intentioned and deliberate lie spread in order to discredit the USSR Armed Forces, in order to set the Army and the Soviet people at odds. A military coup in the Soviet Union is impossible. There are no military leaders in the USSR who would resort to this, and there are no military forces that that could be used for a coup.

1. The high command personnel of the Army and Navy (the leadership in the Ministry of Defense, the commanders-in-chief, the troop commanders in the military districts, groups of forces, fleets, and armies, and the corresponding workers in staffs and the political organs) are people who have served in the Armed Forces for 30 to 50 years. The Minister of Defense and most of his deputies took part in the Great Patriotic War. All these people have been communists for many decades. For them, loyalty to the socialist Motherland, respect for the socialist order, and their oath to the Motherland and the Soviet flag are the meaning of life. For these people the authority of the top organs of power in our motherland is absolute. To assert that these people could lead a military coup is a deliberate falsehood. Such acts are in contradiction of their entire past and present. These people are for perestroyka and they are working for it.

The generals, admirals, and officers of the Army and Navy have been educated as convinced communists. The overwhelming majority of these people are conscientiously carrying out their military and party duties. They are ready to spill their blood in defense of the Motherland, and if necessary, give their lives. The concepts of "duty," "honor," and "devotion to the Motherland" and to state power, are embedded in their minds and hearts. They know how to command the formations, units, and subunits subordinate to them, and how to persuade and mobilize and organize personnel in defense of socialism and the state interests of the country.

2. Our soldiers and sergeants are conscientious citizens of their own motherland. It goes without saying that sometimes there are opposing views, which are inherent in our society today, and inherent too among military people. But, first, most of our society is for socialism. Second, the entire tenor of army service stems from the soldier, spiritually and physically, as defender of the socialist Motherland. A serviceman is not simply a defender, he is a staunch and conscientious defender of the socialist motherland. No one will succeed in using him for any kind of goals directed against the people.

3. Throughout the history of our society the Army and Navy have never engaged in antisocialist actions. But even in 1930-34 any specialist commanders who had previously served in the tsar's army were repressed. In 1937 Stalin accused a group of military leaders in the Red Army—Tukhachevskiy, Gamarnik, Yakir, Uborevich, Primakov,

Kork, Putna, and others—of making preparations for a military-fascist coup. But this was slander. All those military people were devoted to their people. Nevertheless, they were destroyed. Because of his own suspiciousness and perfidiousness Stalin did not trust them, they were interfering with his evil plans to destroy party and state leaders, honest communists and patriots. In the fifties repressions again took place against the Army command staff with no justification whatever.

To repeat Stalin's lie about the possibility of a military coup in the USSR is a deliberate falsehood.

And finally, much material is presented in the journal that you edit depicting Soviet generals in a false light. Is this to make a military rank reprehensible in the eyes of the people? A general is a soldier who has served in the Armed Forces at least 25 or 30 years and who knows all the burdens of military service. Does OGONEK know about the road that must be traversed from lieutenant to general? I think not.

You carried on the cover of your journal the picture of a tank Colonel holding in his hands Stalin's book "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People," and had his face hidden with the words: "Stalin is with them" (not with him, but with them). I cannot agree with the political position of this Colonel. Showing Stalin's book, as I understand it, shows his position. But on his chest there were seven wound stripes for fronts in the Great Patriotic War. I ask you to pay attention to this—seven, and three of them for serious wounds! But you showed no respect even for a man who had endured that pain and spilled so much of his blood for the motherland. Just let the men on the editorial board of OGONEK be tested just once in an attack on a fascist defensive position, or burn in a tank, just once... If you experienced this you would not be so severe. What kind of charity can we expect from you, and for whom?

Honorable Comrade V.A. Korotich!

For some years the journal OGONEK has been allowing attacks against the Armed Forces, and it is about these attacks that I am writing to you in this letter. But it is impossible to review the main problems of the Army and Navy in just one letter, even a long one. I am ready to discuss them with you in any form—a personal conversation, on the pages of the journal, on television, in disputes in any other auditorium. I ask you to publish this open letter in the journal of which you are editor. Let us conduct our polemic openly. It would probably be less correct for my part and less convenient for the readers if I were to publish this letter in any other publication.

Sincerely,

S. Akhromeyev, Marshal of the Soviet Union
23 November 1989.

From the Editor

Respected Sergey Fedorovich, we are publishing even your letter in this issue. And it would indeed be difficult for us to discuss the map of foreign military bases and the facts

cited in the letter with the information available to us: for you yourself know that glasnost still finds itself quite far from access, enabling it to discuss Army reality. It would be a very fine thing, for example, to find out who took the Army and Navy out of sight of the mass media—television, for instance. For, let us be candid, apart from the quite uncontroversial program "I Serve the Soviet Union" not one word about our valiant military is to be heard on Soviet television, which is a big favorite of the people. Well, the program "Vremya" does flash across the screen the shoulder boards of some generals and marshals at parades, but that is all. Is this fortuitous? Is the unseemly behavior of the leaders of our Ministry of Defense fortuitous as soon as it becomes a question of press organs criticizing their department. The "yellow press" is still the mildest of their traditional definitions. Can you imagine OGONEK calling someone who says this a martinet? But this would be the mildest response at the level of discussion offered.

Dear Sergey Fedorovich, you possess the knowledge and education that enable you to conduct a discussion at an honest and conclusive level. It is, therefore, simply impossible to accept your accusation concerning disparagement of the troops by the journal. We have done and are doing a great deal of work to safeguard the rights and interests of our fellow countrymen, in particular those who had to serve in Afghanistan. Perhaps, those most deserving of abuse and disparagement are those who sent honest lads, trained and ready to serve the motherland, to die far away from it. You as a man who for many years have been one of the leaders in the Ministry of Defense could talk about the true circumstances of the matter, perhaps better than others. But you do not. And even given all the lifting of censorship, we could publish any serious material on Army affairs only with the permission of the military censor. Does this not concern you? In particular from the standpoint of safeguarding the human rights of servicemen, for whom it is not simple to arrive at the truth. Just speak a little more loudly, call aloud when you accuse us of disparaging the country's valiant Armed Forces; ask yourself here for whose mill this is grist. It is not grist for our mill, it is grist for yours...

It would seem that Stalin's mania for persecution did not go away when he did. While helping to explain and justify the enormous number of shortcomings in the system and shift them onto now internal, now external enemies, for decades we have been justifying many of our own economic failures on the need to spend for defense, or for a war that is about to happen or has happened. Through all our sufferings, through the inconceivable lack of respect for our own people, shown in particular in their suffering, we remember only the fate of those who took up arms and were prisoners during the last war, we remember the peoples who were resettled in other places, and we remember our losses. We paid for the victory with that blood both because the enemy was base and crafty and because the state was based on an immense lack of respect for the simple person, and his interests and his life.

There is a need for dispute. There is a need to study the various viewpoints (incidentally, we at the journal are

doing this, but several times the position of our readers are in dispute, one with the other, and exchanging information you regard as the OGONEK position).

I repeat: the reputation of the Soviet Union, including the reputation of its Armed Forces, is dear to us. But we cannot justify silence about things; an attempt to call a veteran who holds a volume of Stalin to his breast, standing beneath the tricolor Russian banner, the embodiment of all war veterans is insulting first and foremost to veterans.

There is no need for overexposure. When talking about an excessive military budget would it be possible to talk about its size and also about the fact that in your letter you represent the Soviet border as a potential front line? Why so? Is this not more in line with cold war ideas? And taking into account the fact that you so often use the formula "in the event of aggression," why do you not say which countries are nurturing plans to conquer the Soviet Union? Who is eager to invade a country with such a disordered infrastructure, such an extraordinarily resentful population, ready to start a partisan war even before any enemy invades USSR territory?

Moreover, does it not seem to you strange that the leadership of the Ministry of Defense has virtually rejected the idea of creating a professional army even before the calculations have been performed and an in-depth analysis made of possible military spending in such a situation?

Does it not seem to you that your proofs about the impossibility of a military coup in the USSR (since you yourself raised the subject) are just a little too general if we take into account, for example, the fact that up to now we cannot even find out who specifically gave the order for the insertion of troops into Afghanistan? And eight months after the events in Tbilisi a special parliamentary commission has still been unable to ascertain what happened? And in this connection I would be curious to know what you mean when you say "the Army cannot stand aside from politics." As far as we know there is not a single military person in any parliament in any European country, or in the United States or Japan, while here we even have a parliamentary group for the Soviet Army which includes most of the deputy defense ministers.

Yes, and in connection with the Soviet military budget, doubts remain despite your assurance of the complete trustworthiness of its figures. And how can it be otherwise when the source of that doubt is a speech by CPSU Central Committee Politburo member Ye.K. Ligachev at a CPSU Central Committee meeting of first secretaries of the Union Republic Communist Party Central Committees that took place in July this year? In particular, Yegor Kuzmich said: "For many years the country has been burdened with enormous military expenditures. A considerable part of the country's production and intellectual potential—the best part of that potential—has been oriented toward consolidating the defense potential. Note that in 1985 almost 40 percent of output from defense plants and the machine building complex was for the

military. In my opinion, if this is the case it is simply impossible to restructure the economy to reach world levels for quality and to resolve priority social tasks within short periods."

Even if we take into account that four years have elapsed since 1985, and even if we assume that military spending has been halved, nevertheless, even with such a turn, even the most approximate calculations show rather more than the R77.3 billion announced for 1989. Understand us, the taxpayers, correctly, Sergey Fedorovich. We are in no way about to argue with you. For you possess unique knowledge and the fullest information, while we, naturally, do not know everything.

Nevertheless, Sergey Fedorovich, our very deep and sincere respect for you notwithstanding, we must draw attention to the following. You write that the United States has 15 carrier battle groups, but according to official published figures from the U.S. Defense Department there are only 14. Moreover, referring to a Pentagon representative, the newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST has reported that by the mid-nineties there will be only 12 carrier battle groups. Who is right?

You report that the numerical strength of U.S. forces, including the National Guard, is 3.3 million men, even though the U.S. regular forces number 2,116,135 men, while the National Guard (subordinate in peacetime to the governors of the respective states, not the defense Department) is 454,854 men. The figure of 3.3 million is obtained only if you add all reservists in the United States to the regular forces and the National Guard. Imagine the kind of number you could get if you add all Soviet reservists, Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, the border troops, and the DOSAAF to the regular Army.

Your letter also contains the following lines, describing the armed forces of the NATO countries: "They are all equipped with modern weapons and are maintained in a state of high combat readiness. These forces are not being reduced." Then what about the recent statement by the U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney, who has ordered a plan to be drawn up to reduce military spending in 1991 by three percent, and by five percent from 1992 to 1994? And how is this being linked with the planned Bundeswehr cutback? What vexing coordination. Perhaps we should attach no significance to them if it were not for one circumstance. You, Comrade Marshal, are not simply a very authoritative person among the military but also an advisor to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. God forbid there should be inaccuracies, and at the highest level!

Nevertheless, Sergey Fedorovich, we are happy that you sent your open letter to us. "The history of our Motherland—of the Soviet Union—is such that there has virtually always been a danger of war"—that is what you write. And you say that this danger is acute even today. Is it, in fact? So that we really need to foster such a large Army, armed the way it is?

We do not know how many highly paid colonels and generals there are in the Soviet Army. No more than is

required in peacetime? It is a pity but we have to find out such things where we may. According to figures from abroad, for example, more generals are serving in Moscow alone than in the entire U.S. Army. And what do our figures say?

The questions remain...

Nevertheless, we must be pleased that we are discussing it openly. Like now. It is to be greatly desired that the authority of our Army be clean and high. It is only through joint effort—jointly with the Army—that we can affirm that authority. As we renew ourselves in perestroika we should become better. Shall we do this?

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Chief Inspector Sorokin Defends the Armed Forces

*90UM0320A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 8, 24 Feb 90 pp 1, 8*

[Interview with General of the Army M.I. Sorokin, chief inspector and USSR deputy defense minister, by special correspondent E. Lunev: "The Times and the Army"]

[Text]

[Lunev] Comrade General of the Army, the history of our illustrious Armed Forces is well known. Despite certain criticism today, the Army has been and remains the true defender of the country and the Soviet peoples, regardless of their national affiliation.

[Sorokin] You are right. Throughout its history the Army has stood reliably on guard. The mass heroism of Soviet fighting men and their selfless devotion to the motherland and their military duty, courage, bravery, and unbending morale—all these excellent qualities are characteristic of our people's Army today.

As far as the criticism is concerned, it has not always been constructive recently. There are people who make absolutes out of negative facts, argue portentously and not, I would say, all that competently, about the alleged absence of any threat to our state from outside, advocate the accelerated reduction of the Army and Navy, chiefly unilaterally, and are emasculating their role in Soviet society.

It is regrettable that these ideas are finding many supporters among young people also and are becoming the basis for the creation of certain informal organizations of youth of an extremely pacifist nature who reject Army service and express anti-patriotic views.

Of course, there are shortcomings in the Army. The party Central Committee's evaluation of the negative phenomena associated with flagrant violations of Army discipline, particularly of nonregulation relations between servicemen, which the people have come to call "Dedovshchina" [hazing of new draftees] was pointed, just and high-minded. It needs generally to be recognized that the defects of the Army are largely the defects of society.

We are today speaking openly about this not only from meeting platforms but also in the military press. We are endeavoring to bring this openness of ours to society.

[Luney] Mikhail Ivanovich, we have recently been witnessing a growth in interethnic tension, and in places this has developed into bloodshed, violence, and grief. Does the Army perform a stabilizing role in such instances?

[Sorokin] Permit me to ask a counter-question. Has there been a moment in our history when the Army has left the people alone in their trouble? Who was the first to rush into the scorching nuclear heat of Chernobyl? The Army. Who was the first to crawl into the hell of the Spitak earthquake? Who was the first to become a wall on the boundary of interethnic passions? Again the Army. Notice that I have cited three extreme situations, in which the Army is not trained to operate and for which it is not intended. However, in each of them it proffered its firm and kind hand. Today it is protecting the citizens against gangsters who have taken leave of their senses and humanity and who, taking cover behind nationalist slogans, are engaging in lawlessness and are committing acts of homicide and engaging in pogroms and robbery.

Men of the Army and Navy are honorably performing the duties entrusted to them, displaying here forbearance, self-possession, patience, balance, and tact and putting themselves at risk, and ensuring stability in the cities and localities in the state of emergency zone.

[Luney] Very good, Mikhail Ivanovich, but I recall an incident described by an eyewitness. A municipal bus was proceeding along its route when it stopped suddenly in the middle of the street, and the driver, glancing in his rearview mirror, announced on the radio that the bus would be going no further until two officers got off. And no one, no one took exception to this outrage against the honor and dignity of an officer.

[Sorokin] If this incident really occurred, it cannot be categorized as anything other than vile. I think that that driver had personal grievances, perhaps some people in the service had given him a hard time, as they say. Only it is hardly reasonable to accuse the whole Army of this. Let us imagine for a moment that some half-educated doctor has made a false diagnosis. Is all of domestic medicine to blame for this? Generally speaking, a certain part of society today is inclined to see the Army merely as an instrument for defense against an external enemy, not as an inalienable structure of society itself with all the ensuing commitments to it. Decidedly aggressive attacks on the Army and its role and place in the political and state structure of our society are increasing. The attempts which are being made to accuse the Army of holding back perestroika and undermining the economic power of the state are nothing other than an endeavor to drive a wedge between the Army and the people.

A leaflet is being disseminated among the young people in Lithuania, for example, which maintains that the Lithuanian state is occupied by the Soviet Union and

that for this reason the Republic's citizens have the right to renounce service "in the occupation Army of the Soviet Union" and return their military service cards and draft papers. Such instances have occurred in the Transcaucasus also.

Much is being written and spoken about national formations in this connection. I would like to emphasize, therefore, that the Army, which is brought up to strength on the basis of the principle of universal military service, is a factor of the consolidation of the nationalities and removes a whole number of contradictions between society and the Armed Forces.

[Luney] And the final question. Life is testing our country, society, and the Army. On the 72d anniversary of the formation of the USSR Armed Forces how do you envision their role at present and in the future from the position of a person who does not have the right to adopt an impartial attitude toward all that is happening in the Army?

[Sorokin] A difficult question. The main thing is that the Armed Forces be maintained in the composition and the condition which ensure the prevention of war, the reliable repulse of possible aggression, effective operations in emergency situations, and the curtailment of military provocations. In short, it should be a question of reasonable and reliable sufficiency for defense.

And it is important to stress here that much in the realization of the principle of sufficiency will depend on the other side. After all, a real intensification of the process of relaxation of international tension and mutual trust, particularly in such a complex sphere as the military, is possible only on a bilateral basis and presupposes a constant lowering of the levels of military confrontation, given observance of reciprocity, equality, and equal security. That it has been possible to push war back does not in the least mean that the threat of aggression against us has already been lifted.

The events occurring in East Europe have today made it a kind of nerve center of the planet. The world political climate will depend subsequently to a large extent on the kind of processes which occur there. And our Army under these conditions is performing a stabilizing role and contributing to the peaceful flow of political passions, remaining a principal guarantor of order. It is itself here also subject to change and renewal. We have to be gratified that a clearing out of stagnation phenomena has begun in the Army and that a struggle against the bureaucratism, protectionism, careerism, coarseness, and arbitrary action of certain officials is under way.

I believe that in the next few years we will have succeeded in doing away with all that is nasty, negative and atypical of the Army. Young, competent, and energetic generals and officers who think in the new way and are capable of bringing firm order to bear and not repeating past mistakes, are coming to positions of leadership today. The Army will be modern and will correspond to the spirit of the times and the letter of the defensive

doctrine which we have proclaimed. And, of course, it will remain the most organized and most efficient force of society—as it has always been.

DOSAAF Chief on Month of Mass-Defense Work
*90UM0264A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
 28 Jan 90 First Edition p 1*

[Interview with Colonel-General N. Kotlovsev, DOSAAF Central Committee Chairman, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent S. Ostanin; on the occasion of the beginning of the latest Month of Mass-Defense Work. The first two paragraphs are a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA editorial introduction]

[Text] Yesterday marked the beginning of the All-Union Month of Mass-Defense Work which in honor of the 72nd anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy and the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory that ended the Great Patriotic War.

This important campaign is the subject of discussion between our correspondent and Colonel General N. Kotlovsev, USSR people's deputy and chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Nikolay Nikiforovich, the celebration of work months is a good tradition that has been observed for many years. Have there been any changes in the purpose of the work months? Are there any distinguishing features?

[Colonel-General Kotlovsev] As always, the main purpose of the work month is to publicize the heroic combat traditions of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces; further the concept of the need to defend the socialist Fatherland; and involve every DOSAAF organization in practical mass-defense work. Taking place everywhere throughout the month will be meetings with Army and Navy servicemen and with veterans of the Great Patriotic War; military-patriotic film festivals; Spartakiades and mass competitions in technical and military types of sports, with prizes awarded in the name of heroes, and other measures.

One of the features of the present work month is that it is taking place during the pre-election struggle, a time that has become a kind of test of authority of our candidates for deputy from Republic and local Soviets. We nominated 1,861 candidates. Fifty-three DOSAAF workers and activists have become Deputies in a number of areas of the country where elections have already been held. We will not fail to employ the work month's rostrum for widely disseminating information on the DOSAAF's patriotic activity, explaining its pre-election platform, and supporting the candidates for deputy. A second major feature of the work month is the furtherance of living work, and the repudiation of old methods that are educationally ineffective and of pomposity and window dressing. Thus, in the Latvian SSR the work month commenced with a "round table" discussion of problems attending mass-defense work. The DOSAAF

aktiv, workers from the Military Commissariats and political organs of military units, and representatives of unofficial associations exchanged factual information and set definite measures to improve the effectiveness of patriotic education of youth and develop technical forms of sports. For example, yesterday—the first day of the All-Union Work Month—Muscovites at the Central Hippodrome participated in motor races, with prizes awarded by the periodical ZA RULEM, and viewed a display of DOSAAF athletic and training equipment.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What will the work month's function be relative to enhancing the prestige of military service?

[Colonel-General Kotlovsev] Defense collectives will work jointly with military units and subunits to organize many military-patriotic measures. The work month's program calls for open door days, visits to military units by pre-draft and draft-age youth, and meetings with veterans of war and the USSR Armed Forces. There is much that is traditional and customary in these measures, of course. We expect the exercise of local independence and initiative. It is no longer sufficient to tour the barracks and eat soldiers' porridge, with draft-age youth facing many problems related to training for military service. I am certain that there will be open discussions between the conscripts and servicemen.

We cannot help but be disturbed by the increase in persons refusing to enter military service. At the present time, as much as a third of draft-age youth are involved in DOSAAF training for the service. We hope that our contacts with servicemen will help to extend the influence to the majority of youth.

'Absurd Subjectivism' of Civilian Critics of Military
*90UM0194D Moscow KOMMUNIST
 VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 89
 pp 42-48*

[Article by Major-General V. Malkov, doctor of philosophy, professor, entitled: "Think Realistically"]

[Text] About the author: Viktor Ivanovich Malkov performed his compulsory service in the Navy. He completed the Higher Naval School imeni M.V. Frunze and performed Komsomol and political work. Following graduation from the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, he completed graduate studies, defended his thesis for candidate and taught. He became a doctor of philosophy in 1986. He is currently Chief of the Department of Marxism-Leninism at the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the USSR. The author has written a number of books and monographs.

Turning to Dialectics

Life itself is the best teacher of the restructuring, one which we should always heed. And life is dialectical. We recall that during the most complex, most dramatic,

turning points in history, V.I. Lenin turned over and over again to dialectics as "the vital soul of Marxism," turned to them not just to understand the historical events himself but also to equip the popular masses with the understanding.

We too turn to dialectics to demonstrate the baselessness of certain opinions about the army which have appeared of late and which view the army as an "obsolete and stagnant social structure," which allegedly does not conform to the spirit of the restructuring but practically serves as a brake on it.

One can only welcome the public's growing interest in problems of the army today, of course. This is an extremely important organ of the state and a social institution, after all. Any discussion on the subject should be conducted on a sufficiently high professional level and responsibly.

What we have, however, is a number of articles in which the authors attempt, as one well-known journalist put it, "to stigmatize, to constrain, to do away with" the army. The extremes of opinion, reaching the point of absurd subjectivism, are clearly in conflict with the dialectics and do not serve either the cause of glasnost or the truth—the complete truth, profound in substance, convincing and persuasive.

Today's new thinking involves proceeding from the realities, being guided by dialectical-materialistic methodology, striving to understand the essence of phenomena and processes, revealing their underlying causes and not skimming over the surface of facts. Thinking dialectically means actively overcoming subjectivism and sometimes, even emotional outpourings. This applies primarily to the mass media, which exert enormous influence upon people.

A sense of moderation and most important, objectivity and competence of judgement, is clearly lacking in articles in certain publications. Offering their platform to politically immature writers, they and the latter declare now pacifistically, "there is not going to be a war anyway," now categorically, "the military are do-nothings," "the army should be disbanded," and so forth. A number of articles have depicted our army as some sort of conservative force. In the bulletin *Vek XX i Mir* (No. 3, 1988) of the Soviet Committee for the Protection of Peace, film expert A. Nuykin, one "round-table" participant, asked the inflammatory question: On whose side will the army be if the foes of the restructuring launch an open struggle for restoration of the old orders? In the article "The Army and the Society" (No. 9, 1988), L. Saraskin, senior scientific associate in the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, states that "it would be difficult for the army to enter into a dialogue... with the society, because it is in a state of profound moral distress...."

The bulletin finally "began to think," it appeared, and in the article "The Opinion of the Professionals" (No. 1, 1989), authors V. Balabushevich and A. Sipko asked the

question: What is at the root of the "frontal attacks" on the army? They "answered" with a question: "Methodological miscalculation or incompetence, or perhaps political rivalry? It is difficult to say."

It is difficult to say, but it must be said, because without revealing the reasons for the "frontal attacks" we cannot overcome the stir raised by the arguments of certain critics and skeptics, who have armed themselves not at all with a scientific approach but with "ready made" facts, conjectures and dogmas. Falling onto the soil of the plebeian minds of a part of our society, their "conclusions" create confusion in the minds of the people and disorient them.

As an officer and a communist, I support the content of the document issued by the State and Law and the Ideological Departments of the CPSU Central Committee and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, "On Explaining the Life and Functioning of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Central Press" (*IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS*, No. 6, 1989), which devotes very serious attention to the level of articles on defense of the socialist homeland in a large number of publications and expresses concern for developing good patriotic features in the Soviet people, primarily the youth, by the press. This is a requirement of the times.

Talking with young people, one is frequently asked point-blank: 'Will there be a war? If not, then why do we have to spend so much on defense? These funds are very much needed for other purposes, after all.' One cannot give a simple answer to such questions. Both sides need to study dialectically all of the linkages, relations and instrumentality between one phenomenon, another, a third, and so forth, and have a clear concept of them. It is not just the youth, after all, but also many mature people who do not yet have solid positions. Incidentally, this was illustrated at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the subsequent session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at which certain of our parliamentarians also expressed not entirely correct opinions on the role of the Armed Forces and their place in the contemporary society. I would simply comment that, as a rule, only those speeches or parts thereof in which the army was given an objective evaluation received applause.

This is what I would like to discuss; the objective evaluation and the paths which lead to an objective, dialectical perception of the army's role in our society.

From the Economic Point of View

Dialectics tell us that one of the reasons for the increased interest in the army is primarily a profound realization by the people of their economic and material situation. And this depends to a certain degree upon the outlays which the society must make for defense. The greater these are, the more negative their effect upon the well-being of the people. It is impossible to make this natural law a "closed" subject today.

We know that the society's economic capabilities are realized in defense through its military-economic potential. The latter is that line over which we cannot step without the risk of undermining the economy. History has graphically confirmed this. Immediately after World War II socialism faced the problem of survival produced by the U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons. The "cold war" and nuclear blackmail all required a serious defense effort on our part. Force had to be countered with force.

Strategic military parity was achieved as a result of the steps taken in response, which consolidated the positions of the USSR and other socialist countries, overturned the expectations of imperialism's aggressive circles for a victory in a nuclear world war.

We paid a high price for this, however. The enormous outlays for the leap forward in the nuclear area multiplied the outlays of subsequent decades, inflated proportionately by the arms race imposed upon us. In giving the very best for defense, the workers were pursuing the goal of providing a reliable defense for the homeland, of course, for the gains of socialism and the preservation of peace on earth. It was a noble and humane goal achieved by the entire people.

Let us admit that maintaining the strategic balance over a period of many years kept our economy in a situation of great stress, because it required enormous outlays and the concentration in the defense industry of the best specialists, the latest technology, modern equipment and scarce resources. In the situation of what was already a deficit economy, the defense complex swallowed up a significant part of the national income. When compiling the plan for 1986-1990, because of the international situation which had developed and in accordance with our previous military doctrine, we were forced to continue the traditional growth of defense outlays at rates higher than those of the national income. That was in a situation in which our economy was (and is) essentially in a state of crisis, a situation resulting from major deficiencies in the management system.

The April (1985) plenum of the party Central Committee defined the concept of restructuring and outlined paths primarily of economic reform; the establishment of a new economic system and the refocusing of the economy on the resolution of acute social problems. We can still not say that the restructuring has produced important results today. There is a shortage of advanced equipment, and the cadres have not yet learned how to manage and work in the new way.

What is particularly alarming in this situation, however, is the opinion of a part of our society that the army is to blame for our economic troubles, an opinion which continues to survive and accumulate new "arguments." It seems that the army is the main dissipator of funds and the source of extravagance, since it a mistake, it seems, to achieve and maintain strategic military parity today. "Although it is precisely nuclear parity and the

policy of restraint which have provided relative calm on the planet for half a century," according to the assessment of writer Yu. Kim, "it is clear to everyone that this is a forced, temporary and unreliable means" (VEK XX I MIR, No 1, 1989).

That and only that: "half a century of relative calm...." The writer then experienced and still experiences concern, since he considers nuclear parity to be "unreliable." That is his business, of course. Since the celebrations of our Victory resounded, however, the world has been saved more than once precisely by that force which the Soviet people entrusted to their armed defenders as a "calming agent" for the lovers of adventures. This agent is expensive and is becoming more and more so. And it unquestionably is a heavy burden on the backs of our people. Changes are taking shape also in this area today, however.

The peaceful initiatives put forth by the Soviet state and the concluding of a number of agreements on the reduction or limitation of certain types of weapons and the principles underlying the new military defensive doctrine have made it possible to effect a truly revolutionary maneuver. It is this: Considering the proposed reduction in outlays over the next two years, the total savings on defense with respect to the approved five year plan will amount to almost R30 billion.

Our military outlays are no longer a "closed" subject. The total amount for 1989 was named and its "apportionment" detailed at the Congress of People's Deputies. Prospects have been outlined for further reducing military outlays by a factor of 1.5-2 by 1995.

The conversion of military production is proceeding more and more intensively, and the freed capacities and resources are being diverted to the accomplishment of social and economic tasks. These steps will make it possible to increase the output of equipment for the agroindustrial complex, light industry, trade and public dining by a factor of 1.5-2. Undergoing a restructuring, 40% of the output of our defense industry is even now going to the civilian economy, and the figure will exceed 60% in 1995.

We do not plan to disarm unilaterally and carelessly, of course. The threat of war has not been eliminated once and for all. And even with the systematic reduction of outlays on defense needs, the government will try to provide the Soviet Armed Forces with everything necessary by implementing the principle of reasonable adequacy.

The army is the offspring of the Soviet people, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR pointed out, and it deserves all-around support.

And so, those who imagine that it is defense which is "eating up" the butter for their bread should give less thought to the unfounded statements of incompetent and irresponsible writers and more to the objective realities of our time. And these realities are, as an example,

enormous military budgets for the USA and other NATO nations, programs for their production of new types of weapons and combat equipment and a determined effort to achieve military superiority. All of this provides food for serious thought.

Social Problems

Interest in the army is a result of the people's realization of their social situation, which is a derivative of the economy's development. Neglect of the social area and violations of the principles of social justice have become a retardant to stimulation of the creativity of the people themselves and given rise to a condition of social apathy, indifference and pessimism in our society. Recognition of the burdens of their life have turned our people to thinking about the causes of this situation. And the army has become an object of this thinking, of course.

It is perfectly obvious, however, that the resolution of acute social problems depends primarily upon the improvement of our entire economy. Few would need to be convinced of that. The reduction of military outlays and the numerical strength of the army can unquestionably contribute to some degree to the resolution of a number of social problems. This occurred during the years of the "Khrushchev thaw," for example. The freed defense funds made it possible at that time to establish 100 housing construction combines and to double old-age pensions. (I shall refrain here from discussing the moral costs to people "caught up" in the reduction, which was poorly conceived).

The fact should be mentioned that the total savings of budgeted funds as a result of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles will amount to around 300 million rubles for the USSR. These funds will be channeled into the social area. If they are used for housing construction, this amount is enough to build 30,000-40,000 apartments. The army's reduction presently underway will make it possible to free additional hundreds of millions of rubles for social development.

It was pointed out at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR that the defense complex should make a far greater contribution toward meeting the population's needs for cultural and personal goods. The "defense workers" are presently producing a total of 30 billion rubles worth of these goods annually, which is 22% of their total output in the nation. There will be a growth of 33% in 1990. It was announced at the congress that under the 13th Five Year Plan the defense complex will produce 250-270 billion rubles worth of these goods, exceeding the target for the current Five Year Plan twice over. This is just one such example.

Despite all the positive processes, however, which are supported with great satisfaction also by the military, the following surprises one. Judging from certain articles, one could conclude that the army is practically the only "source of sustenance" for the social area. With what fervor the authors of a number of publications "divide

up" and "distribute" the funds acquired by reducing the military budget for meeting social needs. B. Rayzberg's article "Is It Easy to Forge Plowshares Out of Swords?" (NEDELYA No 8 1988) greatly surprised me. He states that reducing the military budget by even 50 billion rubles will make it possible to reduce the state deficit by 36 billion rubles, to raise the average pension significantly, to establish monetary assistance for all families with an income of less than 75 rubles per member, to raise the minimum wage to 100 rubles and to drastically increase funds for public health, education and culture. After such statements it is actually rather awkward for us military personnel to appear on the street in uniform: all of those people looking at you in the hope that you will finally part with your shoulderboards....

In a talk with an OGONEK correspondent (No 25, 1989), Sh.A. Amonashvili, academician of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the USSR and People's Deputy of the USSR, slices the "pie" from the "military table" in his own way. He says: "What would it take to transfer 5, 10 or 15 billion rubles from the military to the school system in order to achieve a revolutionary improvement in the school. This cannot be done slowly. We graduate a generation every year, and we need to hurry. I repeat: The mission of protecting the homeland is accomplished not in the army and not in the Supreme Soviet...."

There you have it. Everyone views the military "pie" with his own slant. And each of them has his own version for "splitting it up." One can understand these people, who are in the final analysis thinking about benefitting the people, albeit from a narrow, departmental position. Each of them no doubt has supporters and adherents. And in general one cannot condemn them. But where is the state approach to the matter? Where is the careful look at social problems, which are just as severe if not more so in the army and navy than in the society as a whole and which also require funds, including funds from the budget "savings"?

I shall name a few of the "attractions" of army life, about which those who see only the irritating brilliance of the shoulderboards for some reason do not want to know. More than a hundred thousand officers do not yet have a place of their own. Thousands of wives of officers and warrant officers, particularly at remote garrisons, are unable to find work. And the average "wage" of junior officers, who make up the majority, is 180-300 rubles. And this in a situation of frequent moves, private apartment rentals and so forth. There is an acute shortage of pre-school, cultural and personal service facilities. Add to this the unregulated work day, the high level of responsibility for people and equipment and the danger involved in performing the mission, and we have the social portrait of an officer, upon whom an even greater load of cares and a higher level of responsibility for the combat readiness of the subunit, the unit or the ship will fall as a result of the reduction.

It is only natural to ask whether it is not time for our "civilian" press agencies to take a broader look at army problems than they are now doing. The sons and brothers of steel workers, miners, doctors, agronomists, engineers and artists—even those of the writers and journalists themselves—serve in the army, after all. Do they not have an interest in seeing to it that the "minor rear area" of the homeland's defenders is also reliable and that the officer and warrant officer can feel at ease about his family as he performs his training or combat mission? He will only perform more confidently and selflessly and his morale will be stronger as a result.

I predict that I myself may be reproached for taking a departmental approach to the "military pie." This devotion is only natural, however. The army is an inseparable part of our society, one which, due to circumstances, performs complex and specific missions. And are the homeland's armed defenders not worthy of proper concern and attention? We need also to think about the prestige of the military career, which, let us be frank, is declining in great part because of poor living conditions at the garrisons, which makes this a matter of interest to the entire nation.

Grasping the Realities in the Morale Area

The interest in the army is due also to a desire by people to understand the current state of the society, the actual processes occurring in various areas of our life, including the Armed Forces. Unfortunately, it has to be said that concepts of war and not peace predominated in the defense thinking of the people until recently. I have experimented many times by posing the same question to audiences: "What do you understand the word 'peace' to mean"? Unfortunately, I have rarely received an answer which was satisfying to any degree. This is an indication first of all that our doctrine on war and the army is more thoroughly developed than our doctrine on peace. Furthermore, dogmatic truths inherited from the past still predominate.

I cite the following fact by way of comparison. The West has more than 300 institutes, centers and organizations specially studying the problems of peace, and an independent school, "paxology"—that is, "peace research"—has developed within bourgeois public-political thinking. We are certainly not going to attach truly scientific significance to this science, of course. Its research is carried out within the framework of the bourgeois world-outlook and ideology, but it is a fact of considerable importance with respect to public opinion. We, on the other hand, have only recently attempted to call the study of war and peace the "study of peace and war."

Because of this defense awareness has gradually begun losing its ideological reference points. And so we hear statements like this: 'The army is "a conservative force"! "Of the entire system of administration by decree,"' writes Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Arbatov, "the

army is the subdivision most oriented toward administration by decree, with all its typical features; a rigid hierarchy, departmental interests, the absence of glasnost covered over by all-embracing secrecy. This is explainable in part. The army cannot exist without discipline, nor can it get along without secrets from a likely enemy. Within the framework of the system of administration by decree, however, these natural features have assumed hypertrophic forms, and defense has emerged from under the control of the society whose interests it is supposed to serve" (MEZHDUNAROD-NAYA ZHIZN No 3, 1989).

There is no questioning the fact that the army cannot exist without orders, instructions and commands. On the other hand, however—and this is confirmed by the restructuring in the Armed Forces—it must also have the development of democracy and glasnost and all-around development of its spiritual life. The army is founded on discipline, however, and the slovenly cannot tolerate this. The army is maintained by labor, and this does not suit loafers.

But I am tossing out one maxim after another. I ask you, is everyone prepared to discuss problems of the army pertaining to its spiritual improvement? The question can be debated.

Take statements which claim certain scientific generalizations, for example. Writer Vladimir Lazarev and scientific worker Olga Tugarinova write the following: "The constant perception of life and its planning based on the emergency laws of wartimes (attempts to conduct patriotic upbringing as military-patriotic education) are very detrimental to the spiritual, economic and biological life of the nation ('a nation of peoples' in the case of our fatherland). 'Departmental patriotism' as a type of world-outlook is always more limited than civic or even general state patriotism" (VEK XX I MIR No 5, 1988).

It is not just a matter of the debate at all. One is amazed by the persistent assertion that if it is military-patriotic upbringing then is at variance with patriotic upbringing and is even harmful to spiritual and physical health.... One is puzzled also by such "claims" as this: The struggle for peace is patriotism, while armed defense of the homeland is limited patriotism. How can one contrast the two concepts "patriotic" and "military-patriotic"? It is the same as contrasting the society to the army and the army to the people. Since when has the sacred duty of protecting the homeland become a "little-patriotic" matter? A distorted concept of the army and the role which it performs in the society is clearly evident in this interpretation. When the negation of war is equated with negation of the need for and the importance of military service, when it is proposed that the struggle for peace be waged by "antiwar patriotic upbringing," this sounds ambiguous at the very least, if not paradoxical.

It has long been a known fact and not learned dogma that the historical purpose of the socialist armed forces is primarily to serve as an instrument for preventing war

and preserving peace. Military service under socialism is truly service for the benefit of peace.

Because of this and also because of statements to the effect that the military think up the "military threat" themselves in order to justify their existence, I would like to direct attention to a new phenomenon today: the higher echelons of military leadership are becoming actively involved in the process of international detente. Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, Advisor to the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and member of the Committee on Defense and State Security of the USSR Supreme Soviet, visited the USA this year, and prior to that (in 1987 and 1988) he was there as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. General of the Army P.G. Lushev and General G. Galvin, Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, met in London in May of this year. Admiral W. Crowe, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, made an official visit to the USSR in June. General of the Army D.T. Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense, visited Great Britain in July and then Finland, and the United States of America in October. Vice Admiral G. Johnson, Commander of the U.S. 2nd Fleet, recently received Vice Admiral I.V. Kasatonov, First Deputy Commander of the Northern Fleet, in Norfolk, and Admiral M.N. Khronopulo, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, received Vice Admiral Raymond P. Eagle, Deputy Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, at Sevastopol.

It should be the job of diplomats and politicians to seek grounds for compromise and agreement, and the job of the military to prepare to repel and inflict attacks. Time marches on, however, and the new political thinking is taking over the minds of people, regardless of the hierarchy to which they belong. The idea is becoming increasingly firmly established that the only way to win a nuclear missile war is to prevent it. And contacts at the highest military levels make it possible to discuss the military-political situation more substantially and with an understanding of matters. They make it possible, I would say, to introduce a common human element into the system of political and strategic military relations, which ultimately strengthens mutual trust. And trust is so necessary at such a turbulent and complex time.

As citizens of the USSR Soviet fightingmen serve their state and the peaceful policy of socialism, because the Armed Forces are an organ of the state and an instrument of its peaceful policy. The purpose of military service in the USSR is to preserve peace and prevent war.

It was noted at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR that international tensions have decreased considerably thanks to peaceful Soviet initiatives. We do not yet have guarantees of the irreversibility of the positive changes begun in the area of disarmament and the strengthening of trust, however. In this situation ensuring a reliable defense for the nation is one of the most important functions of our state.

The restructuring is generating numerous problems in the dialectical linkage between the army and the society. These problems are sometimes artificially created and thought up and are sometimes produced under the influence of emotions, but they never contain a scientific reflection of reality itself. Socialist pluralism of opinions requires a certain world-outlook and political sophistication. This is still lacking in some glib authors of no less glib publications. We need a serious and competent discussion and special polemical accent on real and not concocted problems. But we have to think realistically.

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Samoylenko, Belyakov on Domestic Functions of Armed Forces

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[Article by Major-General (Reserves) V. Samoylenko, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Honored Scientist of the RSFSR, and Colonel N. Belyakov, Candidate of Philosophy, under the rubric "The KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Debate Club": "The Army's Functions: Dialectics of Development"]

[Text]

V. Samoylenko: Stand on the Foundation of the Realities

Despite the great diversity of opinions, I do not believe anyone would deny that the external function of our Armed Forces continues to be the main, basic and decisive function. "...As long as there exists a danger of the unleashing of aggressive wars and military conflicts by imperialism," the CPSU Program stresses, "the party will give untiring attention to the strengthening of the USSR's defense and the reinforcement of its security and to the preparedness of the Armed Forces to rout any aggressor." This same concept was confirmed also at the 19th party conference. "We do not forget the threat to peace from imperialist militarism," M.S. Gorbachev stated, "and we do not believe that guarantees of the irreversibility of the positive processes begun have developed yet." Soviet military organizational development, which is presently based primarily on the qualitative aspects, must ensure reliable security for the socialist state and its allies in strict accordance with our defensive doctrine.

Recently, however, the Soviet press has printed articles which interpret the functions of the Soviet Armed Forces in different ways. Directly or indirectly, they raise the question of whether we have not announced the withering away of their internal function too soon.

This formulation of the problem is based on a number of factors. In the first place, our society's social and political maturity has grown considerably. In the second place, there is the explosion of economic, social and

ethnic problems which accumulated during the time of the cult of the personality and the period of stagnation. Conflicts have arisen in recent years in Kazakhstan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, for the settlement of which not just agencies of the militia and internal troops but also subunits of the Soviet Army have been enlisted. In the third place, our fightingmen take an active part in mopping-up operations following natural disasters and the accomplishment of various large-scale national economic jobs.

All of this requires taking a fresh look at the functions of the Armed Forces and analyzing them from the standpoint of the new thinking and the restructuring processes underway in the country. It has to be stated first of all that the external function is the main and basic one. It has become more complex today both in scale and in substance and methods of implementation. The external function covers such missions as protecting the sovereignty and security of the USSR and its allies, preventing nuclear and nonnuclear wars and securing universal peace. The new political thinking makes it possible to detect and find additional possibilities for countering the policy based on force on a broader political basis than before. Objective factors have come into being during the second half of this century which are strengthening the system of protection for socialism and universal peace.

The matter of the internal function is more complex, I believe. Yes, from the standpoint of internal circumstances the country does need an army. We have built a new society during the years of Soviet power. Unfortunately, it is still far from ideal. At the same time, however, it is a society with its own indisputable values, gains and advantages over the system of class antagonisms and exploitation.

A revolutionary restructuring is presently underway in the country, the purpose of which is a renewal of all areas of public life, which would truly serve the interests of the people and the uplifting of man. The more rapidly this occurs, the less basis there will be for discussions about whether the internal function of the Soviet Armed Forces still exists or has outlived itself. Furthermore, the present state of our society in the difficult, critical time of the restructuring in no way requires involving the Armed Forces in the resolution of acute social problems. The participation of servicemen in the dispersion of unauthorized meetings and demonstrations and the suppression of acts of hooliganism by certain extremist groups was not necessary in my view. It was caused more by a manifestation of weakness on the part of the local soviet and party leadership and the inaction of internal affairs organs.

It is not so simple to say that the Soviet Army does not perform any internal functions, however. If we stand on the foundation of realities, we would obviously have to agree that the Armed Forces are in fact performing an internal function in the form of a certain restraint. The very fact that the socialist state has an army cannot fail

to make certain extremist, antisocialist forces stop and think. I hope that the Law on Defense being prepared for national discussion will contain a provision stating that it is not expedient to use the army to put down disturbances and the like. It is obviously necessary for this law to state directly, however, that in case of a serious threat to the lives of many Soviet people or the activation of clearly antisocialist forces, an emergency, military state may be declared, and other laws would then go into effect: those of martial law, under which the state can resort to using the army.

The Soviet Armed Forces are making a contribution to the building and renewal of socialism by performing a number of jobs of a cultural and educational, administrative and technical nature. These jobs could hardly be called the army's function, however, since they are not typical. All of the vital activities of the military collectives in peacetime involve the performance of these important jobs. Since they are constantly renewed, it seems to me that they come close to being a function with respect to their significance.

Finally, it is perfectly apparent that the Armed Forces will continue to be enlisted for clean-up operations following natural disasters, just as they have in the past. After all, the army was the first to take on the most difficult jobs involved in mopping-up following the Chernobyl disaster, the earthquake in Armenia, repeated railway disasters and so forth.

The Soviet Army is a part of the people. It has always served the people faithfully and truthfully. The country's armed defenders are doing everything possible to see that the USSR's defense capability is maintained at the very highest level. Our people can be confident that the army will carry out its sacred duty to the end.

N. Belyakov: If We Do Not Cling to Dogmas

The process of developing democratization and glasnost in our society has also affected the army, an important structural organ of the state. Members of various groups in the society — scientists and writers, professional military men, blue- and white-collar workers — are writing and talking about it today. They are interested not just in the extremely acute internal problems of the army itself (legal protection for servicemen, nonregulation relations and so forth) but also the dialectics of development of its functions. Diametrically opposed opinions are sometimes expressed. I would like to offer my own point of view, which may appear far from uncontroversial to some....

We know that from the time of their inception the country's Armed Forces have carried out two functions: internal and external. With the rout of the counterrevolution and the elimination of antagonistic classes our society ceased to need an army from the standpoint of internal circumstances. And the need for it was dictated exclusively by external circumstances: the real danger that imperialism could unleash aggressive wars and military conflicts. The conclusion is drawn from this that

the Soviet Armed Forces have only an external function, that the internal function has withered away. There would appear to be no arguing with this persistent approach. But are such assertions so axiomatic today? I think not.

First, about the internal function: The conclusion that it has withered away is based on the assertion that socialist development in our country has been carried out in strict accordance with Leninist principles and the army has performed its own job. We now know, however, that this was far from so. This raises the question of whether the army's internal function has withered away or whether it was a process which, as a result of the distortion of socialism, was not only not completed but actually acquired new substance. The key to answering this question lies in materialistic dialectics.

It should be remembered that the first socialist state's armed forces developed "in the spirit of overall Soviet development...", that, according to M.V. Frunze, they are "a precise copy, a precise mold, of our country of workers and peasants...." This approach is not obsolete today. Is there anyone who does not understand that in discussing the army's functions, their substance and alterations, we must proceed from the dialectics of our society's development and the tasks carried out by it at all the stages of post-October history? A history which, it is revealed today, we did not profoundly understand. It is apparent that socioeconomic relations and the political system were subjected to major deformation at a certain stage of socialist development.

The system of administration by decree which developed had a devastating effect upon various aspects of the Soviet society's development. This created the possibility for repression and lawlessness; separation of the masses from property, which began to be dispensed with, uncontrolled, by the nomenklatura's bureaucracy; the removal of power from the workers and its concentration in the hands of the party and state apparatus. The 19th All-Union Party Conference stated that democracy in words but authoritarianism in action, oratorical incantations about people's power but arbitrariness and subjectiveness in praxis, talk of democratic institutions but actual flouting of the standards governing the socialist way of life and a shortage of criticism and glasnost became widespread and took root in the reality. A law-based socialist state was not built as a result.

All of these and other deviations from the principles of socialism in its Marxist-Leninist definition evoked and continued to evoke social dissatisfaction in the masses, which was expressed in various forms (political apathy and skepticism, flight abroad, mass-meetings and recently, strikes, the exacerbation of inter-ethnic discord and so forth). The complication of the situation in various regions of the country is artificially kindled by sharp operators in the "underground economy" and by the criminal activities of extremist-minded separatist and nationalistic groups.

In this situation the local apparatus and many party and state figures lost their ability to influence and lead the masses. The political means, selected without adequate thought and not always applied competently for resolving urgent problems, naturally proved to be little effective in the extreme situations. This forced the state to use military force to stabilize the situation in areas of social tensions and in other cases. Political means are a sort of weapon, after all. And one needs to know how to use this weapon. It should not be waved about, generating unnecessary excitement, but should be fired with aim at stagnation. The approaches to resolving the matters we are discussing, which are troubling and sometimes evoke social protest on the part of the workers, were made possible by the functioning of the system of administration by decree, which increasingly moved to the fore dictation, undisguised bureaucratic rule and the use of force, including military force (MVD troops and army subunits), sometimes even where political methods should have been sought and applied. In such cases some people speak of relapses of the army's internal function; others, of a revitalization of that function. Is this the case? Military force was previously used, after all, but it was not supposed to be talked about. In Novocherkassk in June of 1962, for example. The participation of army subunits in the suppression of unauthorized demonstrations and mass-meetings, in the quelling of riots and conflicts based on ethnicity were contrary to the nature and the purpose of the Armed Forces, exacerbated relations between the army and the people and undermined the prestige of the "man with the weapon."

The fact should be stressed, however—and this is of fundamental importance—that the use of military force to maintain public order had some peculiarities: the use of army subunits was mainly a restraining, preventive thing and was frequently intended to defend the constitutional rights and personal safety of citizens, as demonstrated in Alma-Ata, Tbilisi and other cities and regions of the country, for example. The constant renewal of this mission by the system of social relations into which the army was drawn, it seems to me, gave it functional significance.

Nor is our army standing on the sideline when it comes to performing national economic jobs. It takes an active part along with the people in the creative labor. And although these are not typical missions, they are far from incidental, secondary ones, as is sometimes asserted in the literature. The army builds not just for itself but also for the people. It has long been an enormous "construction ministry." The military construction detachments and Civil Defense units in the Armed Forces perform mainly economic jobs, although the Constitution of the USSR does not specify this. These and other troops take part in the construction of large economic and social facilities, the development of the railway and road system and the performance of other jobs. The entire eastern section of the Baykal-Amur Mainline (1,470 kilometers) was built by military railway workers, for

example. In general, they have built more than every fourth kilometer of the steel mainlines in our country. During the period 1988-1995 alone road construction units are to build more than 20,000 kilometers of roads.

Background information: Under a 21 March 1989 ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet the internal troops along with the Border and Railway Troops were legislatively removed from the Armed Forces of the USSR. The decree states that this was done for purposes of bringing the composition of the Armed Forces into full conformity with the missions and functions for which they were created, as established in the Constitution of the USSR.

They also provide important assistance to the population by hauling various kinds of freight. Personnel of motor vehicle battalions of the USSR Ministry of Defense alone hauled more than 22 million tons of agricultural freight, including 8 million tons of grain, in 1988.

The army is making a significant contribution to the resolution of the food problem. In 1988, for example, military sovkhozes and subsidiary farms produced 109,000 tons (net weight) of meat and 65,000 tons of milk, for example. The army has an enormous role also in mopping-up operations following natural disasters, various accidents, explosions and calamities.

The constant participation by the Armed Forces in the performance of these missions is in my view also functional in nature.

We are used to the expression that the army is a school, a reference primarily to the performance of educational tasks. Many writers acknowledge that the Armed Forces perform a great deal of goal-oriented to develop in the individual qualities of public importance and value also outside the army. None of them attaches to this fact the "status" of an essential element of the army's internal function, however. The arguments are ordinarily one and the same: The army, they say, "is not created specially for education," upbringing "is not a goal in and of itself but a necessary result of the military organism's vital functioning," "is not a mandatory condition for the development of a citizen or a prerequisite for the society's normal functioning," and "military service far from always contributes to the spiritual and moral uplifting of the individual."

What can one say in response to such arguments? Yes, the army is created to perform entirely different missions. But does our society have special social institutions dealing with upbringing alone? There are none and there can be none, because upbringing cannot be separated from the education, the professional training and labor activities of individuals. Nor can a universal organism be created which would function as "a mandatory condition for the citizen's development."

It is also an extremely unconvincing argument that not always by far does the "military service contribute to the spiritual and moral uplifting of the individual," of

course. Unfortunately, it does not help some people, to be sure. Some youth do not become spiritually or morally enriched from this great school of moral-political and physical tempering, a school of patriotism and internationalism. But does this actually indicate that the army has no upbringing function? In this regard it would be more logical to talk about the effectiveness of ideological and upbringing work in the army.

We also know, of course, that the state performs its functions through structural formations created by it. There are functions, however, which cannot be successfully realized through some individual social institution, even one specially established. The state thus performs its cultural and upbringing function through many social structures (the family, the school, the vocational and technical school, the production teams and so forth). These include the army. And each of these state and public formations performs upbringing work focusing on certain qualities. The army, for example, shapes good moral-political and physical qualities in the fightingmen. And this essentially applies to almost the entire healthy male population of the country. This is where the character of the youth is re-formed, educated or re-educated, where that is achieved which was not achieved in the family, at the school or in the production collective. The army, the 27th CPSU Congress noted, is "a school of civic responsibility, courage and patriotism."

It is true that upbringing is not a goal in and of itself for the army. Emerging as an extremely important organ of the state, however, the army must independently duplicate and perform the tasks involved in bringing up the fighting men in order to successfully accomplish its purpose. In short, it must perform an upbringing function. The army has a smoothly functioning system of ideological-upbringing work for accomplishing it, and a large materials and equipment base has been established for this purpose.

Background information: The Armed Forces have thousands of officers', enlisted men's and sailors' clubs, movie projectors and radios. The libraries contain more than 120 million books. The forces and fleets receive millions of copies of central, military and local newspapers each day. The Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense annually publishes more than 2,500 books, pamphlets, albums and posters totally around 70 million copies. Each year the forces receive more than 100 new feature films and as many as 250 documentary and popular science films. The availability of television sets for the troops has increased three fold in recent years; radios, ten fold.

As a part of our people, the army, in V.I. Lenin's words, has been and remains "the best bearer of awareness" into the ranks of the Soviet people, particularly the youth, and a school for developing an active vital stance in them. Dozens of military units maintain ties of sponsorship with schools, vocational and technical schools and enterprise labor collectives. Many fightingmen continue their military-patriotic work in the reserve. Particularly

effective in this area is the work performed by former soldier/internationalists, who unite thousands of young men and women around themselves. The civic stance of fightingmen who have served out their military duty is also of enormous upbringing importance.

It is important also to note that in the situation of the restructuring the army has not remained on the sideline in the processes occurring in the society but has become actively involved. We see a politicalization of relations between the army and the people and an increase in the social and political activeness of the fightingmen. This is indicated most clearly by the results of the elections of people's deputies of the USSR, during which 82 servicemen were elected people's deputies of the USSR. It is important to mention this also because in the intensifying situation in various regions of the country some people would like to undermine the prestige of the army among the people and weaken their positive reciprocal influence.

And so, the Armed Forces has to perform a large group of jobs within the country. And while upbringing work is a characteristic component of the army's internal function, participation by the Armed Forces in the quelling of riots and the performance of various national economic jobs in the country are an anomaly born of the system of administration by decree. These are essentially latent (hidden) functions of the army, since they do not reflect its nature but stem from the system of distorted public relations which developed and into which it was drawn.

The army, it was stressed at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, should perform its own work. It is not enough merely to state this, however. We must also have the proper conditions (sociopolitical and economic) essential for implementing this demand. Unfortunately, these have not developed. Social tensions are not everywhere being reduced but are even tending to increase, a fact borne out by the processes occurring in a number of republics: the continuing strikes are increasingly becoming political; there is a growth of extremist, separatist and nationalistic groups taking anti-Lenin, antisocialist positions, and so forth.

Only the successful accomplishment of the restructuring tasks and the building of a truly democratic, law-based, socialist state will make it possible to free the army of jobs not characteristic of it. The Armed Forces will then have only the upbringing function within the country. The accomplishment of the tasks of ensuring good qualities for the "human material" and the combat readiness and fighting efficiency of the Armed Forces will depend in great part upon the accomplishment of that function.

On the external function of the Soviet Armed Forces: This function has also undergone substantial changes, because the circumstances under which military force itself functions have changed. These changes involve certain limitations on the use of military force today. It is no longer possible to win the arms race or an actual nuclear war. World civilization could perish in a global military conflict. In this situation I believe that it is important to reinterpret

the external function of the Armed Forces. In the nuclear missile era they can no longer serve as an instrument of policy as in the past. One then has to ask: Are they needed? Yes, they are. The existence of the Armed Forces for the USSR and for other fraternal countries is dictated by the policy of the more reactionary, aggressive imperialist forces of the contemporary era, which have not supported with action the specific political platform for an all-embracing system of international security advanced at the 27th CPSU Congress. As we know, it covers the military, political, economic and humanitarian areas. In the military area the USSR put forth a program for totally eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000. The military-political leadership of the NATO nations, however, particularly the USA and England, do not want to reject the concept of "nuclear restraint," according to which nuclear weapons are a "guarantee" of the security of states. In this situation military force will continue to be essential for a long time to come.

The achievement of strategic military parity between the USSR and the USA, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, created a fundamentally new situation. Despite all the great costs and difficulties, the Soviet Union is capable of inflicting unacceptable damage upon any enemy with nuclear or nonnuclear weapons. This capability of the Armed Forces presently serves as a reliable factor protecting the country from aggression. Our army's external function is exercised precisely through this factor today. Consequently, the Soviet Armed Forces perform their external function before a nuclear conflict begins, in peacetime, through their real capability for inflicting a devastating strike upon any aggressor. We are witnessing today a certain rethinking of the army's external function in a situation in which there can be neither victors nor conquerors in a nuclear war.

In this period, a sort of "historical period of transition" from military to nonmilitary, basically political means of ensuring both national and universal security, strategic military parity serves as a reliable factor securing peace on the planet. It performs the function of restraining imperialism's most aggressive, reactionary forces. It could cease fulfilling this function, however, if its level were gradually raised. The reliability of this factor will be strengthened by lowering the parity level and eliminating nuclear weapons.

And so, we have the dialectics of development of the protection function from the first phase—the use of armed forces as the main instrument of war, to the second—the phase of the army's functioning as the main force for preventing war, and from it, to a third phase—elimination of the army as an historically obsolete tool of rational policy for states. It is important to note that even during the second phase the stress shifts to political means of ensuring security (national, mutual, universal).

The Armed Forces today are becoming actively involved in the political process. We can see the growing role of the army and military leadership in the political dialog. And this is only natural. The reality of the contemporary world is such that history has begun its measurement of the

development of mankind at a time when war can no longer serve as a means of achieving any goals whatsoever. Naturally, the attitude of states even in this situation can be affected by forces which do not reckon with the conclusions of the new thinking but continue to regard nuclear weapons and the buildup of armaments as a circumstance "preventing" war. In a speech at a commemoration of the 200th anniversary of the country's Department of Defense, for example, U.S. President G. Bush spoke out resolutely for modernizing American intercontinental ballistic missiles and producing the Stealth invisible bombers, and particularly stressed the importance of carrying out the SDI program.

If we take a stand of common sense, we see that the speaker was clearly taking liberties with the truth or with elementary logic. It is a well-known fact that there is approximate parity between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in the area of nuclear weapons and in armed forces in general. The course of building up nuclear and other weapons will lead to destabilization of the military-political situation in the world and a breakdown of the existing parity.

The new American military-political strategy of "competition" also serves precisely these goals. Describing the concept, General of the Army D.T. Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense, pointed out that its purpose is "once again to draw the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries into military competition with the West. The emphasis is on the latest technology, by means of which it is planned to depreciate our systems of weapons and military equipment and force us to transfer funds from social and economic plans to the development of new weapons. And since the authors of the concept clearly have in mind our lag in the area of technology, they are counting on these weapons ultimately to be rendered ineffective, thereby achieving 'maximum strategic preponderance' over the USSR." In order to prevent this our party has taken a line in our defense development primarily involving qualitative factors—both with respect to the equipment and military science and to the composition of the Armed Forces. Only in this way can we ensure that the strategic military parity is maintained and thereby preserve the historical "window" of vulnerability.

The external function of the Soviet Armed Forces stems from this. It has changed qualitatively. The main thing now is to prevent a potential enemy from unleashing aggression. The main ways to prevent war are the following: maintain the strategic military parity; maintain the army and navy at a level of reasonable adequacy for reliable defense and capable of providing a devastating rebuff to an aggressor under any circumstances; involve the Armed Forces in an active military-political dialog with armies of the West, continue to use the Soviet Army as an instrument for maintaining peace, and others.

Today the military route is increasingly giving way to military-political, peace-making activities by the army. This is convincingly indicated not just by the military doctrines of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, which are thoroughly defensive in nature and are designed to prevent war, but

also by peace-loving initiatives coming out of the military organizations of the socialist countries.

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Armed Forces Called Instrument of 'Totalitarian Empire'

*90UM0190B Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 5 Dec 89 p 1*

[Declaration: "Statement of the General Meeting of the Tallinn Club of Veterans of the Former 8th Estonian Rifle Corps of the Soviet Army on the Occasion of the 45th Anniversary of the Complete Liberation of ESSR Territory From Nazi Occupation".]

[Text] Early in the morning of 24 November 1944 the forces of the Soviet Army with the participation of Estonian national military subunits crushed the last center of resistance of fascist forces on the southern extremity of the Syrve peninsula. Estonia was forever liberated from the yoke of the German invaders.

The soldiers of the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps fought as part of the Soviet Army in a united front of the peoples of Europe against the hated fascists with the knowledge that they were carrying out their sacred duty to their Homeland and their people and that, putting their lives in the balance and sacrificing them, they were fighting for democracy, humanism, and the right of nations to self-determination and freedom. In those years we could not foresee everything, and it was not our fault that after the victory over fascism the Stalinist repressions started up anew in the Soviet Union, demanding new victims, including veterans of the Great Patriotic War.

Beginning in 1956 when all the national military formations of the Soviet Army, including the 118th Guard Estonian Tallinn Red-Banner Rifle Division, were disbanded without the consent of the Republic's highest legislative organs, the Soviet Armed Forces have been used more and more often to carry out the aggressive and punitive objectives of a totalitarian empire. This was demonstrated in the flagrant armed intervention in the internal affairs of the peoples of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, without mentioning the recent use of the Armed Forces against the people of Georgia. This was a continuation of what happened in 1939-40 in Poland, Bessarabia, Finland, and the Baltic region.

We unanimously approve the 12 November 1989 resolution of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet "On a Historical and Legal Evaluation of the Events Which Took Place in Estonia in 1940" and categorically repudiate the crimes against the people of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Afghanistan, and Georgia in which Soviet Armed Forces were used, both before and after the Great Patriotic War. And in this context we consider it necessary for the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, proceeding from the rules of international law, to give an evaluation of the current

status of Estonia; that is, it should state whether our homeland is now joined, incorporated, annexed, occupied or in some other manner subordinated to a foreign force, and it should state the conclusions it draws from this evaluation.

We are troubled by the irresponsible attempts of some political forces to persuade Estonian youths to refuse to serve in the USSR Armed Forces. True, we also support the requirement of article 51 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, which forbids an occupying state to require the citizens of the occupied territory to serve in its armed forces or auxiliary forces. However, in our view it is impossible to make use of this requirement so long as the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet has not given a legal evaluation of the current status of Estonia and has not changed the wording of article 61 of the Estonian SSR Constitution, which requires Estonian youths to serve in the USSR Armed Forces. Otherwise they are necessarily subject to criminal punishment in accordance with article 78 of the Estonian SSR Criminal Code.

We repeat the proposal to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet contained in the 9 July "Declaration" of the constituent meeting of the Tallinn Club of Veterans of the Estonian Rifle Corps to include in the agenda the resolution of urgent issues concerning the defense of the Estonian SSR and military service.

We, veterans who served under fire in the Great Patriotic War, disclaim and categorically condemn the anti-perestroika activities in Estonia of informal associations of generals and officers discharged from today's Armed Forces into the reserves or retired. Relying on the local leaders of the military-industrial complex of the USSR (V. Yarovoy and others) and the pseudointernationalist movement (Ye. Kogan and others), now under the mask of the rights of man, now of equal rights, they try to preserve their great-power privileges and call for a boycott of the elections on 10 December to the local soviets. At the same time, leaflets full of the vilest slanders and insulting the Republic's Party and Soviet organs and their leaders are being circulated. We hope that the Estonian SSR Procuracy will quickly communicate to the public the names of those people who are using the democratic freedoms won in Estonia to slander political opponents and the legal authority.

We summon all the inhabitants of Estonia, including veterans of war and labor, to remain above this neo-Stalinist meanness and to participate actively in the formation of organs of local self-management on democratic principles, showing tact and understanding in relations with the various political forces.

At the same time we express the hope that during the elections to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, which will take place under the terms of the IME, one of the decisive points of the election platform of the fighters for the renewal of Estonia will be the creation in the Baltic area of a nuclear-free zone and the gradual demilitarization of this region, as well as an adjustment of relations with the USSR Armed Forces. For our part, we are

already prepared to aid in the resolution of these issues to the extent that we are able.

General meeting of the Tallinn Club of the Estonian Rifle Corps.

(Approved unanimously 27 November 1989.)

Survey, Commentaries on Afghan War

Interpretation and Results of Survey

*90UM0192A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Dec 89 p 2*

[Commentary by S. Kushnerev: "After Afghanistan"]

[Text] About 15,000 people took part in this press poll. About half of them were in Afghanistan themselves.

Almost 45 years have passed since the end of the Great Patriotic War. They are still finding unexploded bombs from it.

Not even a year has passed since the end of the "Afghan" war.

Rereading the questions on the survey, I think about how my old comrade would answer them. Calm and good-natured like the actor Boris Andreyev in his youth, he would hardly ever complain of anything. In general he preferred not to talk about Afghanistan. And all at once there was a sudden, inexplicable explosion: He almost maimed a taxi driver who had committed some kind of clumsy action. And then quite recently there was another outburst. He showed up late one night excited and stretched as tight as a violin string. In an absolutely sober voice, although it seemed he had been drinking quite a bit, he said the same thing over and over: "I will blow him up." And he told me about his "housing" nightmare, about the boss at his shop who abused everyone, and about the grenade he had ready for the boss.

I do not know whether there was in fact a grenade. But—there could still be an explosion.

Realizing that the Congress of People's Deputies will be discussing the issue of a political evaluation of the events in Afghanistan (and, one hopes, the issue of how the people who participated in the "events" are living), we decided to publish the very first, preliminary results of our press poll. Despite the fact that the surveys are still coming in. Despite the fact that, after processing the surveys we have already received, there are many more questions than answers. For instance, what does each of the respondents mean by one of their primary goals, judging by the survey—"to put things generally in order"? And what methods will they use? Everyone says that the "Afghanistan vets" will not support the enemies of perestroika in any fashion. But who is an "enemy"? Is it coincidence that Komsomol workers more than anyone else call Afghanistan a disgrace for us (and by the way, ¾ of the Komsomol workers who answered the survey were "there" themselves)? There is a difference in the evaluations of these events between those who "went"

and those who "did not go" and between people of various ages and professions. Will the difference narrow—will society arrive at a "common denominator" on this occasion too?

One thing is already apparent today. We have begun too early to forget about that war, never mind those who returned from it. The search for truth can be dragged out, as has happened more than once before. But artificial limbs are needed today. And housing—today.

And privileges too, even if some of us seem to have interpreted the ruling on them as some sort of indulgence of society's. And concerning these privileges, a majority of those who went to Afghanistan as well as those who did not are very right about their reality... So when we speak about values common to all mankind, which we must yet determine in our evaluations of our own past, let us not forget (as has also happened) about the most important of these values—about man. About people. About those who returned from war.

And finally, sociology is a precise science. For that reason, we will not speak about "Afghanistan vets" in general. The figures that we present today are the opinion of almost 7,000 of them who wrote to the editor. Let us remember that each one has his own fate, story, and life.

What Is Your Attitude Toward the Consequences of Our Participation in the Events in Afghanistan

Here and elsewhere we indicate the percentage of those answering the corresponding question affirmatively from among only those who were themselves in Afghanistan.

The main thing is to quit discussing the war and help those who returned from it	66
The main thing is to find a correct political evaluation for the war in Afghanistan	25
The main thing now is to find those who are guilty and call them to account	11

In Your Opinion, Have Those Who Returned From Afghanistan Received Enough Attention From...

Society in general	12
The government	18
Party organs	5
Soviet organs	5
The Komsomol	14
Those around them	25
The older generation	33
The youth	26
The press	48
You personally	26

The percentage of "Afghanistan vets" who say that they have received "Disgracefully Little" attention from the above groups and organs follows: soviet organs—35, party organs—34, the Komsomol—21, the government—20, society in general—14, those around them—13, the youth—11, the older generation—8, the press—7, themselves personally—4.

What Is Your Opinion of the Role of Our Servicemen in the Events in Afghanistan?

It was our internationalist duty	35
It discredited the concept of "internationalist duty"	19
It was a difficult but necessary step	19
I am proud of it	17
It was a disgrace for us	17

Those who did not go to Afghanistan answered the question this way: "It was a disgrace for us"—46, "it discredited the concept of 'internationalist duty'"—30, "it was a difficult but necessary step"—19, "it was our internationalist duty"—10, "I am proud of it"—6.

Do You Often Think About Events Connected With Your Service in Afghanistan?

Often (very often)	60
Rarely	12
I forced myself to forget about all of it	3

How Do You Think Those Who Served in Afghanistan Should First Apply Their Efforts?

Help each other	34
Educate the younger generation	30
Put things generally in order	29
Participate in the political struggle	12
Struggle against crime	10

Would You Agree With the Following Opinions Expressed in the Pages of the Press?

"Afghanistan vets" are some of those few who will support the country in times of trouble	72
Afghanistan is the best school of life	66
"Afghanistan vets" are a lost generation	8
"Afghanistan vets" are a force who will support the enemies of perestroyka	4

What Is Your Attitude Toward Privileges for the Veterans of Afghanistan?

The privileges are only on paper	71
They are clearly not enough	17
It is that little bit that society can and should do	16
They are unjustified, as are any privileges	7

More than half of those who did not serve in Afghanistan subscribed to the opinion that "the privileges are only on paper," and half of the remaining people believed that the privileges are clearly not enough.

Which Problems Are the Most Troublesome for You?

Housing	40
Restoring your mental equilibrium	35
Finding your place in life	32
Restoring your health	31

**Which Problems Are the Most Troublesome for You?
(Continued)**

Financial problems	28
Consumer services	10
Creating a family	9

Letters Accompany Survey

*90UM0192A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Dec 89 p 2*

[Commentary: "After Afghanistan"]

[Text] This press poll is something that needed to be done. But it seems to me that things will not go any further than this... There will be only sighs, comments, and apologies in the press and on TV. I am not disabled, nor do I have any wounds, but I want to buy my wife some shoes (for example), and there is a long line out front, so I made up my mind (!), got out my privileges card, and tried to make my way up to the counter... They let me have it from all sides. After that I do not even carry the card. "I did not send you there." It is a pity. It seems that the only people with privileges are the disabled. I do not have anything against the disabled, because I saw with my own eyes how they got that way. But we, the ones who returned healthy, thank God, were also THERE. And now, here in the Soviet Union, someone in a crowd has to send me...

Respectfully,

Viktor Ivanov, former senior sergeant

* * *

I do not know if you will have time to read my letter along with the survey. But behind the survey is a woman who wrote "yes" and "no" to all these questions.

I spent two years in Afghanistan working as a laboratory assistant at a supply depot for petroleum oils and lubricants. I had to drive on temporary assignments to Bagram and even across the Salang Pass. Today it is terrible to remember. But it is impossible to forget any of it! Sometimes I want to remember, to talk a bit, but there is no one who would hear me out and understand me. The only one who could do that would be someone who had been "there." Anyone else simply will not understand, and because of that it is impossible for them to judge.

Almost no one recalls that we, the Soviet Army civilian employees, were also in Afghanistan. It is a pity. What else is there for me to live for? Even at work, at my own collective where I returned after 2 years in Afghanistan, now and then the question of my tour there comes up: Should her visit really be considered Afghanistan duty?

I am tired of it.

It is somehow embarrassing to have to explain and prove it. And because of this I feel discontented with life and dissatisfied with myself. I have thoughts of psychological

inferiority—I do not know how to put it any better. And meanwhile I have to bring up a son. He is only 10 years old.

Everything gets in such a tangle, and my bad health just makes it worse—I came down with malaria and typhoid fever in Afghanistan. Who is going to need me in this shape?

Maybe among the surveys there will be a letter from a lonely, troubled man who was in Afghanistan. I would like to write him.

[Signed] O.K.

The editor has the return address for this letter on file.

* * *

Yes, Afghanistan was a school of life. The country can rely on these fellows in times of trouble. But in the event that they are not treated with the proper attention somewhere and people begin to become embittered, it is not impossible that these forces might also be used by the enemies of perestroika for their own ends.

[Signed] B. Salogub, 27 years old.

* * *

I am one of those who served in that war. Our soldiers labored in that disgraceful war for 9 years. I wish our people understood that, for perestroika's progress, we are that very force which does not look for life's easy paths. I will describe myself. Five years of nightmares and stressful conditions, and all as a result of two years of service. Privileges are just paper. They are obviously not enough. The main thing for us is to restore our health. One half of us lost our health, and so how are we to live? We must develop an "Afghanistan veterans" program. There are about a million of us—certainly such a program can be instituted through the parliament. The "Afghanistan vets" are excellent fellows, and there are drug addicts and alcoholics among us, a small number of the boys. It is an enormous pity. But our society, where we exist, has brought them to such a life. I will always defend the honor of the "Afghanistan vets"... Even among my friends and family I do not have the friendships I had in Afghanistan. There will not be any more of them. It was a dream.

[Signed] A. Kutlyyev, Namangan Oblast.

* * *

My family would answer one of the questions on our surveys in this fashion. The main thing is to find a political evaluation for the war in Afghanistan and help those who returned from the war, and afterwards to find the guilty and call them to account. These days it is accepted practice to ascribe everything to the period of stagnation. But in each concrete instance there are people who are responsible for this or that decision. So why, in these times of perestroika and glasnost, can we

not name them and call them to account for what they have done? Hushing it up does not offer any guarantee that Afghanistan will not repeat itself.

We are raising a son, Andrey. He is 15 years old, and we do not wish him, as a result of someone's ill-considered and criminal decision, to undergo the same rite of passage as the boys who served in Afghanistan.

The bulk of the boys who served in Afghanistan comprehended the need for perestroika and suffered for it long before many of us arrived at that same thinking.

[Signed] The Mastrenko family, Novosibirsk.

* * *

This is the first time I have ever written to a newspaper. I will begin with a request. Gentlemen fans of the cinema! Perhaps we have had enough of your making cannon fodder of us. Understand, you imbeciles, we came home to LIVE, and not to be bogeymen (which you make of us): "Citizens, live honestly or else a platoon of baby-killing 'Afghanistan vets' will appear and take care of you all." This is the message in each of your "films." What do you know about us, about the carnage that is called "internationalist duty"? We are people! And before it brands us "the lost generation," let our "humane society" realize at its leisure that it may be partly to blame for that.

Do you know, if all over the Soviet Union the cry were to ring out, "Volunteers! Back to Afghanistan!"—I would go... I would rather go there than live and see all this filth, those gobbling mugs of the office rats, that spite for humanity (which not everyone has) and savage hatred for everything, and those wooden, useless slogans! There everything was simpler.

Yes! Even there not all relations were so smooth, but everything was understood there. If he is a swine, there is nothing to hide his swinishness, nothing to paint it over. But here?

And in conclusion I would like to say a couple words to the editorial board. I like your newspaper very much. Steady on! I ask only one thing: Write the TRUTH! Whatever it may be! Write it, and I hope that "Afghanistan vets" will support you, and not because these boys are such "infallible and immaculately honest ideological champions" (as they represent us), but simply because we can distinguish the truth from lies for ourselves. And one more thing: If this letter is published, print these albeit banal lines:

People! Be merciful! Do not harm stray dogs, do not abandon your elderly, and do not pass by human pain. Be humane, people...

Leningrad - Moscow - Tomsk

Hazing Leads to Desertion

90UM0192A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Dec 89 p 2

[Commentary by A.N. under the rubric "A Special Case": "All I Wanted Was To Live..."]

[Text] I read the article "Hostages of War" and decided to write. I no longer have the strength to torment myself at night. Now, after almost 3 years at home, the past has returned from that haze, that mirage, that delirium. I lived relatively peacefully for 3 years. But sometimes it would come over me anyway. Gradually it happened more often. And now my "past" does not leave me alone. No, I am not complaining. I want to come to understand it.

I was born in 1965. I graduated from railroad school in 1984. I worked July, August, September, and part of October as an assistant engineer. Then I was conscripted into the Soviet Army. I pictured service in the Army like something from the program "I Serve the Soviet Union!" I encountered only one good unit in my travels—my training unit. In the spring they began to split us up into operational units. The training unit was in a fever. At that time everyone's attention was on Afghanistan, at least ours was. One reason was that we had hardly heard anything about it. On 19 April 1985 they sent me and 69 other privates to the "south." For three days, 70 people were confined in one wagon on a train...

We arrived in Tashkent. Within a week we had already been reequipped with summer uniforms and equipment, and one night they drove us to the airport. And only just before takeoff did they declare officially that we were flying to carry out internationalist duty in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]. We had guessed it much earlier. Two hours later we were in Kabul.

A few other men and I ended up in a unit near Kabul (actually, above Kabul)... Our company commander appointed us to extra duty believing, probably, that he had found a way of protecting replacements from "dedovshchina" [hazing].

But that just delayed it until later. We had already gotten to know our company and we knew that those who went out on combat operations never humiliated anyone. The ones who did all the bullying were just those men whom the commanders did not trust enough to send out on "combat ops"...

When they "worked me over" for the first time, the company commander learned about it. At the medical unit they examined my scrapes and bruises and decided to transfer me from the station. The longserves were reprimanded, as a result of which I became known as an "informer." And so they started in on me with all the brutality they could muster... I began to avoid the company. I stopped going to the mess hall. Each day hunger gnawed at me more and more sharply. And finally the day came when everything went to the devil and I and one of the other new arrivals got into it. I

looked in on him at the station—he was alone. We talked a bit and drank a little vodka with some dried bread. And we decided to sneak into the hut where the rear service warrant officer lived. Our reason was that this warrant officer was always skimming goods from the soldiers and selling them on the side. As we crept in he saw us, but he was unable to catch us. My friend and I ran into the "green zone" [active combat zone] near the unit and sat down by a minefield to discuss the problem. I had given up all hope (I thought then that I would catch it even worse than I already had). I broke down completely. But my friend turned out to have more spirit than me (or maybe he was just thinking a little better). He took off to work things out with the warrant officer, leaving me alone by the minefield. But one thought gnawed at me and hammered at my head—I was a thief.

I lay in the grass by the minefield with that thought until evening. I did not see any way out. And in this condition I decided that it would be better if I blew myself up on a mine. I raised the barbed wire and crawled into the mine field on all fours. The commander had warned us that there were three or four mines per square meter, sometimes more. I crawled to the middle of the minefield. There was no explosion. Then I began to pound on the ground around me with my fists, expecting an explosion each time. I crawled on and came to rest against the barbed wire on the far side. I lay there until about ten at night.

It grew dark. I came to myself, looked at the starry sky, and realized that I wanted very much to live. I was terrified by the thought of crawling back across the minefield. I crawled through the barbed wire and walked to a broken down house standing apart from the kishlak [Central Asian village]. I spent three days in that house. At night I picked green apples near the house and fed myself with them.

On the fourth day some Afghan teenagers noticed me and, as I learned later, they sold me to the rebels. The latter told me I must either go to Pakistan or die. I went with them. We traveled three days. In Pakistan they sold me to one of the Gulbeddin bands. They sold me for three assault rifles and a grenade launcher.

They did not force me to work in captivity, they fed me and beat me and constantly asked if I was an officer or enlisted, had I killed or not, and why had I come to their land if I did not wish to fight and kill. How could I explain to them such concepts as duty and obligation?

In captivity I became covered with lice and completely lost track of the time. Winter set in (I knew by the snow). But toward the end of winter they washed me and drove me back into Afghanistan. They explained to me that one of their men had been taken prisoner and that they were trading me for him. And if I wanted to refuse or run away to the West, then I could go with a group of others, some nine people (as I understood). I said, "Send me home!" They exchanged me. I was flown to Kabul by helicopter. I was put in the garrison stockade in solitary

confinement... The first investigator pressed me hard. To get him to leave me alone, I wrote down that I had been recruited by Chinese intelligence. A new investigator appeared... Eventually they sent me to the Soviet Union. I thought they would put me in jail, but on the contrary they began to move me from one unit to the next. I was transferred in and out of quite a few. They examined me. They carefully crossed out the privileges on my military service card (as a result of my premature transfer to the USSR)—and it was signed that way. And the hell with them and the privileges. Something else troubles me. Everyone around knows that I was in Afghanistan. Some (a few dozen) know that I was missing in action, and my mother has turned gray (for which I will never forgive myself). I do not know how I will explain to these people everything that happened to me. How will I explain to my wife, who waited two years and believed in me? To my friend? And to say that I was a prisoner... No.

[Signed] A.N.

Veterans Renounce Decorations

90UM0192A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Dec 89 p 2

[Commentary by V. Zarovskiy under the rubric "Fact and Commentary": "Decorations on the Ground"]

[Text] Photographs speak for themselves [photos not reproduced]. There were more than 100 of them, soldier-internationalists or, as they call themselves, "participants in the war in Afghanistan." They gathered not long ago in Vilnius' Nagornyy Park to remember the dead and to say that the war was unjust.

I cannot judge whether the Lithuanian "Afghanistan vets" are right to renounce their decorations. They have made their choice themselves.

Appeal To Keep Decorations

90UM0192A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Dec 89 p 2

[Commentary by R. Aushev, Hero of the Soviet Union, USSR people's deputy, under the rubric "Fact and Commentary": "Decorations on the Ground"]

[Text] Yes, I know there are occasions when former soldiers who fought in Afghanistan discard their combat decorations. A few days ago I met with soldier-internationalists and USSR people's deputies and we talked about this. I do not remember who it was, but someone said very accurately, "If they are throwing away their decorations, it must mean that they do not value them very highly."

I know from my own experience that behind each medal or decoration there is, as a rule, not only the labor and courage of a single person, but also that of a whole squad, sometimes of a platoon. Behind them is your comrade who, perhaps, died in that same battle covering you with

his fire. And that means they are not renouncing their medals, but rather their comrades in combat. What should we call that?

They say that the war in Afghanistan was a political mistake. If it was, then let the politicians answer for it. But combat decorations for honest service should not be abolished. They do not depend on any political evaluations. If you believe differently, then let us renounce all decorations given out before 1985, under Stalin or during the years of stagnation. After all, they did not build a developed socialism, they did not build communism in the 1980's. Does that mean that the decorations were dishonest?

I am sure that not one peasant or worker will repudiate his decorations. Behind them are his sweat and blood.

Psychological Service for Veterans

*90UM0192A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Dec 89 p 2*

[Report by M. Magomed-Eminov, candidate of psychological sciences, director of the psychological service of the Union of Veterans of Afghanistan: "Commentary of the Psychological Service of the Union of Veterans of Afghanistan"]

[Text] Our service studies the problems of the psychological and socio-psychological rehabilitation of veterans of Afghanistan. It conducts not only scientific method studies and training of specialists but also carries out psychological consultation and psychological rehabilitation with the goal of eliminating the aftereffects of post-traumatic stress of veterans and their families.

The psychological service has a network of interconnecting centers for family therapy, a center for professional problems, a center for post-traumatic stress, a center for rehabilitation from drug addiction and alcoholism, a psychotherapeutic center, etc. In addition, it has a branch in the new hospital for veterans in Moscow. We train specialists in psychological rehabilitation of traumatic stress for the country's rehabilitation centers. Intensive work is underway to create regional branches across the entire Soviet Union.

The information we receive will be used in the training and retraining of specialists and in psychotherapeutic work. It will help us define more precisely the factors of traumatic stress, the criteria for maladjustment, and the problems which veterans encounter in the various spheres of their lives.

The results of the survey have permitted society to express its opinion on a variety of issues concerning veterans of Afghanistan, the events in Afghanistan themselves as well as their consequences, and the present situation and problems of veterans. A detailed scientific analysis is ahead.

And finally, the country's leadership has shown interest in the results of this investigation—they will be taken

into account in the process of developing and adopting resolutions concerning this issue.

THE STATE OF THE OFFICER CORPS

Air Force CinC Yefimov Interviewed on Army, Navy Day

*90UM0321A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
No 45, 23 Feb 90 p 3*

[Report on interview with Marshal of Aviation A.N. Yefimov, deputy minister of defense and commander-in-chief of the Air Force, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, by Captain 1st Rank A. Slobozhanyuk, SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent; on the occasion of Soviet Army and Navy Day, 23 February 1990, entitled: "On Guard of the Motherland".]

[Text]

[Slobozhanyuk] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, we mark Soviet Army and Navy Day on the eve of the 45th anniversary of the Great Victory. You were an active participant in the War and a witness to the birth of many combat traditions of our Armed Forces. Are these traditions continuing now, at the time of a reevaluation of many, it would seem, firm moral values and a candid revision of the course and results of the war.

[Yefimov] The victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War is unforgettable. It changed the world completely, and it was a turning point in the history of the Soviet state, the peoples of Europe and Asia, and even of all the other continents of the earth.

Victory was attained through the joint efforts of the anti-Hitler coalition. However, the Soviet people and its Army carried the main burden on their shoulders, and, incidentally, the Army has remained invincible from the day it was organized. During the time of the Great Patriotic War, it destroyed 506 German divisions and 100 divisions of the German satellites. Recently, there have been more frequent attempts, one might even say tougher attempts, to make the dramatic pages of Soviet history more absolute. Attempts are being made to review our victory also, and everything that is associated with it. In this respect, I stand firmly on the position of the platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Congress of the Party, which states: "The idealization of the past and the reluctance to know the full and harsh truth about the tragic pages of our history are just as dangerous as the attempts to make null and void all that is really great and valuable in our historical legacy. The continuous ties of the labor and struggle of the Soviet people cannot be disrupted."

Yes, we achieved victory at a very high price. Indeed, there were errors also and the crimes of Stalinism against his own people and Army. However, this should also be realized, that the objective advantages of socialism and its ideals and moral potential rallied our entire society. Without this, the mass heroism at the front and in the

rear area cannot be explained, and, without this, victory would have been impossible.

Loyalty to military duty, selfless devotion to the socialist motherland, and continuous readiness for heroic deeds in the name of sacred objectives, international fraternity, and military comradeship—these are those military imperatives and those traditions which guided millions of Soviet soldiers, officers and generals, infantrymen, flyers and sailors, partisans, and members of the underground who fought for the freedom and independence of the country, not sparing themselves, their blood, or even life itself. In this connection, I would like to mention that Soviet aviators during the War conducted more than four million combat sorties, destroying 57,000 enemy aircraft. This constituted 62 percent of total enemy air losses during the Second World War. More than 600 winged sons of the people rammed into fascist aircraft in the air. And the heroic deed of the crew of Captain N. Gastello, who flew their damaged aircraft into a concentration of enemy manpower and equipment, was repeated by 505 air crews. As a pilot, who knows war firsthand, I assert: No kind of repressions or fear of a penal battalion, about which newly-made "inspectors" of our history are making a fuss, are capable of moving a person to such actions. It is significant that not one of Hitler's glorified aces dared a similar step.

You ask about the fate of the military tradition of our Armed Forces? I will answer this way. All kinds of things happen in a complex organism like our Army. But if the main and definitive thing that characterizes it is to be identified, then it can be asserted with confidence: the glorious combat traditions are alive and are being filled with new content. This characterizes all services of the Armed Forces, including the Soviet Air Force.

As previously, military airmen are faithful to their military, civic, and international duty. They displayed self-sacrifice and courage in the wake of Chernobyl, in eliminating the aftereffects of a major railroad catastrophe in Bashkiriya, and in the tragically unprecedented earthquake on Armenian soil. Today, the mass media is reporting in detail about a whole complex of tasks that military airmen are resolving in connection with the well-known events in the Transcaucasus. For myself, I will add: Operating under extremely difficult conditions, at a tense pace, and, frequently, as the saying goes, doing everything within their physical and mental power, the airmen performed an enormous amount of work in a short period, not allowing even one misstep.

[Slobozhanyuk] Lately, the Army has been at the center of crucial discussions. Many criticisms, judging by the editorial mail, are not without justification. Our readers are especially troubled about the problem of non-regulation behavior, the so-called "dedovshchina" [mis-treatment of recruits by soldiers with more service]. How is the work proceeding on eliminating violations of discipline, and how effective is it?

[Yefimov] Yes, you are right. Discussions about the Army in recent years have reached a scale that is unprecedented

in its entire postwar history. This is understandable. Within the framework of the process of perestroyka and glasnost, the Armed Forces, as a copy of society, could not remain a zone outside criticism.

We are not against well-wishing, constructive, and competent criticism. The more so because for us, as in all society, many unresolved problems have accumulated. And we are prepared to talk about all of this openly, and to search for ways, together with society, to improve matters.

Now about non-regulation behavior and more broadly, about the status of military discipline. This question disturbs not only your readers. With us, it is first and foremost.

I would like to emphasize that the deep roots of the so-called "dedovshchina," like crime on the whole, are found outside the Army. It is my deep conviction, based on a large amount of service experience, that our Army, was and remains the healthiest part of society, although it is fully dependent on it.

In recent years, a whole system of educational, organizational, and law enforcement measures has been implemented in the Army and Navy, and a campaign has been initiated—fierce and implacable—against any manifestation of non-regulation interrelationships. The guilty parties are punished in the most decisive way. In general, the number of law violations committed in 1989 in the Soviet Air Force and crimes on the basis of non-regulation interrelationships constitute approximately four percent. The main thing that it was possible to do was to reduce the number of victims almost by 13 percent, and also law-breaking on grounds of drunkenness and the theft of weapons and state and military property.

[Slobozhanyuk] Our Armed Forces always were multinational. And this was considered to be one of the sources of their might. Now voices can be heard more and more frequently about the need for national military formations. What is your opinion on this score? I would also like to know what you think of the proposal to create a professional Army?

[Yefimov] Yes, our Armed Forces, in a way that was always incomprehensible to our foes, were united into a single family of sons of various nations. And this unity, whose durability was tested by war, was one of the most important factors of their might. I will say also: A united multinational Army is the cementing force of Soviet society.

As for the voices about which you speak, it is necessary to ask oneself at the outset: For whom and for what reason are national military formations necessary? Because from a purely military standpoint, they cannot represent a real force capable of resolving defensive tasks independently. I think that this is obvious even to an amateur. The thesis concerning national republic armies today, as I understand it, is only one card in the pack of a "broad" policy whose name is separatism.

If we are talking about the creation of a professional army, then, I think, that a lot of outspoken demagogic surrounds this question now. Professionalization is a natural process, whether we want it or not. It is especially urgent for those services of the Armed Forces that are equipped with complicated and expensive equipment. For example, the level of modern aviation equipment is so high that its use by poorly trained people is simply impossible. Therefore, officers and warrant officers constitute the foundation of the Air Force; that is, professionals. As an example, in an air regiment many subunits today no longer have any soldiers and sergeants on their staffs who were drafted.

Moreover, as the commander-in-chief, I will say that it would be much easier and simpler for me to work with subordinates who are professionals. Incidentally, any commander will corroborate this. But, you see, our economy today is not capable of supporting a professional army. This would aggravate even further an already critical situation in the social sphere of society.

By the way, only the United States and England have hired professional armies.

[Slobozhanyuk] Aviation has always been covered by an aura of romanticism and fliers have been surrounded by the special attention and love of the people. Would you not in a few strokes draw a portrait of the modern military airman? Tell us, please, about those tasks that the Soviet Air Force performs, and what kind of aviation equipment is in the inventory now?

[Yefimov] The romanticism in the aviation profession and the especially respectful attitude of the Soviet people toward it have played an inestimable role in the rapid formation and development of our Air Force, and in its modern status. Today, it meets the best world standards, and, in a number of respects, it surpasses them.

Our principal capital, of course, is the people. They are the pride of the Soviet Air Force and of the country. However, a generalized portrait of the military aviator will not be complete, if it is not pointed out that, as a rule, the aviator is a person of high patriotic and military dedication; he has a developed intellect, a broad mental outlook, loves the variety of life, and appreciates humor—just take the team of Quipsters Club aviation cadets from Kharkov in the final meeting of 1989. A person in military uniform with "wings" on his collar patches is multifaceted. But among these facets is one that tops all of the rest—great military and flying skill that cannot be compensated with anything. The more so now, when the Soviet Air Force, being cut numerically, is growing qualitatively, and is being equipped with fourth-generation aircraft. Among these are the combat aircraft MIG-29, SU-27, SU-25, and also the transport super-giant AN-124 "Ruslan."

Now, about the tasks that are performed by the Air Force. All of them, briefly speaking, can be reduced to not allowing the unleashing of war and providing a firm and reliable defense of the country, jointly with the other services of the Armed Forces. This is how military aviators see their mission.

[Slobozhanyuk] The press has more than once cited cases of the social disorder of our soldiers, including aviators. What measures are the Ministry of Defense and the Air Force undertaking to resolve this complicated array of social problems?

[Yefimov] You are asking me questions in this holiday interview that are not at all "holiday-like" questions. The extremely unfavorable condition of the social sphere in the Army, everyday living, the legal protection of the servicemen and of their families—this is the kind of a subject about which it is difficult to speak calmly.

In actual fact, 239,000 families of servicemen today are directly experiencing the unsettled housing problem. Of these, 170,000 do not have any apartments and are forced to go from place to place. Among the services of the Armed Forces, the Air Force ended up in the worst situation. We have 39,000 without apartments. Among these, unfortunately, are several thousand pilots, and also other specialists who are directly engaged in providing flight safety.

All of this affects the mood of people and their attitude toward the work; it undermines the prestige of military service and the military profession, and also to a great extent the defensive capability of the country. Effective measures are now being taken both on the level of the union government and through Ministry of Defense channels.

As for the Soviet Air Force leadership, we are also undertaking a number of measures in this direction. We are directing 70 percent of all monetary resources that have been allocated to us for capital construction to housing. There has never been this kind of a redistribution of resources before.

The main thing that is needed is to preserve the benevolent attitude of the workers of the city and the village toward the Army, toward the person in a military uniform who is standing on guard of the country.

Additional Benefits For Service Retirees, Families

*90UM0252C Moscow SOBRANIYE
POSTANOVLENIY PRAVITELSTVA SOYUZA
SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH
RESPUBLIK No 30, 1989 pp 740-741*

[Decree of 21 Aug 1989, No. 674: "On additional benefits to service members discharged from active military service to the reserve or retirement, and to their families".]

[Text] 133. On additional benefits to service members discharged from active military service to the reserve or retirement, and to their families.

The USSR Council of Ministers decrees:

1. That the time in service of officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-service members discharged from active military service due to age, illness, or reduction in forces, or for restricted state of

health, should be included in the continuous employment period necessary for payment of benefits from state social insurance, additions to old-age pensions, one-time bonuses for years of service (percent raise in wages), and that other benefits and advantages established by law accruing from the employment period that are in effect in the place of employment also be granted, if the interruption between the date of discharge from active military service and the starting date of employment or study at a higher or middle special academic institution (including the preparatory department), or assignment to an academic institution in a personnel qualification enhancement and retraining system does not exceed six months.

For the service members indicated in this point, who were discharged from military units, from enterprises, from institutions and organizations located in regions of the Far North and in locales that are equated with the regions of the Far North, as well as in regions where percentage raises in pay are paid in accordance with the procedures and conditions provided by the decree of the CC, CPSU, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the VTsSPS [All-Union Council of Trade Unions] of 6 April 1972 No. 255, the time of their military service in such regions, if they begin employment in these regions within six months after discharge from active military service, will be counted in the continuous employment period for the receipt of raises in their wages, and other benefits established by the current laws for workers in such regions.

2. That the continuous length of service be preserved for the wives of officers, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-service personnel sent for military service abroad, regardless of the duration of the interruption in employment, after their return to the USSR in connection with discharge of the husband from active military service or his transfer to a new place of service in the USSR.

3. That the executive committees of the Councils of People's Deputies, the heads of ministries, departments, associations, enterprises, institutions, and organizations take specific measures to find employment for the wives of service members, and more widely utilize an incomplete work day (week), a flexible schedule, or work at home for this purpose.

The period that the wives of officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended service personnel have spent in locales where there is no opportunity for employment in their specialty is included in the total service period necessary for assignment of an old-age pensions (but no more than 10 years) if they do not have such a period of service on the day they reach pension age. The State Committee of the USSR for Labor and Social Problems, in agreement with the USSR Defense Ministry should determine the procedures for counting the employment period of the wives of such service members.

4. That the heads of enterprises, institutions, and organizations should ensure priority assignment of employees from among officer personnel, Army and

Navy warrant officers, and extended-service personnel, discharged from active military service in connection with the reduction in the USSR Armed Forces, to academic institutions in the system of personnel training, retraining, and qualification enhancement in order to acquire the necessary professional knowledge and skills for successful accomplishment of their production duties.

That they be allowed to pay these employees an average wage in that specialty (profession) for which they are preparing during their period of training and separation from their work.

5. That the time of military service of officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-service personnel discharged from active military service in connection with the force reduction in the USSR Armed Forces be included in the employment period in their specialty, if within no more than six months (and in cases provided for by law, longer than this period) they begin work in the specialty received prior to conscription to military service or during the period of service.

6. That the words "and of service members" and "or for accomplishment of service" be struck out from sub-point "b" of point 9 of the rules for calculating continuous employment service of blue and white collar workers for designating allowances in accordance with the state social insurance, approved by the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 13 April 1973 No. 252 (SP SSR, 1973 No. 10, art. 51; 1984 No. 4, art. 19).

Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. Ryzhkov
Administrator of the USSR Council of Ministers M.
Shkabardnya
Moscow, the Kremlin, 21 Aug 1989 No. 674

Study on Tendencies of Junior Officer Retirement

90UM0282A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 1989
(signed to press 2 Nov 89) pp 43-51

[Article, published under the heading "For the Competition "Communist. Perestroyka. Duty." by Maj V. Mukhin, entitled: "Whom Are We Discharging?"

The author, Vladimir Georgiyevich Mukhin completed the Tashkent Higher Combined-Arms Command School imeni V.I. Lenin. He served as the commander of a motorized rifle platoon and was the secretary of the unit Komsomol committee. Since 1980, he has been in journalist work: a correspondent-organizer, responsible secretary and editor of a large-run newspaper, a correspondent-organizer for the propaganda department of the newspaper of the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District SUVOROVSKIY NATISK. At present, he is a student on the Editorial Department of the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin]

[Text] Why do the young, largely promising officers begin submitting requests for discharge? Upon assignment from

the editors, a special correspondent of the journal studied the given problem in one of the garrisons of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District...

Are Objective Factors "To Blame"?

After Moscow and Tashkent, much here is perceived unusually. There is the proximity of the frontier, where human life is under strict self-control. There is also the climate when even in the spring the asphalt paths in the compound burn with heat and the Afghan wind picks up so that the dust turns day into night. And the exotic life of the Central Asian remoteness, when the strict military uniform cohabits oddly with the motley tents....

Accustomed to the difficulties of serving in these places and to unexpected turns of fate, the men, and this immediately struck one, gravitate strongly to a new person. And probably for this reason they were maximally frank in their talks with me. They spoke about a great deal but virtually everyone took up those everyday problems of life which substantially complicate their living. And the first conclusion which I would draw from these stories was the following: many of the young officer personnel want a return to "civies" because they consider a majority of the urgent problems in their service and life to be insoluble.

Need it be said that the picture was not auspicious to the eye. This was largely due to the action of the "residual" principle which until recently determined the attitude toward the sociodomestic sphere in society and the army.

Initially about housing. I can give the opinion of the division commander on this score. Precisely the difficulties linked to housing, he said, primarily encourage the young officers and warrant officers to think about civilian life. Waiting for years in line to receive apartments, they must reside with "private persons," paying for a miserly hearth with an inordinate share of already rather meager earnings. At the moment of the conversation, 48 serviceman families did not have apartments in the garrison. Those few "fortunate" who "succeeded" in finding room in the hotel of the local KECh [Billeting-and-Maintenance Unit] feel it a great luxury to live in six or eight meter "closets." Although it is crowded, as they say, it is no insult as it is not hard on the "pocket"! And this is even the case when many officers from the formation are former "Afghaners" [Soviet veterans of Afghan War] who have the right to the preferential receipt of housing.

But the command and the political department of the formation are unable to alter fundamentally the existing situation in any way. They do not have any reserve housing. Those "crumbs" which are handed out by the local authorities do not suffice for all...

From the data of a sociological poll.* Among the officers who had written out a request for a discharge, only 38.8 percent had separate apartments; 12.5 percent lived in

communal apartments; 23.1 percent were housed in dormitories; 25.6 percent rented a "corner somewhere."

The housing problem, it should be pointed out, gives rise to many other acute questions in the life of officer families. Inevitable complications arise related to resident permits. And this means, the deputy chief of the formation political department Maj V. Semenov pointed out, that one out of every ten officer wives in the garrison cannot find a job. And what about the child? The garrison nursery is overfilled. Instead of 120 children, there are 160 there. And almost 100 are waiting on the list.

"In order to place our son in the nursery we had to wait almost 18 months," said, for example, Senior Lieutenant S. Odrov, who had decided to leave the army. "Then certain 'essential' persons on the outside resolved this question almost instantaneously.... And now our child is finally in the nursery. My wife is working. However, there still are problems. In the garrison stores the shelves are empty. At the market, the prices 'take a big bite.' And so we live from payday to payday. We have had enough...."

Many other officers and their wives said similar things to me. But is it fair to place all the blame for this on the garrison leadership. Not enough money from above has been allocated to improve the living conditions of the officers and their families. The garrison leaders should definitely dispose of everything available to them in a correct and just manner. But this, judging from everything, is still just a good intention.

For instance, the wife of officer Feruz Isakov turned to the formation's political department and staff not only because she was fed up with paying "mad money" for a private apartment but also because they soon should be getting a house, but the husband's name was not on the waiting list. Why? Because, as the officials explained, Capt B. Isakov had filled out the request wrong. Evidently, he had not filled out the corresponding documents as he should and because of this was removed from the list....

"He had reached the rank of Captain, but could not fill out a request correctly," I was told indignantly by the political officer, A. Vasilyev. "He gave it to the wrong person and the document was lost. By that time, the lists had already been drawn up. Now he would have to wait...."

Let us reflect a bit: what has happened here? An officer has arrived in the unit with his family. Why is he not immediately put on the list for obtaining housing, in effectively working out all the necessary papers? Certainly, the providing of housing is a prime concern for a person. This would be, I feel, a concrete manifestation of concrete concern for a concrete person: for the officer, warrant officer or reenlisted person on the part of the political department and the rear services and for which we constantly appeal.

Let us go back to that same nursery. Yes, it is an "honest" truth that at times it does admit children of the parents not affiliated with the army. For example, the mother of Narine Davidyan is a teacher in a music school and the father is a tire worker. But the little girl has been placed in the garrison nursery. And this was done, as was explained by the head of the nursery K. Zhenovich, upon a decision of the chief of the formation political department himself... there you have it! Permission was given because Narine's grandmother works in the nursery.

Strange logic, to put it mildly. And it clearly runs contrary to the principle of social justice.

Incidentally, domestic problems and all sorts of everyday troubles existed before. But at that time there were virtually no requests for discharge. What has happened here? Lieutenant Colonel V. Vasilyev helped explain this question:

"At present, the country has set out on a policy of reducing the Army and Navy and this has given rise to a new attitude toward the Armed Forces among the personnel. And here, in my opinion, there have been certain contributing factors. Some of the mass information media have greatly 'inflated' the army question in 'sketching it' in a negative manner. This has contributed largely in the decline of the prestige of the military profession. So some of the officers have begun doubting the advisability of further service. Supposedly, everything will be cut back. Would it not be better to leave for civilian life sooner in order to find a good job?..."

From the Data of a Sociological Poll. One out of every ten officers who submitted a request for discharge "was uncertain of tomorrow" and doubted that due to the army cutback he would be unable to serve out the number of years until retiring on pension.

The opinion of Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel A. Kurakov was very similar to the comment of Lieutenant Colonel V. Vasilyev. The piling up of requests for discharge, this officer said, was due to the fact that our command bodies had not yet learned to forecast one or another situation:

"For instance, if there is a cutback, the army would first get rid of those who had served the stipulated time as well as ineffective personnel. But promising, diligent and competent officers must be kept for the army. But in fact, unfortunately, the situation is otherwise."

"We have, for example, in our unit," he pointed out, "called together all the officers at one time and read to them the corresponding order: for anyone who wishes, write out a request for a discharge. And what happened? The request was filled out largely by young, conscientious, exemplary and well-proven officers.... At the same time, I am convinced that if on the spot we would have gone more deeply into the essence of the problems which had built up in the service of the officers, particularly the young ones, there would have been many fewer request.

In my opinion, careful 'selection' work with officer personnel is not being carried out. Many measures related to the cutback have been turned into a regular campaign. No consideration has been given to the real situation, to the moral-political and professional qualities of the men....

From the Data of the Sociological Poll. In 70 percent of the instances, along with other reasons for the departure of officers from the army, mention was also made of their dissatisfaction with domestic conditions, the disruption of families, including children, and the absence of normal housing. But only 37 percent of them were hopeful that after being discharged they would begin living "more humanly." Some 58 percent of the young officers was also dissatisfied with wages. Some 41 percent of the officers seeking to leave the army were hoping for an unregulated work day. At the same time, over 60 percent of them after dismissal into the reserves was fully determined to begin a new career, as they say, starting afresh.

These data lead to one thought: the men want to go into civil life to work and more fully realize their abilities. But these should be realized solely with benefit for society.

New Thinking and Relapses of Stagnation

"...That's enough! We can't go on like this! I am responsible for the border hedges, the toilets, for building by the 'catch-as-catch-can method,' and constantly reequipping the quarters. I am a combat officer and I should teach the soldiers what they require. As this is not required of me, I am going into civilian life. Possibly there I will find something to my liking and will bring about good," was how Capt S. Frolov put it in a conversation with me.

His "tirade" caused confusion as he had confidently handled the position of chief of staff in a motorized rifle battalion, he was a party activist and all of a sudden...he might be admitted to a military academy but no, he wanted to go back to civilian life. That was absurd. Then I wondered if possibly Frolov was merely a weak-willed person? In no way. The regimental leadership had a good opinion of the battalion chief of staff. "If they were all like him..." what was the matter?

Let us take a look.

Capt Frolov arrived in the motorized rifle regiment from a position of company commander of an intelligence battalion. With what warmth the officer recalled those days of his service! Even though he spent weeks on the range. And he came home only on Sundays and not always then. But Frolov considered precisely this time as the happiest for him. Because he was involved in his professional job of the combat training of personnel. This is a good example of the dialectic showing how little a person needs for happiness, that is, to be involved in an undertaking which is to his liking and to which he has decided to dedicate his life! But then, things did not work out and...a request appeared.

Something similar happened with certain other officers from the regiment....

In his conversations with me, Captains Frolov, Morozov and other officers who had submitted a request agreed that they must be concerned with providing amenities in the unit and other routine problems, there was no getting around this. But they certainly did not agree that everything must be done at the expense of combat training. And they gave flagrant facts of how with the knowledge of senior chiefs, precious time assigned for exercises had been wasted.

For example, from the superior staff there came an order to quickly break up the "old quarters" in the battalion. Clearly, someone did not like them. And so they broke them up. And they began building new ones. But why? Who needed this? In the unit was the given problem a primary one and all the others long since resolved? Or had surplus money appeared? Neither one nor the other. Simply someone from the superior personnel wanted it.

Many with whom I happened to speak drew my attention to a common pattern. Some of the negligent officers were particularly happy when various unexpected orders were received or emergencies occurred. Why? Well, because in the total mass of men involved it was possible to calmly lose oneself and not do anything. And this is what they did. But they benefited from advantages on an equal footing with all. For example, Senior Lieutenant A. Khloyev. He served poorly but did not intend to be discharged from the army as he did not think it advantageous to part with the "sinecure."

Thus appeared another paradox. The energetic Frolov and other equally energetic officers who are bothered by the problems submit requests for discharge. But the negligent Khloyev and others similar to them feel unperturbed. And this, it seems to me, is a consequence of the notorious leveling, when the poor organization of combat training and equal pay for both conscientious personnel and those who are not in the habit of making any particular effort give rise, on the one hand, to dissatisfaction with service and, on the other, complete indifference.

From the Data of the Sociological Poll. One out of every five officers who submitted a request was disappointed with the chosen career, as they see themselves in military service in a completely different quality: not as a "nurse" for subordinates or a superior "wherever they may be sent," but rather a true mentor and educator of the soldiers and sergeants. Some 25 percent of the officers do not want to serve because they are dissatisfied with the organization of their job and perform duties which do not correspond to their level of education and training.

...The commander of the motorized rifle battalion, the very same where Frolov is the chief of staff, Capt. M. Ivanov, told me:

"From a human viewpoint I understand Frolov very well. For this reason, I sent his request on. Of course, I

spoke with him. Certainly the army needs such officers. Time could have been found and several additional "soul-saving" conversations could have been held. Certainly everything should be thought through well and weighed. But I did not do this for I largely share the thoughts and feelings of my subordinate. And do you think it is just I?! Just take a look at how we live and serve. Instead of combat training there are all sorts of construction projects and emergencies. And how much rudeness and injustice all around? I would not be surprised if after a certain time the younger officers also submitted requests for discharge...."

The words of Capt M. Ivanov, unfortunately, have been affirmed in daily life. Thus, Lieutenant Pratov was living in the hotel of the Billeting and Maintenance Unit. But once he came back from the range and his things were out in the corridor. An officer from the unit staff, Lieutenant Colonel P. Suzdaltsev had been moved into his place. This officer took the "room" of the lieutenant and even the money which Pratov had paid for future rent was not returned. And no one came to the lieutenant's aid....

Yes, our officers are largely unprotected in legal terms. This, unfortunately, can clearly be seen in the draft of the new combined-arms regulations. For instance, the officer can be dressed down in front of subordinates, as is regularly done, for example, by Lieutenant Colonel V. Prikhodko. Or he can be sent to the guardhouse...supposedly for a uniform violation as occurred with Captain Morozov.

Or such a minor detail. At one time, the regiment was allocated some Japanese tape recorders. But not a word about how many to whom. The battalion under the command of Capt Ivanov, it learned, was to receive one. They were pleased. But when they went to the store to buy it, it turned out that this had already been done...by an officer from the unit staff, Lieutenant Colonel Kotlyar....

From the Data of the Sociological Poll. Among the other reasons causing the officers to leave the army, in 34 percent of the cases they pointed to factors related to a violation of the standards of social justice and the permissiveness by the leadership.

Some of the officers with whom I spoke endeavored to heap all the blame on the regiment's commander. Supposedly, he was largely to blame for the fact that an unhealthy moral atmosphere arose in the unit. He supposedly is to be responsible....

Undoubtedly, there is some reason in these assertions. But what about the party organization and the officer collective? Has it turned out that they have remained on the sidelines in solving the problems? Unfortunately, this is the case.

From the Data of the Sociological Poll. Among those who want to be discharged into the reserves, over 65 percent

are Communists and Komsomol members. Only 10 percent of those who filled out requests took them back....

...Capt Frolov was a secretary of the battalion party bureau and a leader who had been chosen by the subunit communists. Hence the officer had authority among this fellow servicemen. Why didn't the regimental party committee influence him and persuade him that the men needed him. But for some reason the party committee members did not do this. A similar picture is observed, unfortunately, not only in the regiment where Capt Frolov serves.

In particular, an anonymous study of the effective influence of party organizations on the life of their troop collectives as carried out in this unit by the deputy chief of the formation's political department Maj V. Semenov has shown that almost 70 percent of the CPSU members feel that the party committee has little impact on solving the problems confronting them. Some 67.7 percent of the communists stated that only a narrow group of party members is involved in carrying out vital questions relating to the life, routine and service of the subunits. Some 61.8 percent of those questioned pointed out that regardless of the acute criticism and the frank discussion of shortcomings at the party meetings, the situation had not changed for the better. Nothing had gone beyond mere words.

Let us return to the situation with Lieutenant Colonel P. Suzdaltsev who occupied the housing where Lieutenant Pratov was living. We must say directly that this was an immoral action. But this person behaved immorally after this. In the evenings he began to drink. Initially on the sly and then "noisily." He regularly used soldiers to clean up the traces of the "feasts." The music played on until midnight. Between "feasts" he heaped abuse on the women on duty on the floor and who were demanding silence. And Pratov was able to keep the soldier's room.

When I asked for a comment on this instance by the deputy regimental commander for political affairs, Maj R. Garayev, he was surprised:

"That cannot be! We will investigate. Clearly, there has been some mistake made."

The formation's chief of the political department also promised to investigate the situation and he just a little bit before had inspected the legality of the residence of the officers in the hotel but for some reason did not discover violations in occupancy.

They made a study. They promised that a reprimand would be entered in the personal file of Suzdaltsev by party procedures. And Pratov would be returned to his legitimate place. Seemingly, justice had triumphed. But deep in my soul, I was dissatisfied. My belief in the triumph of justice was "undercut" by conversations with certain senior officers from the formation who, unfortunately, did not see the "criminal" in the fact that the Lieutenant Colonel had illegally taken the lieutenant's place.

...Let me give one other example of social injustice. Senior Lieutenant S. Odrov had been deeply wounded both by service and by superiors. Some 18 months before he had been a communist and a company commander. Now he was a nonparty officer and was in command of a platoon. He was punished for the fact that he had sent a soldier to work in a civilian institution and the soldier had deserted home. Nothing happened to the soldier, but Odrov paid with his career. It turned out that other officers had engaged in similar practices but their punishments had been less severe....

The justice of a punishment and social justice. One reflects on this when one becomes acquainted with the data which I obtained in the garrison commandant's office. Here, unfortunately, the guardhouse is not empty. And officers are frequent "guests" here. And one is very struck by the contrasting infractions for which arrests were imposed: along with drunkenness, brawling and failure to report (Captains V. Titko and A. Izokh and Senior Lieutenant M. Trofimenko)...there were violations of the uniform, failure to salute and so forth (Captain A. Morozov, Senior Lieutenants O. Dudnik and A. Denisenko and Lieutenant S. Konyshев)....

One might ask: Have certain superiors always given some thought to the consequences of such "disciplinary practices"? Here there is just one answer: No!

Or take the following question. The regimental commander, for example, regularly "dresses down" the officers in the presence of their subordinates, belittling the honor and personal dignity of the men. And certainly it is known that evil, no matter how it is dressed up as a virtue, always gives rise solely to conflicts and exacerbates the situation. So it was in the conflict with the battery commander A. Podorazhnyuk who, having been fed up with hearing insults from the regimental commander addressed to him, in a rage threw down his cap on the ground and left the ranks. And for now just the ranks....

From the Data of the Sociological Poll. Virtually every officer who submitted a request has justified his desire to leave the army by dissatisfaction with various aspects of service activity and by the atmosphere which prevails in the military collective: is "wounded" by the impoliteness and boorishness of the senior commanders and feels himself without rights and socially unprotected.

This, in my view, shows the following trend: the men do not want to live in the old way and by requests for discharge are making an unique protest and voicing their disagreement with the existing facts of injustice. Many officers are now coming to recognize themselves as individuals, they are beginning to analyze what they have experienced using new criteria and assessing their current situation.

Are We Doing Everything to Convince Them?

In the mornings at the Cadres department of the formation, there is a line of officers and warrant officers.

Recently those who have decided to return to civilian life often show up here. The chief of the Cadres department, Lieutenant Colonel V. Vasilyev, shows particular attention to them. In assembling and systematizing the disturbing information about them, Viktor Mikhaylovich [Vasilyev] can clearly see how the situation has grown more complex. It is complicated by the fact that it is the young officers who, as a rule, express a reticence to serve.

From the Data of the Sociological Poll. Some 27 percent of the officers submit a request at the age of 21-23 years; around 43 percent at 23-25 years; 21 percent at the age of 25-30 years; the remainder at an age of over 30 years.

In order to substantiate this, let us turn to examples.

"...Meet Lieutenant Polyakov," said Lieutenant Colonel Vasilyev, pointing to a tall, broad-shouldered officer. He also does not want to serve. Yesterday they gave him new orders for a new position in the regiment. He spent some time there but obviously he didn't like it. And again he is back here at the staff.

We introduced ourselves. Here is what the lieutenant said of himself:

"After Afghanistan, I was able to serve in several regiments (and this was over a short period of time). And everywhere I concluded that I was not needed anywhere. There was nowhere to live, and I spent the night in Lenin rooms, on bare chairs. I did not receive the decorations for which I had been put up. Do you think I would want to serve after this?

And in Afghanistan he had done a real job. But back here...the only useful thing is the political exercises he conducts. As for the rest, it is administrative work, so much crowding and rushing following the principle "Stand here—go there." No one bothers to talk or speak. They consider you a robot. The chief of a regimental staff asks "Do you want to serve?" and I reply that I do not want to serve in that manner. So before you know it, there is the reply to go back where you came from. And so here I am back with Lieutenant Colonel Vasilyev. And here is a "soul-saving" conversation. Supposedly the state has spent money on you, and has given you an education. What have you then given the state? I understand such conversations perfectly well. But who understands me? Certainly the state taught me to do my job....

In a word, the lieutenant had encountered difficulties in his brief officer career. But certainly back there, in Afghanistan, it never occurred to him to leave the army. It was only having encountered "peacetime" problems when he submitted a request for a discharge. It turns out that it was easier for him in the war than here. Now he is wronged. He is unable to accept calmly today's reality and the related injustices.

Thus, the lieutenant is offended that no one needs him. That no one helps him on elementary matters. And this lack of understanding by certain superiors merely aggravates the situation.

Seemingly, what would have prevented the regimental chief of staff where Polyakov went for questioning him in more detail about the existing problems and shown some concern and involvement? What prevented Lieutenant Colonel Vasilyev from helping the lieutenant in deeds along with the "soul-saving" conversations? To be concerned that Polyakov was not "bounced" from unit to unit. To try to learn about the fate of the "gone astray" submissions for decorations? Then the list of officers not wanting to serve possibly would have been one shorter. And an effective one.

Unfortunately, certain chiefs burdened down with daily routine matters have grown accustomed to being callous to the young officers. They hand out orders or say the official words in official conversations and that is it....

The problem is that at present such a way of action does not work. Life dictates that it is time to turn toward another person and extend a helping hand to him. It is time to share both grief and happiness with him. But how easy all this is to write on paper. And how difficult to adjust in reality!

...If one hears various opinions about a man, interest in him is heightened. Clearly, for this reason I was interested in the personality of Sr Lieutenant K. Yurchenko who also had submitted a request for a discharge. The unit command felt that the request must be granted. But "closer" superiors and subordinates felt that Yurchenko should be talked out of it and helped. Who was right? Incidentally, here you could guess and argue as much as you like. Lieutenant Colonel A. Kurakov helped understand the situation.

"You have to know the men. Then everything will be understandable in them. For me, Yurchenko is an open book. He rapidly establishes relations with the soldiers. He doesn't stand aside from them because he has good experience: in the former place of service earlier he lived for months with the platoon in a single tent. He ate out of the same mess pot as the soldiers. It was not bad that he could rough it. And that he went around rumpled is a rectifiable matter. It was difficult for him to keep clean as he was constantly in the equipment park, it can be said he spent his nights and days at the range and was not married. Where could he get his uniform washed and ironed? Yurchenko would have made a good officer. But you would have to work with him. But he became burned out and tired of service. He had spent a long time in one rank and was not being promoted. For this reason, he submitted a request for discharge. But here is the paradox. In the battalion there are men who serve much worse than Yurchenko. But they do not submit requests and it would be very difficult to take them out of the army."

At the end of our conversation, Lieutenant Colonel Kurakov said the following:

"I could already retire on a pension. But, it might be asked, who will remain with those who take my place, if many energetic young officers also leave the army?"

Kurakov's words sketched out an interesting picture. The battalion commander, in describing his subordinate, spoke with pain about the problems related to the reduction in the size of the army, and reflected rather pertinently and aptly on the selection of young officers and on the need for individual educational work with them, but himself actually was removed from this. Hence, in principle, he was indifferent to the fate of Yurchenko. Why? We feel that partially the battalion commander has been "infected" with such an attitude by examples from the work of the unit certification commission. We estimated with Maj A. Flegantov that over one-half of the officers submitted by the command for discharge into the reserves had been characterized to the highest degree affirmatively. What did this mean: indifference, or possibly, simply the inability to think things out?

From the Data of the Sociological Poll. The low effectiveness of individual educational work carried out with the officers who had submitted requests for discharge was noted. Only in one out of ten cases, as has already been pointed out, did such work achieve the goal of withdrawing the request. But here is something that must be pointed out. Almost 77 percent of the officers who requested departure for civilian life were energetic in service and were described as conscientious, efficient men. And as a rule, they remained thus until the last day of service.

And certainly it is easier to persuade conscientious and aware personnel. But why could they not be talked out of it. The army is largely losing its very flower.

In our last conversation, when I was sharing impressions on my mission with the deputy chief of the political department, Maj V. Semenov, he said to me:

"Your proposals to solve the problems related to the discharging of officers from the army are premature. But then you must grow accustomed and become fully involved in the real problems of the garrison in order to correctly assess many facts and phenomena."

Possibly, I would agree with him. But then I have relistened to the tape recordings of talks with officers who did not want to serve in the army and have concluded that I do not have to revise my views. Certainly I was endeavoring to look at the problems of the garrison officers with their own eyes. With the eyes of those who had submitted a request for a discharge. And I am very hopeful that I did not err in determining the reasons which have caused the military men to leave for civilian life....

And I would like to add: the army does not stand to gain without many of those who wrote out or are writing a request for a discharge. And let me hurry to add that those who are still hesitating or have not yet taken this step, my advice is don't hurry! It is easy to leave and

much more difficult to return. And let me say to their superiors: Do not remain indifferent to the young officers!

Help them. Help them now for tomorrow will be too late.

Footnote

* Here and below we have used data from a survey of 160 political workers from various military districts and troop groupings as conducted by student of the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin Major M. Ivanov, under the leadership of the Chief of the Chair for Social and Military Psychology at the Academy, Doctor of Psychological Sciences, Colonel S. Syedin.

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Conclusions of Study on Naval Officer's Work, Free Time

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[Article by Col Ye. Lukashenya, entitled: "Who Is To Blame That Working Time is 'Endless'?" The question was asked of numerous Northern Fleet officers who serve 16-18 hours a day and have an average of 10-15 days off a year. The author, Yevgeniy Ilich Lukashenya completed the Journalism Faculty at the Lvov Higher Military School (1971) and the Military Pedagogic Faculty of the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin (1981). He has worked as an organizer-correspondent and department chief of the editorial staff of a district newspaper. He presently is the editor for the Department of Military Pedagogy and Psychology of the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL. He is a member of the USSR Journalists' Union. He has won the Prize of the USSR Minister of Defense. The first paragraph is an editorial introduction.]

[Text] In 1972, the Northern Fleet Political Directorate conducted a sociological study to determine the actual amounts of working and free time for various categories of officer personnel. At that time the research helped to work out specific measures to systematize service on the ships and in the units as well as eliminate many "painful" questions. Our correspondent was given the task of studying how this problem is being carried out now. What has changed? To what degree now does the working and free time of the officers correspond to the constitutional rights and ensure sufficient combat readiness of the fleet? Under real conditions what could and should this time be?

The author of the article was able to talk with the command and political workers of a number of units and formations, with many shore and ship officers, attend various assemblies and meetings and observe the course of the exercises and the training of the crews for long voyages. Voicing their opinion on this matter were the Northern Fleet Commander, Admiral F. Gromov, and Military Council Member and Political Directorate Chief

Vice Admiral S. Vargin. Some 1,012 officers replied to the questions of the journal's special questionnaire. The results of this poll as well as personal observations and conclusions from talks with the Northern Fleet officers were used as the basis for the published material.

In the Throes of Old Approaches

The Red Banner Northern Fleet. The major naval sentry of the fatherland. Leaving from here for their battle stations are the nuclear missile-carrying submarines capable of remaining for many months on independent cruises both under the Arctic ice and deep in the ocean's waters. Plying the expanses of the world ocean in constant readiness for action are the powerful carrier and missile cruisers, destroyers, large and small ASW, landing, patrol and other ships and auxiliary vessels.

But the main strength of the fleet is its personnel. In their hands the unbelievably complex equipment shows its capabilities. The servicing of such equipment requires from the officers, warrant officers and seamen an enormous effort as well as time. Often this is at the expense of a lengthening of the workday. Certainly military labor is specific. An officer or warrant officer should remain in service for as long as the interests of combat readiness require. And not merely be here but also dedicate all his strength, knowledge and experience to carrying out those tasks which confront the subunit, ship or unit. This is our profession. For the sake of service interests, personal time is not to be reckoned. Each officer is morally ready, it would seem, for this and none complains of difficulties caused by objective necessity. At times, need forces one to spend days readying equipment and subordinates for an exercise or for the passing of a course problem or for field firing at the ranges. It may also happen that circumstances emerge that for several months running there is not a single day off. There is no friction or hard feelings if the effort is justified. But if the lengthening of the workday is caused by mistakes of the staffs or by the inability of certain leaders to properly organize service, the life and activities of the personnel, then this causes dissatisfaction.

Here we should recall the words of M.V. Frunze. He said that "...the workday of our commander averages at least 12 hours and there are places where it reaches 13 and even 14 hours.... We do not know how to organize our work. We must learn to save time."

The data obtained in the course of the study show the great overburdening and disorder of working time for a significant portion of the fleet officers and particularly for the crews.

From an analysis of questionnaires. While in 1972, some 33.8 percent of the questioned officers had a workday lasting 12 and more hours, at present this is now true for 78.4 percent of the servicemen in this category. Here some 21.7 percent work 16 and more hours.

Table: Data Characterizing Length of Officer's Workday:

Category of Officers Questioned	Length of Workday			
	12 Hours		14 and More Hours	
	1972	1989	1972	1989
Submariners	85	86.7	no data	53.4
Surface ships	75	89.9	"	56.8
Shore units	16.9	67.4	"	47.4
Rear Service facilities	15	45.7	"	17.1
Command organizations	13	27.6	"	11.2
Unit, ship commanders	51.5	78.8	"	59.5

Note. Given in percentage of number of persons questioned.

As we see, working time has already eliminated free time and is even advancing against those hours and minutes which are needed for a person to satisfy physiological needs. Let me add: many officers annually spend around 6 months at sea, when the demands on them, it can be felt, are around-the-clock.

A colossal responsibility, but one accepted by all! Often this is at the limit of a man's physical and moral abilities. The service activities of ship officers in terms of their severity, accelerated wear and tear on the organism, the degree of psychoemotional stress and the number of stress situations can scarcely be compared with any other activity. Medics have stated that approximately by age 45, many ship officers show an exhausted nervous system. Each year, in the Navy because of health a number of officers is written off equal to two graduating classes of a naval school. Alarming statistics.

The disorder in the working time of a majority of the fleet officers turns them, the persons who are the most obliged and responsible for the security of the nation and the fate of mankind, into persons who in many regards are the most without rights and socially unprotected. They are not showered with comfort either at sea or on land. And the dream of all is the most mundane: not of an 8-hour but at least a 10-12-hour workday, and not 2 days off a week but at least 1, but guaranteed; they are in favor of precise regulation of service time and for the strictest observance of the daily routine.

At times, equipment and weaponry move man into the background. This is so at times when ships are given the "okay" to set to sea. "Is all of your equipment in order?" comes the question for the ship. "The equipment is in order," follows the answer. And the trip is permitted. But what is the state of the crew? It must also be said that the designers, when they were designing certain submarines and surface vessels, clearly were not thinking sufficiently about the personnel. Some places the head room is low and the backs of those on watch are propped up with pyramids of instruments. The officers and warrant officers frequently live in the close 4-meter cabins and many ships make no provision for sports quarters. But this is a separate discussion.

It can scarcely be seriously thought that someone must tolerate the hardship and deprivations of service and merely find satisfaction in this. If a person sees that generally a normal life is going on around him, then he, in overcoming difficulties constantly, begins to feel wounded. This is the reason why in recent years among a portion of the officer personnel there has been a marked decline in the authority of service and particularly on ships. There are not even any persons who would particularly wish to work on the command bridge. Easier, less responsible positions on shore have become prestigious.

On one of the ships I was a witness when in response to a strict reprimand for oversights in service, the commander of the engine room group responded in the following manner: "I work without any days off. I have the position of a Senior Lieutenant. If you were to write me off the ship, I would merely be grateful. Any position on shore would be much more attractive than the present one."

Yes, at present the paradox is that harsh measures are at times impotent in changing anything for the better.

From the materials of the research. Over the six months of the current year, 38 officers from the Northern Fleet were discharged from the Armed Forces for personal lack of discipline and for various infractions, an equal number was relieved of duty and four men reduced in rank. Certain negligent officers from the crews intentionally get involved in various conflicts in order to be transferred to shore or generally discharged from the Armed Forces by any means. In the submarine formation alone, where Capt 2d Rank V. Yashchuk serves, from January through May of this year, 43 junior officers submitted requests for discharge into the reserves. Clearly the reason for such changes in view are the serious flaws in the system of moral and material incentives for the crews and, it is certainly no secret, the failure to elaborate many organizational questions which frequently do not depend upon the ship personnel.

As an example, take the unjustified prohibitions for officers to go on shore because of various "organizational periods" the aim of which is at times not even clear to the very initiators of such measures. Officially, the "organizational period" (that is, when for 10-15 days, the ship crew is preparing to take a course problem) has been eliminated recently in the fleet, but it actually continues to operate. Only the form of introducing it has altered. Now the "organizational period" is given to one or two commanders when there are certain problems in their departments. And they naturally announce the same for the inferior commanders. And the inferior ones do this for their subordinates. And, as a result, remaining on the ship are not only the duty and watch service and those ordered by the regulations, but also the officers and warrant officers of the shift being relieved.

Right-of-Way

Because of the poor organization of service, "sitting-it-out" on ships continues for days and continues in this manner for weeks and months. Because the presence on board of as many officers as possible is seen by certain leaders as the only panacea against all arising problems. In Severomorsk, in returning late one evening to the hotel, on a pier at the gates of the checkpoint I saw scores of women patiently waiting for the arrival of their husbands on shore. Some had come with their children. Others, having given up hope of meeting their husbands, had gone home alone.

Once I noticed a young woman sitting on a bench near the exit. She looked so upset that I decided to talk to her. Tatyana Ivanovna Gorlova on that day had passed her last exam for an institute, and she had agreed ahead of time with her husband that they would hold a family celebration. Today he was to come off shift, but had not yet arrived. She said that her father had been a sailor. But she did not remember that her father, like the husband, had been held up so long or did not come home for weeks when the ship was docked at the pier. Suddenly her face was illuminated with a radiant smile. Walking or actually running through the gates of the checkpoint was a Senior Lieutenant. It was just 20 minutes to midnight. I asked why they were so late.

"Well," said the Senior Lieutenant shrugging sadly, "a subordinate had been given a reprimand. The commander ordered that we inspect how it had been eliminated."

One wonders if this was such a weighty cause, a reprimand to a subordinate, to deprive his commander of his rest. Why has it become a system, for instance, in sending three or four sailors for some economic work to appoint an officer in charge or, in an exceptional instance, a warrant officer? A group of sailors is sent to the movies and again an officer goes along as in charge. Swabbing the deck and again an officer is in charge. It is as if there were no petty officers in charge of cleaning, no squad commanders, no team petty officers. One must agree, such a style of work not only keeps the officers above any measure in the subunits and on the ships but also strikes at the very prestige of their vocation.

In front of me is the copy of a letter. It is a long letter but in order to understand its essence and the pain of a human soul, let me quote it in full, without changing anything in it.

"Greetings, dear comrades! I, the wife of a naval officer, would like to hope very much that this letter might change something in our terrible (I can find no other word for this) life. And what I would like first of all is that the family see the father and husband and that he does not appear at home as some rare guest. My husband serves on the nuclear-powered missile cruiser 'Kirov.' They have a two-shift work [schedule] there, so one would realize that my husband is virtually never home. Due to constant sea trials, he has missed his tours on

shore and days off and the work week reaches 120 hours! (According to the USSR Constitution, this should not exceed 41 hours.) And when my husband does come home, it is in such a state that I simply lack the courage to ask him for any help, and he is literally falling off his feet. Everything is falling apart at home. With a small child to care for, I am completely worn out both physically and morally. I spend all my time alone, and the child does not see its father. And soon my husband will be leaving for a 6-month voyage. This is no life. And there is no light at the end of the tunnel. There is not even the warming hope that there might be some improvement. I have no job, as there is no place to put the child. And there are masses of others like me. I must say I merely want to cry from bitterness and shame, when one reads or hears from civilians that the 'warriors' are overfed and live too well. If they had felt this on their own skin (excuse me for the impolite tone), they would not say this....

"The officers from the 'Kirov' are being worn out to an extreme degree (this, of course, applies to those working conscientiously). But what sort of high combat readiness or what recuperation of strength by the officers can there be with such tense service conditions, constant stress and extremely little time for leisure? I feel that supervision should be tightened over how the officers work and how and how much the officers rest. Some three months ago I met with the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral F. Gromov, and asked him questions about the double-shift system and the recovery of the lost days off. He replied that the two-shift system was introduced in extreme circumstances for a short period of time and that the lost days off should be recovered. He also spoke about systematizing the workday of the officers. But for now all of this is just words and nothing has actually changed. Possibly you will help the crew officers and their families not grow gray so soon.

"With respect, the officer's wife, I.G. Samsonenko."

Such a letter, it can be said, is a cry of the soul. I was acquainted with its content by the fleet commander, Admiral S. Gromov. Felix Nikolayevich commented:

"It is not fleet service as such which is the reason for the aggravated problem of the shore leave for the officers. For the personnel of the cruiser 'Kirov' this year cannot be called particularly intense. The ship was under repair and did not set to sea. The commander had a complete opportunity to organize a normal workday. Along with combat readiness, one must also show concern for the personnel who comprise the basis of this combat readiness. I think that with the political directorate we will rectify the situation on the 'Kirov'."

Almost three months have passed since then. We were confident that measures would be taken on the letter without fail. But then recently a new letter arrived from Irina Gennadyevna.

"...Recently I returned from my parents in Leningrad. I went there with my child and underwent a major operation. Only now am I more or less recovered. Incidentally, this operation and my illness were largely the consequence of a 'happy' family life. I must inform you that in the area of the workday and days off for my husband there have been no changes for the better. Quite the contrary, it has become even worse. Because of my extremely severe state and stay in recovery, my husband was granted a portion of his leave. He came to Leningrad. I was in recovery, there was no place to leave our child and there were other difficulties. Now we are back home. On the cruiser 'Kirov,' the men are again exhausted and everything is as before. Even worse, as they are expecting an inspection, a nervous tense situation prevails and there can be no question of any normal life.

"You inquire whether anyone spoke with me or what advice was given? Alas, no one had any intention to speak with me. And in principle, I am certain that this would not have altered anything in the completely hopeless situation of the crew. These are the most disenfranchised persons in our country. And in an officer family it is even worse. It is difficult to live materially, I cannot find a job and there is no place to put our child. I went to our RONO [rayon public education department], I had just broached the question of putting our child on the list for the nursery when the civilians from this institution stated: 'No one summoned your husband, and certainly not you, here.' As a result, we are left empty-handed. I see my husband occasionally. The ship is in port, but my husband does not come home for 7-10 days. In order that the child does not forget his father, I show him a photograph. And when the father, completely exhausted, crosses the threshold of his home, he wants nothing to do with his son but merely to make it to the sofa. Who has freed our husbands from the duty to their family and the raising of their children? Why should an officer's workday equal around-the-clock not only month after month, but year after year?

"Certainly it does not seem just to me alone that there is an open sore in the Northern Fleet. It is hard to say where the solution lies. But something must be done so that everything does not end in a major tragedy (like the loss of the 'Komsomolets'). I am not afraid of writing such letters, although very many are. I am not afraid because we have nothing to lose....

"And so you have my letter. But this is still written in rosy tones in comparison with my emotional state...."

Why has nothing changed in the life of Samsonenko and her husband? Certainly, as Admiral F. Gromov said, the command itself could have resolved the question of systematizing the officer's workday and solved it in such a manner that "service necessity" and the elementary requirements of a family are no longer in disharmony. During the mission to the Northern Fleet I happened to spend a half-day on board the cruiser "Kirov." Unfortunately, at that time I did not know about the letter

from Irina Gennadyevna. But then I recalled a two hour conversation with the ship's commander. There were traces of fatigue in the thin face of the officer. The day before he had not had any sleep for almost 24 hours (he had still not been on leave). No, I would never accuse him alone for all this.

"Yes, the men are overworked and the daily routine is overfull," said the Captain 2d Rank angrily. "It is not because of an easy life that we have a two-shift work [schedule]. There is a mass of reasons for this which do not depend either on myself or even upon the fleet commander. There is no money. We try to save in everything, but this savings at times passes us by...I personally do not have any problem of free time, because I do not have any of it at all. I do not see my two children for weeks on end. My wife does not work and tried to get a job in a nursery, even as a janitor, but they would not take her.... You would not believe it, but at present a ship commander is the most set-upon individual. Any telephone message can order him to carry everything out personally. But even if I were everywhere, there would still not be enough...."

It would be hard not to agree with the opinion of the commander of the cruiser "Kirov." It does happen that they simply do not consider how busy they are. Many orders and instructions to the commanders of units and ships are accompanied by categorical "urgents": "report personally...", "inspect personally...", "monitor personally...." In this manner the staffs endeavor to cover themselves, or to put it figuratively, and are setting out markers, forgetting that the ship regulations clearly define what a commander is personally responsible for and what are the duties of his mates, the commanders of the departments and the service chiefs. Is this not the reason for the blunders, the evermore frequent shifts of training measures, the failures of the daily regime and the time improperly wasted? It certainly should be obvious that in planning the work, each superior official should without fail consider the load on subordinates.

The Situation of a Short Blanket

The problem of days off and the systematizing of the workday is equally bad on the small ships as on the large.

On the net-tender "Sukhona" I happened to become acquainted with some curious data. Capt 3d Rank A. Pokrovskiy had kept a schedule from which you could see that in January he was on the ship without a day off for 18 days, in February—18 days, in March—21 and in April—22. In January, he went ashore 11 times, in February and March 10 each and in April 8 times. The time going off duty was 2130 hours and the return was 0730 hours. In January and February, he had 1 day off each month, and in March and April had none at all. One can imagine the thoughts and feelings of Pokrovskiy when he is literally 7 minutes' walk to his home but doesn't see his family for weeks or even months.

"I am still in a privileged position," said Anatoliy Kirillovich [Pokrovskiy]. "The ship is at the pier.

Recently I have had two or even three days off a month. And some of the officers on the coastal and seagoing minesweepers, which are permanently on patrol, did not manage even a score of days at home last year. And this year, there won't be many more."

To a certain degree the situation is exacerbated by the fact that there are just five officers on the fourth-rank ships. If someone takes ill, has gone on leave or a temporarily vacant position has appeared, then the remainder cannot go on shore leave. These are facts which, as they say, are inescapable.

However, the systematizing of the workday depends largely upon the officers themselves, their professionalism and organization. Many have not yet learned to work according to a previously compiled plan. Such officers are often caught up in matters which come up accidentally and lose sight of the main thing in the routine. At the end of the day, they suddenly recall that they have much still to do and must remain at work. Only nine percent of the officers in the questionnaires stated that they work strictly according to a plan. Some 60 percent of the ship and unit commanders, 72 percent of the commanders of the subunits and departments, 53 percent of the political workers and 64 percent of the representatives of the rear bodies stated that their style was no planning.

At times, an officer, as they say, is not the master of himself. He plans one thing but then the circumstances arising above dictate something quite different and no consideration is given to how busy he may be. Hence the problems and wasted time.

"Not always caused by service necessity" was the reason stated by 76 percent of the officers participating in the questionnaire concerning the reason they were held up on the ships and in the units above the established time. These included:

Category of Officers Questioned	1972	1989
Commanders of units, ships	47	75.7
Commanders of departments, subunits	69	80.2
Political workers	37.3	81.3
Submariners	71	83.6
Surface ships	55	81.3
Rear Services	50	58.9
Directorates	42	49.7
Shore units	30	77.1

Note. Given in percentage of persons questioned.

In frank conversations, many even asserted that in the army it was virtually impossible to systematize the workday and immediate concerns would always be found. Is this the case? I feel not. Could the commander of the missile cruiser "Marshal Ustinov," Capt 3d Rank G. Frunza and the Deputy Commander for Political Affairs of the Floating Dock "Ivan Kolyshkin", Capt 3d

Rank A. Burya, not only have achieved in their collectives the precise observance of the daily schedule and organized the service and leisure of their subordinates according to the regulations, but also find the strength and opportunity to mitigate the disruptive influence of all sorts of objective and subjective circumstances. There are many such communists in the Northern Fleet.

But alas, in the fleet there still are many leaders of various ranks who often endeavor to carry out new tasks with old methods, although these no longer produce or can produce the expected results. A situation of a short blanket arises: if you pull it up over your head your feet are cold and vice versa.... All that has been achieved in the Northern Fleet has been done largely by intensifying the labor of the officers, warrant officers and crews. Instead of maintaining consistency and planning in all matters, certain superiors have followed a policy of merely extending working time and create unnecessary stress for subordinates. To the just dissatisfaction of the men, they reply that far from everything depends upon them and supposedly circumstances are to blame. But what are these circumstances, what is their nature?

The fleet has its procedures. Each day at approximately 1800 hours the ship commanders assemble for the evening report. This can last an hour or two. Among the crews, everyone is waiting for the commanders. There can be no question of going on shore until they arrive. Because a commander can return from the staff with an urgent assignment. Recently, such a thing happened. And why do various inputs occur precisely at the end of the day? Was it really impossible for the planning bodies to foresee and anticipate them?

"Recently," said Capt 3d Rank A. Kulibaba with indignation, "at 1930 hours we were given the task of escorting a detachment of combat ships. We received the order literally several hours before carrying it out. But why could we have not been informed about this earlier, when the fleet's staff was planning this? An order is an order, and two coastal minesweepers were quickly readied. At 2210 hours, one of them had already cast off when suddenly orders came to come back and wait. We sat waiting for the signal. At 0200 hours, we were informed that the escort was expected at 0630 hours. Near morning, we received a new message of shifting to 1250 hours.... A complete muddle. The rest for the officers was interrupted and there was no real service as such. We sometimes wonder what they are thinking about there, at the fleet staff."

Incidentally, such instances when the staff and the HQ directorate do not set an example of professionalism and

organization for the officers of the ships and subunits are not isolated. Here is what Capt 1st Rank V. Yurchenko said:

"Last year, from January through August, almost 50 percent of our sea cruises for the submarines for combat training occurred on Saturdays and Sundays. We deprived the officers of rest. I went to the fleet staff and complained. They began to take a look. It turned out that the beginning of operations for the sub on the range was set for Monday. In the fleet directorate little concern was given to the fact that for this the boat would have to leave the base on Sunday. But we, the commanders and political workers on the spot, are also guilty of this."

Analogous complaints of the work style of the planning bodies could be heard in many units. The flaws in their activities lead to unforeseen inputs. The tasks set for the staffs of the units in the morning often reach the ships only in the evening. The officers from the directorates and services have left for home, but on the ships the crews are starting the peak of the work. Trucks carrying supplies for the ships arrive at the pier, as a rule, toward evening. The supply bodies have been in no hurry to load and dispatch them and the workday is over for them, and you, sailors, can do what you like with them.

Nor is it easy for the officers of the shore units. They often receive "from above" threatening orders like: "On holidays, cease all work, seal the quarters and ensure their security and fire safety." After this follows a new order: "Open the quarters, summon the maintenance personnel, unload the railroad cars and ensure the absence of any stoppages." That is, everyone is to rest but also do emergency jobs.

At any moment, no matter what the officers are engaged in on a ship or in a unit, their endless work can be invaded by an arrhythmia upon orders from above and an unexpected order can catch them. For instance, on a neighboring ship, the officer on watch dropped a knife in the water, in another unit a sailor flagrantly violated the safety measures in operating electrical equipment and a petty officer 2d class, while on a brief leave, went swimming and drowned—and immediately all the sub-units receive instructions to have all the personnel study the safety measures, take quizzes and report up the line of command. There is no doubt about it, such warnings are essential in order to increase the vigilance of the others. But on the other hand, the measures carried out as an emergency, in taking up a great deal of time due to their lack of organization, not only disrupt the work plans of the officers but also do not bring much tangible benefit. The mere recording of negative phenomena in and of itself does not solve the problem. Only systematic work can produce effective results.

The Data Characterizing Level of Organization in Officer Workday

Category of Officers Questioned	Organized Rationally		Unevenly Busy		Overloaded	
	1972	1989	1972	1989	1972	1989
Submariners	4.7	4.2	49	31.2	44	64.6
Surface ships	9.9	3.9	43	26.9	46	69.2
Shore units	24.4	7.7	39	34	33	58.3
Rear services	16.6	11.6	41	32.3	40	56.1
Directorates	24	19.4	31	27.1	40	53.7
Commanders of units, ships	7.2	6.6	36.2	11.8	54.6	81.6
Commanders of departments, subunits	6	5.9	50.1	15.4	41.9	78.7
Political workers	20	17.3	28.3	19.5	48.7	63.2

Note. Given in percentage of number of persons questioned.

According to the Iceberg Principle

No matter how strange this might sound, after several years of fighting for the primacy of combat training, in certain fleet collectives this still has not become the major concern and as before gets lost among the other problems such as duties, watches, the collecting of scrap metal, the writing off and receiving of supplies and so forth. We have repeatedly heard officers complain that there must be a sounder approach to the allocating of duty. Guard duty, with all its importance, must not be turned into a difficult burden for the crew. As the research has shown, each month the crews are given two or three fold more of all sorts of details and duty in the unit and garrison than in the shore units which, as is known, are not always burdened down with concern for the personnel.

The commander of the submarine "Magnitogorskij Komsomolets" described with indignation:

"On the average, each month the submarines at base in our small unit must provide: four garrison details of 21 men each, seven galley details of 16 men each, 10 officers and 20 seamen in a garrison patrol, three officers for duty in the commandant's office, and 17 details for unit patrol. Each officer is removed for up to a half month from the internal life of the ship. And there are also watches on the submarines themselves. The time remaining to the officers is not sufficient to put order in their job even poorly. They cannot even think about leisure and days off!..."

The standing of a large number of shore details by ship's personnel unjustifiably takes a great deal of time from the main undertaking. At least the crews getting ready for a long voyage should be given an opportunity to be involved only with their ship. It is impossible to cancel the shore details. What do the officers propose? Introduce modern electronic systems which require fewer men to service. Use guard dogs. Reduce the number of guard details and the servicemen engaged in them by VOKhr [militarized security] details and introduce vehicle-mounted patrols. And the main thing is that it is essential if not to expand, then at least materially

strengthen the shore subunits. They should assume the duties which are now borne by the ship personnel.

There have been repeated articles about the injustice of the existence of a "system of responsible officers" along with the duty and watch service. Regardless of the condemnation of such practices, in the fleet some firmly hold to the view that the longer the officers are with the personnel the more order there will be. In looking through the telegraph message log, you can see for yourself that on the eve of holidays or certain major political events in the nation, the superior leadership without fail "reminds" the command of the units and the ships to assign responsible officers. Their introduction is not simply demanded but rather there is justification supposedly from the "need to increase combat readiness," or "strengthen the fight against violations" and so forth and so forth.

At times, things take a curious turn. Flag specialists from one of the submarine formations where Capt 3d Rank N. Zakurenkov serves, not without irony even described the introduction of "an officer to oversee the activities of the formation duty officer." In order not to insult a fellow serviceman, he did not intervene into the other's actions, but rather walked aimlessly back and forth. And thus time was wasted which could have been used for leisure, for the family.

"Clearly," wrote Maj V. Dmitruchenko in the fleet newspaper, "someone wants to sleep peacefully at the expense of the 'vigilance' of the support officers who waste hundreds and thousands of hours. Proper order in the collective must be reinforced daily by all means and forms and not by the presence of unique supervisors in the subunit."

It is not only in such a role that you will see officers during those hours when they should be home resting with their families. They are even found in the role of officer in charge of a detail on economic work. But this is not done by their own choice, but rather upon instructions from the leadership. Here are just two telephone messages to the commander of a submarine unit. "In line with the arrival of a Fleet Rear Services Commission,

today from 1930 to 2130 hours, a major clean-up is to be organized in the assigned mess areas. For this personnel lead by a senior officer are to be assigned." It was signed by Capt 1st Rank G. Suchkov.

"1. From 0900 hours to 1300 hours, in the assigned areas of the work territories, the garrison is to be brought into proper order in line with the arrival of a senior chief. 2. Particular attention is to be paid to clearing the pedestrian walkways and roads of domestic and construction rubble. 3. The commanders of the units are to put the execution of the work under their personal supervision. They are to report personally on execution." This was signed by Rear Admiral B. Malyarchuk.

For two days running (on Saturday and Sunday), instead of conducting sports and mass cultural measures with the personnel or resting with families, the submarine commanders headed their crews in cleaning up the territory of the base. One can only imagine their thoughts and feelings. I do not feel that the widely respected Admiral from Moscow in whose honor the clean-up was carried out would have been elated if he learned of this. But analogous orders were issued in all the formations which he visited or intended to visit.

Other senior chiefs walk on carpets specially laid for them, they see fresh paint (a desire to throw up a smokescreen) but consider this the standard. Sham and eyewash at times assume a hypertrophied character. Naval officers have a sense of humor. And one should hear with what sarcasm they described how before the arrival of the Commission of the Navy Commander-in-Chief, the chief ordered the snow in front of the command post to be painted. But even nature would not tolerate such an absurdity. The next morning, suddenly there was a thaw, father frost was asleep and the sun peeked out and...the white "milky" streams flowed. Funny? For some reason you don't want to laugh. The time has come to demand personal responsibility for such zeal in service.

(Conclusion Follows)

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Leningrad MD: Survey on State of Officer Corps
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in Russian 9 Jan 90 p 2

[Interview with Col Gen V.F. Yermakov, commander of the Leningrad Military District, by Lt Col S. Neporada, entitled: "The Officer Corps". The first paragraph is an editorial introduction.]

[Text] It is unprecedented. That is what can be said about the study conducted among the troops of the Leningrad Military District in the fall of 1989. It concerned the social status of officers and their family members. We

began the conversation with Colonel General V.F. Yermakov, Commander of the District, with the results of the study.

[Col Gen Yermakov] Yes, such a study indeed was never conducted before. The interest in them is the result of the increase in attention to what scientists call the human factor, simply put, concern about people in the Army and about what influences service one way or another.

I would not say that the results of the study were a big surprise to us. We sense the acuteness of the problems of everyday life facing service members and are resolving them as far as possible. The study helped us see more clearly the trends and phenomena in military life. It showed that there is cause for concern in connection with the social status of military cadres.

I would note that, for the most part, these are people who are not spoiled by worldly goods. They consciously took the step toward what the regulations call the rigors and deprivations of military service. But with all the long-suffering, many have reached their limit. Thus, 91 percent of those surveyed do not hide their dissatisfaction with the pay and believe that with today's inflation and deficit, military pay is not in line with the expenditure of physical and moral efforts. I can understand them.

Here is what one of the officers wrote in the questionnaire: "Now my main goal is to be discharged into the reserve. I have not yet filled out an application, since there is nowhere to move with my family, but it is also sickening to serve in this situation. I am paid 260 rubles a month for working 12-14 hours a day, 10-12 days in a row. I cannot provide decent clothes for my wife. It is shameful. I cannot materially help my parents, who are pensioners. That is also shameful."

It was mainly due to precisely these kinds of sentiments that about 200 applications for early discharge into the reserve were submitted in our district. The vast majority of them were from young officers, that is, from representatives of the generation of military cadres to whom responsibility for the future of the Army and the security of the country is now passing.

[Neporada] A year ago, I would have been surprised by the very fact that the results of such a study have not been locked away as a secret. Now we are beginning grow accustomed to articles which disclose the numerical strength of the armed forces and the structure of the military budget. Maybe you will tell us more about the results of the training year in the district than in past times?

[Col Gen Yermakov] Perhaps we should finish talking about officers' dissatisfaction with their status. It is spreading beyond the level of social protection. Very many officers are dissatisfied with the poor organization of duty in the unit and with the diversion of combat officers to perform unrelated assignments. I see in this dissatisfaction one of the manifestations of ideological maturity and, if you will, a state approach to the job and

to the utilization of military cadres. So, the disorders in the daily structure and material security have not dulled the officers' sense of responsibility for their professional duty and for performance of their duties.

This is also evidenced by the fact that according to the testing results for the 1989 training year, all formations, units, and institutions of the district were rated favorably. The same goes for operational and tactical training of troops and staffs: the readiness of alert personnel and equipment for combat use is being maintained; the tactical and weapons proficiency of motorized rifle and tank subunits has improved.

It is also no secret that we are concerned when analyzing what has been done in the past year. And this included the following.

As you know, recently the question has been sharply raised about maintaining the country's defense capability not by increasing material assets and the number of people assigned to look after them, but through higher quality of equipment and armaments and the better training of specialists. All this is expressed by a capacious formula—the priority of qualitative parameters. But this formula is being implemented more slowly than is required. This is primarily due to the adherence of part of the command and political cadres to old methods of training subunits and command bodies and of raising the quality of instruction. Here again we encounter subjective reasons and a person's attitude to his assigned job.

But what is the result? Many proclaim with uncommon ease their devotion to perestroika and refuse to have anything to do with the so-called stagnation. You look at such a person and envy him: he has time for conversation. I will say honestly that I do not like such people who are concerned about perestroika. I am confident that those who, as they say, have been "plodding" along in their assigned duty section at all times are doing more for perestroika. They are "plodding" along now, too, and they have no time to swear their love for perestroika. Such people, fortunately, also define the face of the regular officer corps in the district today.

[Neporada] And of perestroika in the district?

[Col Gen Yermakov] Yes. It is by their labor that the provisions of the defensive doctrine are being converted into concrete deeds. They are the ones who are assuming the main burden of concern for implementing the new methods of training subunits. They are the ones who are charged with the political and military education of soldiers and NCO's in today's very complex social conditions. They are the "draft horses" in strengthening military discipline.

I will dwell in detail on the latter. This topic deserves special attention. The problem itself of strengthening military discipline requires an increase in efforts: it must be viewed not as a particularly army matter, but as the concern and pain of all of society. After all, it is no longer

a secret to anyone that military collectives cannot immediately neutralize the negative charge that a certain portion of the young draftees bring into the military. And if we do not undertake to eradicate the very causes of these negative phenomena with the entire brush, as they say, they will increase. In any event, experts give us this not very comforting prognosis.

[Neporada] You talked about the results of the training year for the district as a whole. How do things stand with the officer corps? After all, this is the backbone of the military collectives.

[Col Gen Yermakov] I will cite several figures. More than 16 percent of the officers received ratings of good and excellent on the end-of-training-period performance evaluation. Those who train non-commissioned officers and soldiers directly—platoon, company, and battalion commanders—demonstrated high combat efficiency. Incidentally, representatives of our district took first place in the competitions of battalion commanders of the Ground Forces. I am not naming anyone specifically here, so as not to offend others who also deserve a good word.

[Neporada] In any event, what you have said makes it possible to draw a conclusion: the officers are worth their salt. The fact that there are over 9,000 officers without apartments in the district is stunning against this background. I would like to find out your reaction to the reproach by academician G. Arbatov from the rostrum of the Second Congress of People's Deputies personally to the leaders of the Armed Forces for economizing on the social needs of people.

[Col Gen Yermakov] I believe the Academician was more correct when he talked about the "terrible conditions that are generally shameful for all of us." For everyone. But we cannot, of course, relieve the responsibility for the state of the social sphere from the chief, who at least could have done something for its development.

[Neporada] And you personally are not declining this responsibility?

[Col Gen Yermakov] Not in the least. And I am trying to do everything in my power, including to increase the district's housing fund. For example, until recently, 25 percent of the funds allocated to us went to construction. Today 65 percent is spent for these purposes. The figure is gratifying, but I understand that each family is not interested in the overall indicator, but in its chances to get an apartment in the foreseeable future. I can say that these chances will increase for many with implementation of the housing construction program adopted in the district.

[Neporada] We know that development of the military installation at Sertolovo is part of this program. I think the readers would be interested in learning more details about the proposals made at the recent meeting at the district headquarters on this issue.

[Col Gen Yermakov] It was a question of turning Sertolovo into a micro-rayon of Leningrad and direct involvement of the military in housing construction there. I discussed this idea in May with the Deputy Minister of Defense for Construction and Troop Bili-
tting, Lieutenant General N.V. Chekov, and in November with leaders of party and state bodies of Leningrad and the oblast.

It is planned that 13,500 apartments will be built in Sertolovo by the year 2000. In 1990, several buildings with 215 apartments each and also buildings with 68 and 48 apartments will be turned over, and a store, nursery, covered pavilion for a market will go into operation. In 1990, military builders will turn over an automatic telephone station building for installation of equipment. We will put a dormitory in the building that also houses the local soviet and militia office. Work will be done to convert houses to natural gas, we will complete construction of a water line from Pesochnaya, and we will continue modernizing the high-pressure boiler system. We will begin building three more houses this year. Major problems of providing the settlement with all types of power and transportation will be resolved simultaneously.

Without going into more detail, I will say that such a comprehensive building up of a military installation is being undertaken for the first time in the district. And it is very good that in resolving the housing problem of service members we are encountering understanding and support on the part of the Leningrad party and soviet bodies. In my opinion, this is real attention to the people in military uniform and their families. I will be glad to continue to do what is within my power to help this cause. I believe such attention is very important in the set of measures for strengthening combat readiness and carrying out the tasks of defense capability.

[Neporada] You are saying this now as a candidate for people's deputy of the RSFSR?

[Col Gen Yermakov] No, as a commander. Although, it is a right, it is not my practice to separate official and social concerns.

Transbaykal MD Seen as Officer Corps Dumping Grounds

*90UM0222B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 16 Jan 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Olovyanikov, Chief of the Transbaykal MD Political Directorate Cadres Department: "Is it Prestigious to Serve in the Transbaykal?: A View on the Problem"]

[Text] Lieutenant-Colonel P. Kuntsevich had just emerged from the office. He had arrived from the Belorussian Military District [MD]. One does not have to be a big psychologist to conclude that he had arrived in a far from cheerful mood. And he did not hide this, but frankly declared: "In my previous duty station I was

in conflict with the higher-ups, and so they sent me to the Transbaykal MD because of obstinacy." The person believed himself to be unjustly offended, although he arrived for an equivalent position. He has no punishments.

I could give the names of many officers who arrived in Chita with the thought that they had been dispatched as a form of punishment. The service records of the majority are clean and one cannot find fault with the efficiency reports, but doubts remain after a talk. The fact is that a person becomes convinced from his own experience, and that is it. If a comrade does a lot of mischief he is gotten rid of quickly and quietly somewhere as far away as possible so as not to wash dirty linen in public. That is what happened with Major S. Borovkov in particular. He was assigned to an equivalent position here and only later did we learn that the officer had committed a very gross disciplinary infraction at his previous duty station. We had to recommend his discharge to the reserve.

Inasmuch as our district is "interchangeable" there is no special difficulty in that kind of "casting," but in such cases it is far from simple to establish the true reason for an officer's reassignment. It is necessary to guess willy-nilly: Did he really end up in the replacement plan only because of obstinacy or for reasons enormously more serious? I wrote this sentence and smiled mirthlessly: it seems I too already had formed a firm stereotype—that they don't send a good officer to the Transbaykal.

Unfortunately, such a judgement also has real ground under it among political officers arriving in the district as replacements. In my view, the number of people with deficiencies and with party and official punishments is still high. Among them are both regimental deputy commanders for political affairs and officers of political entities. I will say honestly that it is hardly with unconcern that one goes to get a signature on an order assigning a person who has made a slip to a position connected with educating many, many people.

The following fact eloquently indicates the quality of officers arriving as replacements. Almost 70 percent of the political officers reduced in position last year "for omissions in service and personal lack of discipline" are being sent in by other districts and groups of forces. Many did not even serve a matter of months at the new location. I write about this painfully since the simple-minded peasant guile of our neighbors far and near is bitterly affecting the authority of a key figure of perestroika such as the political officer and the aggressive enthusiasm of the district party organization, and this at no simple time in the life of our society and party.

Recently several officers arrived in the district who announced from the doorstep, as the saying goes, a desire to be discharged from the Armed Forces. They also had declared this at their previous duty station, which, instead of looking into it and making a decision, simply "landed" them in the Transbaykal. That is how officers

S. Sadikov, V. Prilutskiy, I. Suslenko, O. Menchak and V. Kovalev were treated in particular. Some may not, but those in the personnel office know well how difficult it is to discharge an officer who has not even served a day in the district. They know how this drags out discharge dates and to what contrivances they must resort, for it is necessary to appoint a person to a position not for work, but solely in order to discharge him soon. The interests of the job suffer and the state bears financial losses.

And how do you choose to regard the rather prevalent instances where people arrive in order to hold out in our district, so to speak, for the required length of service? It is common knowledge that we compute length of service preferentially: one year counts as one and a half years. And so before retiring, officers from among those who lack the required length of service submit a request to be sent to the Transbaykal MD. From a human standpoint I understand them. Who does not wish to secure himself better financially before discharge to the reserve? But at the same time I cannot close my eyes to the fact that some of those who arrive to "qualify" regard their duties listlessly, to put it mildly. They are more concerned with something else—to get their remaining two or three years and return to Europe without overly troubling themselves. So let us add this one as well to our district's personnel problems already enumerated.

There have been instances, and not isolated ones, where officers are sent to the Transbaykal not for a direct replacement. Let us say that a battalion deputy commander for political affairs is leaving the district and they send in a company deputy commander for political affairs in his place. The reason? It is simple. To make it easier to fulfill the replacement plan, some personnel entities engage at times in direct deception: they assure the candidate that he is going to the Transbaykal MD for a higher position (although they are excellently informed that the replacement must be an equivalent one). Here is a fresh example. A military construction detachment deputy commander for political affairs came to us from the Kiev MD, where he was given a promissory note—you are going to the position of deputy chief of a political department. The officer agreed, but in Chita he learned that he had been deceived. It is not difficult to imagine what feelings he experienced when it turned out that the promissory note was false. This story ended with the political officer having to be returned to Kiev.

I understand how it is sometimes not easy for our colleagues from the western districts and groups of forces to choose candidates for replacement to the Transbaykal, but this in no way can serve as justification for such work techniques.

And I cannot be silent about one other problem that is painful for us Transbaykal personnel. It is about staffing our district with military school graduates. I remember in my cadet days some of our mentors threatened that if we studied poorly or violated discipline we would go serve in the Transbaykal MD. Many years have passed since then, but it seems to me that this rule prospers even

now. I became convinced of this once more while talking with political school graduates last August. Two-thirds of the lieutenants who arrived in the district were average students. Certain deficiencies were noted in the young officers' efficiency reports, and there were even party punishments. Only every third one stated his desire to serve in the Transbaykal MD, and the others were ordered there, as it is said. The mood with which they began service is understandable.

Summing up everything that has been said, one can affirm that manifestation of the notorious "residual" principle is apparent in staffing the district, particularly with political officers. As already stated, the district has been turned into a kind of bugbear through the efforts of certain chiefs and cadre organizations.

People form a persistent negative attitude toward the district and service in it even before arriving here. Bitter as it may be, it must be admitted that an unofficial gradation of districts exists to this day. There are prestigious ones among them, but God help you, they say, if you end up across the Ural Range. Many officers take this as a personal drama, as exile. How can I not recall the words heard at the All-Service Officer Assembly: "Many whimperers and mama's boys" have appeared in the midst of our officers who fear the puff of the fresh breeze of distant garrisons and unsettled everyday conditions."

There is no reason to be sly. The Transbaykal region is not the Ukraine, Podmoskovye or Belorussia. Here there are many places that are a far cry from resorts. The remoteness, the severe winter with temperatures below minus 40, the summer heat, and deficiencies in the social sphere (as there are everywhere, by the way). All this subjects a person to a very severe test, but the fact is that this also is the best school. Hundreds on hundreds of superb officers went through it, became conditioned, came to manhood and gained experience in it. The line in the efficiency report "Served in the Transbaykal" will say more to an experienced supervisor than dozens of laudatory words.

And in recent years much has been done to improve the everyday conditions of servicemen's families. The housing problem essentially has been removed from the agenda in a number of places in connection with the reduction in the Armed Forces.

But let us ponder certain moral criteria. Does it become officers to advance the difficulties as an argument against being sent to a remote location to serve in order to replace our own comrades who have conscientiously served the prescribed period here? Is it worthy of a person in shoulderboards, who put them on at his own will, to try by hook or crook to squirm out of being sent to the Transbaykal as a replacement? Have the concepts of "duty" and "honor" lost their luster for us today under a hail of poisonous arrows showered on our Army by some mass media?

We will not oversimplify the situation. It is unlikely that after reading these lines officers immediately will set about writing a request that they be sent to the Transbaykal MD for further service. I also do not think that people in some personnel entities will reform instantaneously, or that literally beginning tomorrow we will be greeting as replacements people who have been exceptionally trained in all respects, who are disciplined and who are morally faultless. It is not that simple to break down all at once a psychology that has formed over the years.

Nevertheless, it must be broken down decisively and irrevocably. During the year that has ended we largely succeeded in cleaning the combat ranks of "ballast," of people who sullied the high title of officer, because of well-known measures to reduce forces and because of efficiency reports. By the way, the fact that the percentage of those recommended for discharge from the Army is higher for us than in other districts once again confirms the thoughts expressed in these paragraphs. The atmosphere in officer and party collectives has become cleaner and the activeness and return in military labor has increased.

Junior Command Unable to Fulfill Disciplinary Mission

90UM0270C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Feb 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col V. Antonov from the Siberian Military District: "Dictated by Special Factors"]

[Text] In working for the last three years in a unit subordinate to me, a disciplinary battalion, I have concluded more and more that junior command personnel objectively are incapable of performing their main task of educating and reeducating the convicts. Why?

In the first place, the condemned servicemen are two or three years older than their teachers. Secondly, no training subunit trains junior commanders for working with such a category of personnel. Thirdly, the reticence to serve in a disciplinary battalion and feelings of kinship give rise to various ties which in no way contribute to the cause of rehabilitating the condemned. Thus, the officer personnel must spend virtually the entire time of the regular service of the sergeants in teaching them to work with the convicts.

What is the way out of this situation? In my view, we must completely exclude the practice of sending sergeants to serve in such battalions. Let them be involved in what they have learned in the training subunit of teaching the soldiers what is necessary in a war. In the disciplinary battalions we should introduce positions of reenlistees and warrant officers. Things would go better, I feel, if the officers would be sent for such work from the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] schools.

Such measures, we feel, could raise the effectiveness of work done with convicts. Particularly as at present we have set the task of strengthening the fight against crime.

THE HOUSING SHORTAGE

Lt Gen Shaposhnikov on Air Force Housing Shortage

90UM0262A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Air Force, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Yelena Agapova, entitled: "Flight Altitude".]

[Text] I met with Lieutenant General Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Air Force, on the day when the newspapers briefly reported about the crash of an American Skyhawk military aircraft near Philadelphia. This information would appear to be ordinary and not have any direct relation to this visit. But only from the point of view that such reports about military aircraft accidents "in their country" do not surprise anyone. As for "us," for many years flight accidents were hidden behind a solid curtain of departmental secrecy. As it is with other information. Similarly, today the Air Force is also becoming more open. Let us recall the recently declassified TU-160, [our] latest supersonic strategic aircraft. Today we know the truth about the incident with Captain Zuyev who hijacked a MIG-29 to Turkey. [We now know] About the pilot who abandoned his fighter aircraft which then flew over Europe almost to the English Channel. [We now know] About a series of recent crashes and about the results of the investigations of their causes and circumstances...

In each case, these causes were different. But even a person far removed from aviation understands: the matter is not only the equipment but also the man. And in no small measure that an excited pilot is a potential incident. And nerves frequently give out due to a chronic lack of humane living conditions and under the pressure of mediocre communal discomforts. Alas, aircraft types are changing but the pilot's lifestyle has practically not changed. From this prose of life which has almost bored us to death, we also began the conversation with Yevgeniy Ivanovich Shaposhnikov who, besides everything else, is Chairman of the Air Force Central Housing Commission.

[Agapova] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, I would like to begin our dialogue with this clarification. Have you waited long for an apartment in Moscow?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] I do not have one yet. I have been already waiting for more than a year.

[Agapova] Recently, I heard this admission from Lieutenant-General N. Gryaznov, chief of the Ministry of Defense Main Housing Operation Administration: Air

Force people without apartments are experiencing the most difficulty. Just why is it that pilots, whom the people always talk about as the elite of the Armed Forces, find themselves in such an unenviable situation? All the more so since no one has rescinded the Ministry of Defense order assigning housing to flying personnel on a priority basis....

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] I cannot list all of the reasons. There are very many. Problems have accumulated for decades. I also will not repeat the well-known truths about the notorious stagnation principle and various distortions and deformations in our lives and in the economy. Apartments have not been added because of this. But I think I must talk about one important circumstance without which it is difficult to understand why it happened the way it did with pilots. Unfortunately, the Air Force was never the housing construction manager even at its own garrisons. Historically, it turned out that the Military District Billeting and Maintenance Directorate fulfilled the functions of contractor for Air Force housing construction. As we all know, they are not subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and it is difficult to exert any pressure on them. And we do not have our own housing directorate. No other branch of the Armed Forces has such a dependent position. I admit that the Air Force also shares the blame for the housing shortage. I would say that due to a certain incompetence on construction issues in those same Air Force formations. Right now, we have 39,000 officers and warrant officers, including flight personnel, without apartments.

[Agapova] Last summer the Minister of Defense tasked the Air Force Military Council with providing all flight personnel with apartments in 1989. We reported this in the newspaper. And we received many letters from aviators with the question: At whose expense can we expect such supersonic speeds in construction? A group letter arrived from a garrison near Moscow where pilots have been waiting for apartments for six years...

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] We will actually solve the pilot apartment problem by the end of this year. We are taking radical steps, 70 percent of the funds allocated to us for capital construction have been directed to housing construction. That has never occurred before. This year, we were released from allocating 20 percent of living space of houses being built for the Air Force to the garrison fund. This is also a first. We are establishing our own engineering element that will assume the functions of construction contractor for housing and social-cultural-domestic service facilities. We have temporarily limited calls to duty to warrant officers without apartments. And this is far from everything.

[Agapova] There is still another excellent technique. Military Transport Aviation pilots are suggesting it. They have been recently authorized to transport national economic cargoes and to spend a portion of the earned assets on social development. The VTA [Military Transport Aviation] currently has an enormous sum of money in its accounts and there are organizations that are ready

to build homes. But the money is lying unused. As reported to me from VTA, the construction ban came from TsFU [Central Financial Directorate]. The reason for the refusal was that the prices are above State [prices].

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] I do not see anything shameful in such construction. If there is strict accounting documentation and there are no financial or other violations. I promise to sort this out.

[Agapova] Are there pilots without apartments in the TU-160, our latest long-range bomber—the Black Jack as they have named it in the West?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] Today there are none.

[Agapova] Life is lavish with unexpected subjects. I recently received an invitation to the Air Force Main Staff from a group of pilot-inspectors. "We are bums," they said. "We live wherever we can. We are constantly on temporary duty, we are constantly flying, but they do not accept us as flight personnel and, therefore, there are no apartment benefits...." The Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate later clarified for me that "They are not pilots, but apparatchiks." What do you think about this?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] Officer-inspectors have one primary duty—to fly. Some of them have a year more flying time than pilots at [flight] regiments. We consider them to be flight personnel. And we have made the following decision: To provide housing in the Main Staff first of all to pilots then to the rest.

[Agapova] But there is now an unprecedented situation in Moscow. As they reported to me at the Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate there are 10,000 servicemen without apartments...

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] There never was any such thing. They allocate only 28.5 percent of the living space requirement to us. Right now, there is only one way out—accelerated construction of dormitories for the Air Force. This year we are starting this in the Moscow area.

[Agapova] How incompatible the realities of our coarse lives are with what a pilot does in the air! With combat missions and the risk....

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] Unfortunately, flight duty does not make allowances for such contradictions. Even when a single correct decision needs to be made in fractions of a second.

[Agapova] Have you experienced emergency situations in the air?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] There were emergency ones and some that were also near accidents. But there were no accidents. I have never ejected.

[Agapova] What aircraft did you fly?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] I am a fighter-pilot. I began in a MIG-15. I finished in a MIG-23. And now I am qualified for unlimited flight operations.

[Agapova] Did you always act in accordance with the aircraft operating manual?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] The aircraft operating manual is a sacred matter for pilots. But there are situations in the air that are not foreseen by any kind of aircraft operating manual. When I commanded a formation we had such a case. The pilot of a transport aircraft with a group of officers on board made a mistake on take-off. The tires on the main landing gear blew out. But the pilot took off anyway. They reported to me: He has three hours worth of fuel. What do we do? I convened a consultation [group]. The Commander of the Flight Safety Service said: According to the aircraft operating manual, when the wheels are destroyed, you need to raise the landing gear and land on the "belly" on a dirt landing strip. Anything is possible here. An accident, a fire, engine breakage.... We phoned experts on this aircraft in Moscow. To Kiev to the Antonov KB [Design Bureau]. We received the same answer everywhere: Operate in accordance with the aircraft operating manual. But my intuition told me that we needed to act differently. I made a decision: Land on the main landing gear on an ordinary runway. Everything turned out alright—both the people and the aircraft were saved....

[Agapova] But it could have turned out otherwise and you would have been the worse for it....

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] Certainly.

[Agapova] And right now already in this position, in what situations do you say: operate in accordance with the operating manual?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] Well, not always (he smiles). If it is precisely such a case, then I know how it should be. It is another matter when you do not know what is better. If there is time, I always wring out different variations and I search for a way out. In flight work there is also creativity, situations when you need to assume responsibility [for something]. In the case with the blown tires, there were many advisors. But when I made the decision, there was only one person at the controls.

[Agapova] I have heard from Air Force officers: No matter what happens in the air, the pilot will always be guilty....

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] Recently a fighter aircraft's forward landing gear was hanging in an intermediate position. This is the worst variation. It could not be raised and it could not be lowered. A landing without the front leg, as we say. Captain V. Alekseyev handled it beautifully. He landed the aircraft at an alternate airfield without damage. I gave the order to commend everyone who participated in the rescue and to submit the pilot for a decoration. You know there are many causes of flight accidents. Pilot error, equipment failure, KPN—design

and production faults... The main thing is to find the cause. If the cause is clear, the guilty will also be found.

[Agapova] You said that you have 3,000 flight hours. The level of a pilot's professionalism is also judged by this figure. But why is there such a contrast between the flight hours of our aces and American aces?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] Yes, American Air Force pilots have significantly higher flight hours. Why? Flight hour standards are in direct relation to the economic condition of the State. Today it is hard for our State to provide the desired number of flight hours for pilots. But the standards that are required to maintain pilot proficiency are being accomplished. By the way, American military pilots told me that they still cannot do what our Pugachev did in the air, his famous "Cobra."

[Agapova] In many countries, the statistics on accidents and losses of military pilots and aircraft are accessible. In our country this data is still not listed anywhere. What is this—a military secret?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] In absolute numbers, the number of flight accidents in our country is about the same as for the Americans. But there is this accident index which is called flight hours per flight accident. In our country, it is expressed in thousands of hours. In their country, there is a different criterion: One flight accident per 100,000 hours. For example, if we reduce this to a common denominator, the Americans get 1.5 times more flight hours per accident than we do. Last year, according to the accident index, we recorded more favorable figures than during the entire postwar period. I do not think that these figures are a very big secret.

[Agapova] Why are there fewer accidents?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] I will never forget my [military] school instructor's words before my first flight: "An aircraft is a very jealous creature. It immediately senses if you are beginning to betray it and will not forgive this...." Our profession will not tolerate laxity. If you read various old documents on flight safety, they all begin with flight organization and equipment preparation. And they place minimal emphasis on discussing discipline and the man himself. But we have now placed our main emphasis on this.

[Agapova] Last year you were in the U.S. as part of a military delegation. The visit was unprecedented. How trusting were contacts with U.S. military pilots?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] They showed us more than I assumed [they would]. All models of the latest aircraft. Many expressed a desire to fly in our aircraft during our contacts. We are conducting negotiations right now. We will probably reach an agreement on reciprocal aircraft exchanges. Many flew in military transport aircraft in the U.S. I was invited into the cockpit and they even offered to let me fly. Our flight instruments are nearly identical.

[Agapova] And what differences are there?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] Our aircraft commander's seat is on the left and the co-pilot sits on the right. The Americans change seats for each flight. I saw an unusual psychological preparation for dropping parachutists right there in the aircraft. The sergeant who was responsible for the drop literally fired himself up along with everyone else. He yelled: Three minutes left! And everyone repeated it with a blood-curdling yell. Two Minutes left! One minute! Some kind of psychosis literally began. Everyone yelled. In our country, this occurs quite differently.

[Agapova] No matter how carefully flights are prepared, incidents nevertheless occur in the air. We rarely talk about the widows of military pilots in connection with this. Tell me, what kind of pension is paid to a family in the event a pilot is lost? And one more question: is it true that a blasphemous situation exists through which a family is left without a pension if a pilot's remains are not found after an accident?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] A pension is designated for minor children. For example, if there are two children in a family, then its size is 35 percent of the pilot's monetary salary. If there are three children, it is 45 percent. If a pilot is missing in action, let us say, over the ocean, the family is not left without a pension. But the red tape in that case is unthinkable.

[Agapova] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, thank you for the conversation and allow me one last question. At what time will you end your work day today?

[Lt Gen Shaposhnikov] Today if I manage to get home by the time VREMYA [News program on television] comes on, my relatives will simply be amazed....

Council of Ministers Decree on Improving Military Housing

90UM0252D Moscow SOBRANIYE
POSTANOVLENIY PRAVITELSTVA SOYUZA
SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH
RESPUBLIK No 32, 1989 pp 777-780

[Decree dated 7 Sep 1989 No 734: "On measures to increase the housing allowance for officer personnel..."]

[Text] Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers

140. On measures to increase the living space allowance for officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-service personnel discharged to the reserve or retired.

The USSR Council of Ministers notes that recently a number of lower Soviet bodies have not complied with the requirements of decrees of the CC, CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers of 20 Jan 1960 No 74, of 5 March 1963 No 270, of 29 April 1975 No 354, and of the USSR Council of Ministers of 17 Feb 1981 No 193 regarding prompt provision of housing space to officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-service members discharged from the USSR

Armed Forces to the reserves or retirement for reasons of health, age, or force reductions.

Many executive committees of local Councils of People's Deputies, especially in the cities of the center and south of the European part of the country, do not provide these individuals without housing within the established three month deadline after they arrive at their place of residence, but within two, three, or more years.

Due to the long wait for housing, these individuals and their families undergo serious hardships associated with the temporary housing permit, employment, and medical care, and education of their children in schools, and they lose the right to certain benefits established by law (with respect to labor, social insurance, and others).

Many individuals from among the officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-service members, after their discharge to the reserve or to retirement, are forced to continue living in closed and separate military camps, exacerbating the housing situation of service members on active military duty.

The USSR Council of Ministers decrees:

1. That the Councils of Ministers of allied republics immediately consider the question of provision of housing to officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-service personnel discharged from the Armed Forces of the USSR, and Border, Internal, and Railroad Troops, to the reserve or retirement for reasons of health, age, or force reductions, and take the necessary steps to provide housing to those individuals on the rolls of the executive committees of local Councils of Peoples Deputies at the moment this provision is adopted, on a priority basis in 1989-90.

That by way of exception, in order to support these service members, in 1989-90 the executive committees of local Councils of People's Deputies additionally receive up to five percent of the housing space in housing built with the funds of enterprises and organizations paid to the executive committees to share the cost of housing construction, within the limits of the amount of housing space duly held by these executive committees for resettling of citizens from homes subject to demolition in connection with the allocation of agricultural plots for housing construction and for providing temporary housing to workers directly involved in servicing and operating the housing fund.

That the Councils of Ministers of the allied republics and USSR Gosplan provide in their draft plans for 1990 for the necessary capital investments to provide housing to officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-service members discharged to the reserve or retirement in connection with the reduction in the USSR Armed Forces.

That starting with the thirteenth five year plan, housing be provided to officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-service members discharged

to the reserve or retirement through capital investments provided for these goals from all sources of financing by USSR Gosplan and the Councils of Ministers of the allied republics and formed on the basis of stable standards, including the resources of the respective budgets.

That the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, the USSR Committee of State Security, and the Chief of the Railroad Troops report annually by 1 April to the executive committees of the local Councils of People's Deputies through the military commissariats on the expected number of such persons to be arriving in the following year, and on the amount of housing necessary to support them.

2. That procedures for providing housing to persons resettled from closed and separate military camps be extended to 1990.

That beginning with the thirteenth five year plan, housing be provided to these persons through capital investments provided for by the USSR Gosplan for these purposes (with limits on contract work) to the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the USSR Committee of State Security, with subsequent transfer of these resources for shared participation to executive committees of local Councils of People's Deputies.

That the Councils of People's Deputies of allied republics ensure that these capital investments are received on a priority basis.

3. That officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-service members discharged to the reserve or retirement for reasons of health, age, or force reductions be received on the housing rolls by the executive committees of local Councils of People's Deputies without presentation of documents regarding release from their former place of residence and relinquishment of their occupied residence. These documents are presented by these individuals directly upon receipt of their accommodations.

That the executive committees of local Councils of Peoples Deputies be obligated in the case of arrival of such individuals (with family members) at the place of residence, selected with allowance for the existing registration procedures, to take immediate measures for their temporary accommodation in the manner prescribed by present law, for the period until the receipt of housing.

4. That the right be granted to officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-service members who have reached the maximum age established by the USSR "On Universal Military Obligation" Law for active military service, or who are within at least three years of this maximum age, of priority enrollment in housing-construction and housing cooperatives, and receipt of agricultural plots for individual housing construction in populated areas selected by them, with

allowance for existing procedures of registration, regardless of where these individuals performed their active military service.

That this law be applied to officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-service members previously discharged from the USSR Armed Forces to the reserve or to retirement for reasons of health, age, or force reductions and subject to resettlement from closed and separate military camps.

That acceptance of these individuals in housing-construction and housing cooperatives, the allocation of plots of land to them for individual housing construction proceed without registration at the location of the cooperative or plot of land, in accordance with documents issued to these persons in accordance with procedures established respectively by the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the USSR Committee of State Security, and the Chief of the Railroad Troops.

5. That this decree be applied to officer personnel, Army and Navy warrant officers, and extended-service members of the organs of the USSR Committee of State Security.

6. That the Councils of Ministers of the allied republics report annually to the USSR Council of Ministers by 1 March regarding compliance with this decree.

7. That the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of Justice jointly with the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR Committee of State Security submit proposals to the USSR Council of Ministers regarding amendments flowing from this decree that should be made to the current legislation.

Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers L. Voronin Administrator of the USSR Council of Ministers M. Shkabardnya Moscow, Kremlin, 7 Sep 1989, No 734

Results to Date of Military Housing Program

*90UM0261A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
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[Article by Major General Yu. Tertyshnyy and Majors I. Ivanyuk and S. Kushner, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents: "The Housing Program; Plans and Realities"]

[Text] Last year, a housing construction and apartment supply plan was approved for Soviet Army and Navy servicemen, workers, and employees for the period until the year 2000. Increased attention has been paid to this goal recently. Suffice it to say that more than a third of the total resources allocated to the Ministry of Defense for capital construction during the last two years was directed to development of the social sphere. During the current year, this share will grow to 46 percent. This significantly exceeds the average indicators throughout the national economy. Nevertheless, the housing

problem in the Army and in the Navy remains exceptionally acute as before. The situation has been aggravated in connection with Armed Forces reductions and the withdrawal of units and subunits from the Groups of Forces.

As a result, 165,000 families of servicemen do not have apartments right now and more than 74,000 need improved living conditions. A most difficult situation has developed in the Kiev, Carpathian, Odessa, Belorussian, Moscow, and Baltic Military Districts and in the Black Sea Fleet. All of this is reflected in the mood of the people, their attitude toward work, and it is undermining the prestige of military service and the military profession. Just what we need to undertake to alleviate the fate of those who do not have adequate housing not only in the remote future but already today and tomorrow! A demanding conversation occurred at a recent meeting of the Bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy where they discussed how the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Construction and Troop Billeting staff Party Committee is increasing the responsibility of communists for accomplishment of the housing program.

In order to give our readers the most complete and comprehensive picture of the housing problem in the Armed Forces, we decided to publish a detailed report about this event and to supplement it with informational materials, statistics, and also letters that have been coming in to the editor.

On an Industrial Basis

During the 13th Five-Year Plan, the Army and Navy need to construct houses with 25 million square meters of living area or 415,600 apartments and, during the 1996-2000 period, houses with 25 million square meters of living space or 450,000 apartments.

It will be difficult to achieve the planned levels. The main question is, what do we construct them of? The answer to that depends in many ways on the results of work during the next five-year plan. By 1995, we need to commission new construction capacity calculated to annually produce housing with about half a million square meters of living space. We plan to get approximately the same growth due to an increase in the operating efficiency of existing enterprises.

The program provides for construction of 10-12 shops to produce cellular concrete units during the next Five-Year Plan, construction of a brick plant with a capacity of 75 million bricks per year, and an increase in the output of lumber and sanitary [engineering] equipment.

Measures are also planned that are capable of producing results in the near future. Thus, the USSR Ministry of Defense decided to cease production of airfield runway slabs. This measure will permit production of an additional 150 housing complexes, including 48 this year. Furthermore, based on these construction shortages, documents have been prepared and submitted to the

government for review that substantiate the need to deliver reinforced concrete, wooden, and brick houses from the national economy during the next Five-Year Plan.

However, now the situation is such that we have to count first of all on our own efforts. Colonel General N. Chekov, deputy USSR minister of defense for construction, spoke about this at a Bureau meeting.

Therefore, the main thing is to implement the housing program and it must be 75-80 percent accomplished using products of our own enterprises. This requires painstaking and effective control of the course of construction of each house and facility and introduction of the achievements of scientific and technical progress and new technology. As it was pointed out during the discussion, it is precisely here that the main efforts of communists need to be concentrated.

During the 14th Five-Year Plan, we need to increase the output of parts of large panel apartment buildings at our own enterprises and bring production up to 2.9 million square meters of living space per year.

For now, production efficiency will rise slowly and [workers] do not have a proper attitude toward materials and assemblies. As the recent State Panel of Experts review and the USSR Ministry of Defense inspection have shown, losses of metal and cement at a number of enterprises that produce reinforced concrete items are unjustifiably high. They number in the thousands of tons. Up to 30 percent of finished lumber is waste. Effective steps are not being taken to save heat energy. The average expenditure of steam at the majority of the inspected enterprises was almost two times higher than the average throughout the national economy.

In his speech, Colonel General N. Kovalenko, Chief of the Military Construction Unit Political Directorate, spoke about ways to intensify educational work and to heighten the responsibility of communists for the work entrusted to them. Here, the role of the party committee is particularly great. It is difficult to count on success without conscientious work at each work location, its organization on a modern level, and a zealous attitude toward the national good.

It is important to not only intensively increase the scale of construction but to also raise its planning to a new level of quality. For example, to consider possible relocation of ground and naval forces, new technical solutions, the nature of demographic processes in servicemen's families, and other factors. The party committee members who spoke at the meeting, in particular, Major General I. Chernyshov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Capital Construction Organization and Planning Directorate, said that the efforts of communists must be concentrated in precisely this direction.

Thus, one of the proposed ways that could become a vital support is construction of so-called "small family units." Up to 10 percent of units produced will be allocated to

this program. There is a definite desire to develop housing construction based on operations using the organization's own resources. Aggressive development of cooperative and individual construction may produce 40-45,000 apartments by the year 2000.

But for now they are only prospects and plans that [produce results] on the threshold of the third millennium. But what can we already be doing right now and what types of housing [can we produce] this year and next year?

[The Housing Problem] Cannot Tolerate Delays

In 1990, we must add a total of 4,074,000 square meters of housing or 73,700 apartments.

Statistics demonstrate: More than 40 percent of the families of officers and warrant officers without apartments are forced to utilize sublet housing. Yesterday they had to invest a significant sum of money from their own pockets for this. Now monetary compensation paid by the Ministry of Defense eases this burden although not entirely.

But it is impossible not to consider the actual situation. Life itself dictates priorities for reaching goals locally. First—to build 7,500 apartments by 1991 for those who are released from military service in connection with Armed Forces reductions. We had to complete half of this work last year and it has been accomplished for the most part.

Only one house in Novosibirsk has not been put into operation. This occurred due to disruptions in deliveries of reinforced concrete structures from the national economy. Unfortunately, more than 500 share holding apartments have not been received from local Soviets.

This year, military construction personnel must once again perform quite a bit of work to provide housing to those who are entering the reserves. This is a forced measure that is not eliminating all problems but, at the same time, it is deeply symptomatic. Perhaps these are the first attempts to guarantee a roof over the head of a serviceman who has been released from the Armed Forces. And it is generally thought that we must pose the question in this manner: It is impossible to release an officer or warrant officer from the Army if he does not have an apartment for his family.

A very urgent mission for military construction personnel was to raise military posts from ruins after the earthquake in Armenia. We are talking about developing tens of millions of rubles [worth of housing] in a compressed period of time. We had to build 2,000 apartments on military garrisons without USSR Gosplan allocating additional resources for this purpose. In spite of the difficulties that are arising, first of all deliveries of materials, the scale of construction and assembly work planned for last year was entirely accomplished and two dozen houses, two schools, and main utilities were built.

The next problem is providing housing first of all to those who perform alert duty, and to flying and sailing personnel. They must first sense for themselves real progress toward accomplishment of the housing program.

As Colonel General V. Rodin, Chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Political Directorate and Member of the Military Council, pointed out in his speech, the housing problem affects everyone and we need to change our attitude toward military construction personnel. It is time for communists of Armed Forces branches contracting directorates to transition from rebukes directed at their partners to joint efforts to search for solutions to problems that arise.

We need to say that the government recently authorized the transfer of significant resources from production facilities to housing construction. Just this year this sum will total 300 million rubles.

The adopted measures will permit us to noticeably improve this matter even in spite of "galloping" wholesale prices for construction materials. And wholesale prices have quite perceptibly increased since 1 January—an average of 25 percent for cement, glass, wood, and reinforced concrete structures. And they, alas, are far from the only factors that are having a negative impact on solving the housing problem in the Army and Navy.

Utilization of All Reserves

At the present time, approximately 68,000 servicemen rent private apartments, about 45,000 reside in dormitories and hotels, more than 40,000 reside in reserved [housing], and about 12,000 reside in office space.

As we all know, allocation of housing by local Soviets in accordance with appropriate Party and government decisions is one of the sources from which housing enters the Army and Navy [inventory]. Unfortunately, These decisions are frequently not carried out locally.

Thus, for 11 months of 1989, as it was pointed out at the Bureau, local Soviets allocated less than half of the annual housing quota. Toward the end of 1989, the remainder was 380,000 square meters of living space in the RSFSR and 85,000 square meters of living space throughout the Ukraine. Furthermore, housing that is owed from previous years totals more than half a million square meters. There is considerable housing owed in Moscow, Leningrad, and Turkestan Military Districts.

Right now, the situation with construction on a share holding basis is no better. Until the present time, the USSR Ministry of Defense has received 7,000 fewer apartments [than planned]. Resettlement from closed and isolated installations is proceeding extremely slowly. More than 70,000 families reside at these installations and they have lost contact with the Armed Forces. If the dynamics of this process are preserved, it will be drawn out for decades more.

The speakers pointed out that these chronic problems can be solved by simply establishing close cooperation with local Soviets. All communists, beginning with commanders in chief, members of military councils, and chiefs of Armed Forces branches political directorates should not be bystanders in this work. Much will also depend on the aggressiveness of military deputies who are elected to local governing bodies.

We also need to bear in mind that our own housing construction depends to a great degree on deliveries from the national economy. For example, at the present time only 60 percent of structures for large panel apartment buildings are being supplied from output at our own enterprises. Six hundred thousand square meters of housing is being erected thanks to deliveries from the national economy.

As we all know, the situation in the economy is quite complicated right now. Existing relations are being torn apart, new ones are being established, and shortages are growing. For example, at the beginning of the year the Northern Fleet did not have any foam plastic because the plant that supplied it was converted into a cooperative and transitioned to operations based on direct contacts. And we could list dozens if not hundreds of such examples.

Of course, even before there were frequently cases when "compensation" was demanded, for example manpower, in exchange for materials that, incidentally, should be delivered steadily. Even now producers of shortage products feel that they are masters of the situation. Thus, one of the enterprises of Glavlenstroymaterialy Association demanded transformers and welding equipment in exchange for ceramic floor tiles.

And the situation in this "market" generally is not distinguished by originality—suppliers do not produce materials without compensation for them in the form of soap powder, bars of soap, or meat. Thus, one of them suggested we ship a rail car load of chickens in exchange for subassemblies for large panel apartment buildings. But there were also suggestions that we pay for delivery of one of the contracts in... dollars.

We must point out something else that was openly talked about at the Bureau. Some communist leaders have turned out not to be ready when old, administrative management methods do not work in a situation and new economic [ones] have still not begun working. And it was previously impossible to resign ourselves to the fact that the process of concluding contracts and completing required documents was being drawn out. Right now, this lack of productivity is having a particularly painful impact.

We understand that it is impossible to eliminate shortcomings that have accumulated in capital construction for years. The Deputy Minister for Construction and Troop Billeting staff Party Committee is energetically searching for a way out of the customary operations scheme and the inertia of old approaches. Can we really remain tolerant with the rule that year after year permits the introduction of more than a

third of planned housing at the end of the year? Really, this unavoidably causes rush jobs, rush work and, as a result defective merchandise, messes, and all kinds of secretive falsifications of figures.

It is impossible to continue to resign ourselves to the way existing available housing operations are organized. Only a bit more than half of the resources required for minor and major repairs are allocated. Naturally, in these situations we can only talk about "stop gap [measures]." Repeated appeals to the USSR Ministry of Finance have not produced any results so far.

The discussion participants pointed out that housing is a vital problem in party political work and intensification of the human factor. This is why a strict accounting of available housing and compliance with the principle of social justice when allocating apartments is so important.

Furthermore, a people's controllers inspection organized last year by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy revealed a multitude of violations of housing law and hundreds of cases of illegal occupation of apartments. There were excessive delays of up to 3-4 month in occupying new houses and vacated apartments everywhere. Many cases of heartless, bureaucratic attitudes toward review of complaints of servicemen and members of their families have been discovered in the Far Eastern, Transbaykal, Carpathian, and other military districts. A principled party assessment has been given to all of this and the guilty have been made accountable.

General of the Army A. Lizichev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, summed up the results of the discussion. He pointed out that communists of the central staff of apartment construction organs understand the political and social significance of successfully implementing the housing program.

In the Resolution of the Bureau of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy that was adopted after discussion of the issue, the attention of the party committee and its secretary Major General A. Minaykin, who were present at the meeting in full strength, was directed to the need to focus the efforts of communists toward an accelerated search for reserves to resolve the housing problem in the Army and Navy. The officer corps anticipates a real increase in this work.

We need to use every possible method to encourage communist initiative and direct it toward developing the housing construction production base, reconstructing existing enterprises, introducing modern technology, progressive materials, and designs, and opening the range of creativity. Much may be produced through closer contacts with party organizations of ministries and departments, political organs and party committees of contracting organizations, and military districts, and fleets.

Considering that the number of cases is increasing when local Soviets violate existing party and government resolutions and do not allocate the proper share of living

space to servicemen and a number of union republics have decided to appeal to the Central Committees of the Communist Parties and the Councils of Ministers to pay attention to this. We also acknowledge the need to call on the political section and communists of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces to more deeply analyze and consider the capabilities of some region to provide housing to servicemen when making decisions on troop relocations.

We propose that the Political Directorates of the branches of the Armed Forces, military districts, and fleets should first of all be concerned with providing housing to officers who perform alert duty and also to pilots and submariners.

It is important to begin work as broadly as possible to insure a thrifty attitude toward existing available housing. We will get a significant and rapid return if we more aggressively begin to encourage construction of housing and dormitories for small families using our own resources.

The resolution particularly talks about the need to lavish attention and concern on those whose work is to build houses—military construction personnel. It is unacceptable that they should feel cheated with regard to trade and lifestyle, medical, and cultural services. Military district, fleet, and groups of forces political organs have been ordered to render required assistance to military construction personnel to resolve personnel training and education problems.

A total of ten years remain to accomplish the housing program according to the time [table] mentioned at the 27th CPSU Congress. This is both a lot [of time] and little [time]. We can resolve this problem only through close cooperation, by linking all of its economic and social aspects, and by providing people with appropriate living conditions by the beginning of the 21st Century.

Continued Complaints on Military Housing

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31 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Letters to the editor, entitled: "Ordeals Without Apartments".]

[Text] On 9 September 1989 in the article "Apartments Without Ordeals," the newspaper talked about the measures being taken by the government to improve provision of housing to servicemen released to the reserve or retired.

Letters of complaint continue to arrive at the editorial office. The letter writers complain that the approved measures are being extremely slowly carried out in practice mainly due to local bureaucratic delays and to officials' indifference.

In other words, as one of our readers pointed out, you will not succeed in obtaining an apartment without an ordeal, sooner the reverse. That is how the headline was born for this collection of letters.

"KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" has already frequently written about us, reserve officers selected for permanent residence in Ulyanovsk and compelled to unite in order to defend our rights to housing. On 28 October, 1989, an official reply signed by CPSU Gorkom First Secretary Yu. Kolpakov was carried in the newspaper. For example, it asserts: "During the last five years the influx of families of servicemen who have retired to Ulyanovsk has grown from 29 to 155 families...."

This is not true. Let us turn to the statistics. Twenty nine families remained on the housing list on 1 January 1985. In 1986, 62 more families arrived and the number of families without apartments rose to 49 by the beginning of the next year. And that is how it grew from year to year to 189, although the "influx" never exceeded 100 families, including last year. The housing list grew because local leaders created this situation themselves.

For three years, as can be followed from Ulyanovsk Gorispolkom Representative V. Vasilyev's article "Be a Patriot of the City" that was published in "ULYANOVSKAYA PRAVDA" in January 1989, 29,800 apartments were built in the city. We will exclude the share of ZhSK [Housing Construction Cooperative] and housing built using their own resources. About 22,000 apartments remain. During that time, 233 families arrived in Ulyanovsk altogether. As we can see, the housing problem for reserve officers is being artificially created in many ways.

This is also manifested in another way. As a rule, they offer Armed Forces veterans apartments only on the first floor, above the sixth floor, or on the outskirts of the city. Do you think this is by chance? During the last six years, 446 families have arrived in the city and only six have obtained apartments in the center of the city, although houses are being constructed there.

I am convinced: You cannot educate through declarations of patriotism. Only social justice and real concern about the defenders of the Fatherland are capable of raising the prestige of military service and the profession of defender of the Fatherland.

Lieutenant (Res.) Colonel N. Golubovksiy

Still prior to being released to the reserve, I visited the Voyenkomat [Military Commissariat] and the Gorispolkom housing department at Gatchina. They told me I could come but I would have to wait two to three years for an apartment.

I was released to the reserve in Autumn of last year. I arrived in Gatchina, was entered on the military roster, and provided documents to the housing department to be placed on the list at the beginning of November. Two weeks later at an Ispolkom session, they refused my request and this decision was motivated by the impossibility of fulfilling the government resolution in a three month period. No one even asked if I agreed or was I prepared to wait?

Reserve Officer V. Abramov

For more than a year, "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" has been advocating repeal of the ban on residence passes for servicemen released from military service that exists in Moscow and certain other cities of the nation even though they were drafted from these cities.

What is better about this system than the practice during the times of repression when people were resettled from their native lands? I think that we need to repeal it immediately.

Colonel (Ret.) F. Shestakov Kiev

I was released to the reserves for health reasons during September of last year. I had served in the Navy for more than 20 years prior to this, 15 of those on a nuclear submarine. At my discharge, I was awarded the Naval Chief of Staff's Certificate and I was allocated an apartment in Liyepaya.

As is appropriate under the law, I surrendered my housing and arrived in Liyepaya. Here I received an order for an apartment in a house belonging to the Ministry of Defense. But they refused me a residence permit and would not issue me a passport quoting a Latvian SSR Council of Ministers Resolution. And no one even wants to listen. They call me an immigrant and assert that the Ministry of Defense did not have the right to give my family an apartment in Liyepaya.

For several months now, I have not received my pension, I cannot find a job, and the Gorispolkom has promised my wife that we will be charged with violating the passport law. I am sitting on suitcases with my two children and I do not know what to do. I have found out that there are ten families like ours in the city.

Captain (Res.) 3rd Rank V. Shatskiy

More than four months have passed since the latest USSR Council of Ministers resolution was adopted on measures to improve provision of housing to servicemen who have been released into the reserve or retired, but the Ispolkom in Sarapul still has not received it. And therefore they are refusing to resolve the most pressing problems of reserve officers.

I returned here, to my native land, two years ago and have been living in a dormitory during the entire time. Maybe they are not building anything in Sarapul? No, 30-40,000 square meters of housing are produced annually in the city. But, for example, not one apartment was allocated to reserve officers last year.

And neither I nor anyone else probably will ever know where the government resolution has become stuck. Does the USSR Council of Ministers really not have the capability to insure execution of decisions it makes.

Colonel (Res.) N. Mansurov, Deputy Chairman of the Assistance Committee under the Gorvogenkomat
[City Military Commissariat].

Defense, Security Committee on Military Housing Crisis

90UM0270A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Kosarev, parliamentary correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Again on the Housing Problem"]

[Text] Regardless of the increasing amount of housing construction in the Army and Navy, the housing problem is being resolved extremely slowly. The number of apartmentless families has virtually not declined and on 1 January of the present year was 181,900, including 170,500 serviceman families (including 128,100 officer families). The most difficult situation existed in the Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, Carpathian and Belorussian Military Districts and in the Black Sea Fleet. As a consequence of the insufficient allocation of housing by the local Soviets in order to house servicemen discharged into the reserves or retired, the number of persons seeking housing each year has grown and on 1 January of this year was 29,763 families.

These and many other facts were brought up at a regular session of the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the Questions of Defense and State Security devoted to a discussion of the problems of providing housing to the servicemen.

In opening the session, the committee Chairman V.L. Lapygin pointed out that at present this question has assumed the most acute and even a no-win character. The government decrees on providing housing for the officers and warrant officers, both those on active military service and those discharged into the reserves or retired, are not being carried out. Many Republics and local Soviets merely ignore them. This is particularly alarming under the conditions of the cutback in the Armed Forces.

The USSR Supreme Soviet as well as the party and governmental bodies receive thousands of letters with valid indignation. One of these from the members of the committee for assisting reserve and retired officers from Ternopol has been read at a committee session. "We have ended up homeless and extremely humiliated, many are beyond the brink of poverty," its authors write. The poor availability of housing has a serious impact on the mood of the military personnel, on the attitude toward service and on the combat readiness of the units and subunits.

At the committee session information was provided by the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for Construction and Billeting of Troops, Colonel-General V.N. Chekov. He provided detailed information on the reasons for the occurring situation and described the measures being undertaken by the Ministry of Defense for resolving it. The USSR Ministry of Defense has worked out a comprehensive program for solving the housing problem for the period up to the year 2000 and this provides for an increase in the amount of housing construction by the

military construction workers under shared participation as well as the involvement of the servicemen in the reserves and in retirement in individual and housing cooperative construction. But this is a statewide problem and it must be solved together. At the same time, over the four years of the current five-year plan, the Ministry of Defense has failed to receive 99,200 apartments from the local Soviets. The eliminating of the committed arrears in providing housing by the Union Republics in 1990 will make it possible to sharply reduce the number of apartmentless servicemen and lower the acuteness of the housing problem.

In understanding the enormous sociopolitical importance of the problem, the Ministry of Defense has outlined the primary ways of solving it. Among these is an annual increase in housing construction both under our own plan and by proportional participation on the basis of the more rapid development of capacity at our enterprises which guarantee the delivery of material resources to the national economy, the strengthening of control from the top downwards over the obtaining of housing by the local soviets, its effective and correct distribution and use, as well as ensuring the safekeeping and prompt repair of housing.

The questions for the speaker involved many problems: both a system of control over the assigning of housing by the local soviets, and the reasons for low labor productivity among the military construction workers, increasing the social justness in allocating apartments and the too great, in the opinion of the people's deputies, cost of official dachas under construction for higher command personnel of the Armed Forces. Speaking at the committee session were the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Gosplan V.I. Smyslov, the Head of the Department for Defense Sectors and Administrative Bodies of the Administrative Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers S.G. Guchmazov, the Deputy Chairman of the Moscow Soviet Executive Committee A.V. Rudakov, USSR People's Deputies Academician Ye.P. Velikhov, Baltic Fleet Commander Adm V.P. Ivanov, First Secretary of the Riga Gorkom of the Latvian Communist Party A.P. Klautsen, Committee Secretary S.A. Tsypliyayev, Lieutenant Colonel V.S. Podziruk and others.

The Ministry of Defense was subjected to serious criticism for the fact that from five-year plan to five-year plan, it has not used the funds which have been assigned for the development of the construction industry and only 70 percent of the available production capacity for erecting housing with its own forces is employed. "The Ministry of Defense must not be left alone with this very important problem," said in particular, S.G. Guchmazov. "The state plan for the 13th Five-Year Plan must include an independent section for solving the social problems of the army. A special section on the social coverage of servicemen must be incorporated in the Defense Law being worked out."

Among the proposals heard were such ones as permitting the servicemen several years before discharge to select

their place of residence and sign up there to obtain housing or join housing construction cooperatives, incorporate amendments in the current legislation which provides for the impossibility of discharging officers and warrant officers into the reserve without the first providing of housing.

The comments of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev were received with interest and approval. At present the situation is such, he said, that non-standard solutions are required. There must be a radical cutback in capital construction of special projects for the Ministry of Defense, although this, of course, is undesirable for combat readiness. Possibly it might even be necessary to extend the period of service for officer personnel. This also will help solve the housing problem. The speaker also took up the question of the official dachas for the leadership of the Army and Navy. I think, the deputy said, that these dachas must be vacated, there must be a thorough investigation and only after this should they be used according to their proper purpose.

The speakers raised the question of the introduction of unjust restrictions by the local Republic agencies on permission for residence, and the choice of a place of residence by the servicemen upon discharge into the reserves or retirement as has been particularly characteristic of the Baltic republics.

At the committee session, specific ways were proposed for resolving the housing problem in the Army and Navy.

Officers Housing: 'Sabotage?' by Moscow Soviet 90UM0298B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Yelena Agapova under the rubric "The Situation", entitled: "A Guarantee Which Guarantees Nothing".]

[Text] More than 10,000 families of servicemen in Moscow lack housing. To be precise, 10,300 are without apartments. There has never before been such an enormous army of homeless officers in Belokamennaya.

What is this, a result of the overall shortage? Sabotage on the part of the Moscow Soviet? Inactivity on the part of Ministry of Defense officials? One hears all kinds of stories at the well-known apartment exchange on Banny Lane. The one that is closest to the truth is that the housing situation for the military has grown markedly worse since 1987. The Moscow Soviet owes a debt of 79,900 square meters of living space today, or 130,900 square meters of total area.

Here is a copy of just one guarantee from the ispolkom. It is one of the reports sent "upstairs" on fulfillment. (The editors have dozens of such documents).

**MOSCOW CITY SOVIET OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE**

103032, Moscow, Gorkiy Street, 13

Telephone.....Telegraph:
Moscow-Moscow Soviet 31 Mar 89, No. 16-3/8-1542
On No. 464947
CPSU CC (seal)

REPORT
On Letter From Group of Officers
on Allocation of Housing to USSR Ministry of Defense in
1987/88

The Moscow Soviet Ispolkom reports that in accordance with decrees No. 319-114 passed by the CPSU CC and the USSR Council of Ministers on 29 Apr 69 and No. 958-222 passed on 3 Sep 84, the Moscow city ispolkom must annually allocate to the USSR Ministry of Defense 65,000 square meters of living space, or 110,000 square meters of total area.

In 1987 and 1988 58,000 square meters and 115,600 square meters of total area respectively were allocated.

A letter of 2 Nov 88 reported to the petitioners that the Moscow City Ispolkom owed the USSR Ministry of Defense 83,400 square meters of total area as of 1 November 1988. As a result of steps taken, this indebtedness has been reduced by 38,000 square meters to 45,400 square meters of total area and will be discharged in 1989.

The answer to the letter's authors was provided by Comrade E.S. Yakushenko, deputy chief of the Main Housing Records Administration for the City of Moscow.

Enclosure: returned correspondence consisting of nine pages.

Chairman, Moscow Soviet Ispolkom, V.T. Saykin

These promises to discharge the indebtedness in 1989 were empty talk, hot air. In October of that same year the chairman of the Moscow Soviet Ispolkom announced that the housing allocation to the Ministry of Defense had been reduced by 25% for 1989.

The decision worked out at the "Moscow Olimpa" [transliteration] ignores party and government decrees. And it exacerbates the crisis for servicemen without apartments in Moscow. Instead of the required 65,000 square meters and liquidation of the indebtedness from past years, the Moscow Soviet allocated a total of only 29,400 square meters of living space in 1989.

"If the Moscow Soviet continues to allocate apartments at this rate, today's line of servicemen could stretch out to 10 years," Lt Gen N. Gryaznov, chief of the Main Billeting Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, believes.

Today a number of publications are circulating the opinion that the army should see to housing for the officers itself. It is doing everything it can to do so! And also helping others. They are well aware of that in the Moscow Soviet. A decision has been made in Moscow to increase the volume of self-construction of housing (constructed with the personnel and funds of the Ministry of Defense). It is planned to release more than 200,000 square meters of housing for

occupancy during the period 1988-1990. The plans are not being fulfilled, however. The reasons? Here they are. With a plan calling for 673 tons of metal structures for last year, Moscow's plants shorted the military construction workers by 514 tons. It was the same with reinforced concrete elements. Also with the allocation of plots in areas of extensive construction.

May the reader forgive me for the profusion of numbers: 1,700 servicemen and 500 motor vehicles is what was allocated to Moscow just for harvesting, loading and unloading vegetables—also last year. Military construction workers have erected 45 social, cultural and personal service facilities in the capital in recent years: kindergartens, stores, medical and sports facilities.... They have put in 45 kilometers of utility lines. The list could easily be continued. The soldiers are assigned to all sorts of jobs and projects involving an all-out effort.

We shall not go into a moral and legal assessment of this practice here. Since it exists, however, it is perfectly obvious that the military in Moscow are not taking anyone else's "piece of the pie" for themselves. On the contrary, the city fathers have been using military construction workers for more than a year now. Eleven military construction detachments work for Moscow; two for Moscow Oblast. I obtained these figures from Col N. Kozlov. He told me that military construction workers are also working at ZhBI [reinforced concrete products] plants, building housing, remodeling government buildings in the Kremlin, making components for kindergartens and schools, building a plant....

I would point out that this is perhaps the only subunit in the Armed Forces in which all the officers and warrant officers are provided with housing. So people at the Moscow Soviet Ispolkom know whom to take care of first.

But let us get back to those 10,300 servicemen who lack apartments. One of the promises coming from V. Saykin, ispolkom chairman, was that the debt to the Ministry of Defense would be discharged in 1990 and 1991. One would like to believe him, but how can one? And what can the unhoused families put their trust in, if even letters of guarantee from such a high official guarantee nothing?

Proposal on Solving Housing Crisis

*90UM0314A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Feb 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Col O. Vasilyev, candidate for RSFSR people's deputy: "Preparing for the Elections: Housing-2000 Program Attainable, If..."; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] "An apartment should bring joy, not cause new problems." Col O. Vasilyev.

Colonel O. Vasilyev, military builder, has been nominated to run for RSFSR People's Deputy from the Lenin Electoral District of Moscow. Oleg Antonovich, a manager in a planning organization of the USSR Ministry of

Defense, offers definite proposals for accomplishing the state program Housing-2000, which is openly behind schedule. The candidate for People's Deputy feels that his intention to implement these proposals was one of the reasons he was included in the pre-election struggle. What does he have to say?

Lying before me is a report compiled by the USSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] listing the results of last year's effort. The plan to introduce new housing fell short of fulfillment throughout the country as a whole. Housing made available fell below the 1988 total in the amount of 4.3 million square meters. This means that about 100,000 families will not be moving into new apartments and the long waiting lines will become even longer. The fact is that throughout the country as a whole every fifth city family is awaiting housing, with many of them on the list for more than 10 years.

As a planner, I make frequent trips throughout the country, spending some time in military installations and speaking with officers. No matter the location, a major point is housing. At the present time, 165,000 families of servicemen have no apartments; more than 74,000 are in need of housing improvements. A critical point has also been reached in the case of reserve officers, who are supposed to be provided with housing within a period of 3 months after discharge.

As far as I know, the Ministry of Defense, especially the capital construction organs, are actively pursuing a resolution of these problems. The task as set calls for building by the year 2001 residential housing in the amount of 47.5 million square meters—865,600 apartments. This would require substantial restructuring of the construction effort, intensification of housing construction capacities, and improvement in planning quality.

Capital investments are presently undergoing redistribution. For 1990, for example, it is planned to allot 46 percent of appropriations earmarked for the Ministry of Defense to development of the social area. Already evident are signs of inclination to combine funds available to the Ministry of Defense and local organs of authority.

Even that is not enough. What more can be done?

One way in which housing construction can be accelerated is to improve its industrial aspect. I shall explain. Our organization is presently working on design documentation for the construction of housing and a number of other items in the social area, employing prefabricated box units. Preliminary calculations indicate that such units will make it possible to reduce the time required to erect a nine-story building to a half to two-thirds of the present time requirement. This is a very promising approach. In this connection, if the voters place their trust in me, I will promote progressive construction

methods such as this in Russia's highest organ of authority. This will help to get the Housing-2000 program moving.

There is something else I would like to discuss. A home should bring people joy and enable them to relax completely, instead of causing problems by way of failures of hot and cold water and heating service, leaky roofs, unserviced stairways and yards, lack of children's playgrounds, etc. People ordinarily take these complaints to the Rayon Maintenance Directorate but unfortunately there is little the latter can do. Voters frequently bring up this topic when I meet with them.

For example, in REU-10 of the Lenin rayon, there is a tireless enthusiast—I. Statkevich—who has been working there for more than 15 years. The people who live in her microrayon are mostly pensioners. The rayon is old and many buildings are in need of repair, but Irina Stanislavovna is in no position to offer substantial assistance, as much as she would like to do so. Why not? Primarily because of the way in which the buildings are used. That is why I believe that we must change the system of using available housing. The REU and DEZ [expansion unknown] should be made independent. In deed, not word. These organizations have every right to possess their own finances as supplied by local soviets and determine themselves what should be repaired and when, with whom they should conclude a contract, the kind of personnel staffing required, and how much the workers are to be paid. Then many problems and troubles plaguing the residents will be resolved.

Another resource that is available, especially in Moscow, is reconstruction of buildings located in older areas. In this connection, this should be accomplished without infringing on the interests of long-term residents by way of moving them from central areas of the city to the outskirts. What could be done is to set aside in every Moscow rayon a reserve of housing sufficient to resettle persons presently living in buildings slated for reconstruction.

The time has come to institute a complete reorganization of the system used to rebuild old houses. This should be the object of attention of highly qualified professionals. This is obviously a case where specialized construction cooperatives could operate effectively.

The resolution of the problem of housing servicemen, especially those discharged into the reserves or on retirement status, can be advanced by wide application of local materials to the construction of privately-owned homes. If a person is allotted a plot to build a private home and is helped to obtain construction materials and a loan, the home will be erected in short order.

It would appear that a contribution to the resolution of this problem could be made by cooperatives that are associated with large housing construction combines and construction material combines. It would be to their benefit to specialize in building private homes with the use of industrial by-products.

I am convinced that the housing program can be attained if we utilize all our possibilities and reserves.

THE DRAFTEE AND THE DRAFT

Estonian Procurator: USSR Laws on Military Service Still in Force in Republic

90UM0209B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 25 Nov 89 p 2

[Estonian News Agency report signed by Yu. Kazesalu Deputy Procurator, Estonian SSR, Senior Legal Adviser, entitled: "Explanation by Procurator".]

[Text] For some time now concern has been expressed in the republic, both at the state level and at the level of the citizen, relative to the status of members of the USSR Armed Forces on a compulsory term of service. One hears suggestions of monitoring the matter of compulsory military service, introducing alternative service, and the possibility of servicemen serving in their own republic or the Baltic. The Republic's leading organs and residents are united in their opinion and efforts.

However, the matter of compulsory military service is being used to advantage by certain persons who are inclined toward extremes.

They are agitating for youth to refuse to fulfill compulsory service in the USSR Armed Forces. They display signs and provide telephone numbers for use by those who wish to avoid military service. They also make references to international law as it pertains to occupied territories.

There is a need to explain once more the legislation governing compulsory military service. Article 61 of the Republic's Constitution obligates all citizens of the Estonian SSR to serve a tour of compulsory military duty in the USSR Armed Forces.

The compulsory service requirement is governed by the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation. This legislation is also in force within the confines of the republic.

The Republic Supreme Soviet 12 November decree, entitled: "Historical and Legal Evaluation of Events Transpiring in Estonia in 1940", did not annul a single law in the Republic. The concise wording of the text does not permit of various interpretations. The Supreme Soviet reserved the right to formulate all interpretations, which it can do only by employing the legal procedure.

Thus, the making of unwarranted conclusions relative to existing laws is illegal and constitutes an offense in the event of failure to observe the law.

In accordance with Article 78 of the Estonian SSR Criminal Code, the avoidance of military service is a punishable offense. The same clause also declares as punishable an act committed by a person for the purpose of influencing draft-age youth to avoid military service. Criminal law holds him to be an instigator of a crime.

This person is held responsible not only for stimulating criminal intent, but also for reinforcing this intent to the point of causing a draft-age youth to commit the act of avoiding military service.

We all are striving for a law-abiding state. However, a major prerequisite for a law-abiding state is observance of law and the requirement of employing an authorized body to change the law.

Uzbek Deputies Dissatisfied With Treatment of Draftees

90UM0172C Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
21 Nov 89 p 3

[Unsigned Article, entitled: "Discipline and Order to the Army". The first paragraph is an editorial introduction.]

[Text] According to the USSR Constitution, service in the armed forces, which are called upon to reliably defend the borders of our country, is an honored duty and obligation of the Soviet people. Young people, as a rule, pass through a school of courage and valor there, gaining life experience, and mastering professional military skill.

But in recent years, with the development of glasnost and democracy, facts have begun to reach the public at large that before were simply never reported. There are non-regulation relations within military collectives, at times leading to fatal results, and frequently soldiers go absent without leave from their subunits, due to unendurable conditions of service. The Central Committee, Communist Party of Uzbekistan, and the Republic government, continuously monitor the state of preparation of young people for army life, and carefully analyze the quality of their service itself.

In the past three years these questions have been discussed three times in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. The Republic government has approved and is carrying out a program for improving the training process and material-technical base of pre-draft training, the DOSAAF schools, as well as the specialized boarding schools with thorough Russian language study and strenuous military-physical training.

Gatherings of soldiers' mothers, and meetings of the leaders of party, Soviet and military organs with youth, and with workers in the mass media, have become more frequent in the Republic. Representatives of the command and political organs of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District regularly write in the press and speak on radio and television. Trips by agitation-artistic collectives to the military districts have begun to be carried out more frequently, and mentorship by republic oblasts is being established over military units where inductees from Uzbekistan are serving.

All of this is bringing positive results, and by and large young people from Uzbekistan are serving worthily in the army, and are mastering military specialties on an

equal basis with their contemporaries. The numerous letters of thanks by military unit and subunit commanders to schools, enterprises, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and directly to the parents of the draftees, bear witness to this.

But, recently the public in the republic is concerned about the most contradictory rumors about the true state of affairs in the army. More and more frequently the Central Committee, Communist Party of Uzbekistan, the Republic government, and the editors of the mass media have begun to receive letters from the parents and relatives of inductees, which express deep concern about the safety of their children and nephews called up for active military service. The letters describe cases of deaths of military personnel, and tell about instances of humiliation of young inductees, which most often are the causes of absences without leave, suicides, and other grave consequences.

People are also greatly concerned about the fact that a significant portion of youth from Uzbekistan called up for military service are sent to the construction and railroad troops, where they are used to fulfill the construction works plans of the ministries and departments.

Party and Soviet organs pay full attention to the facts and cases cited in the citizens' letters and oral appeals, and continuously analyze them. Familiarization with the situation locally during trips to units of the Far Eastern, Transbaykal, Moscow, Leningrad and other Military Districts, shows that many of the stated instances truly did occur.

All of this, in substantial measure, is undermining the authority of the Soviet Army, and is contributing to the spread of anti-army moods, and inciting a part of the population toward public statements and slogans calling for boycotting the callup of youth to army service, and for organizing military subunits according to the territorial principle. Irresponsible people are trying to use precisely such examples to whip up national discord, and are attempting to prove that this is nothing other than vengeance and a reaction of people of other nationalities to the Fergana events, and that it is an "anti-Uzbek campaign." The insolvency of these assertions is obvious, if only because people have died in the army one, two and three years ago. Therefore, this is not a matter of "anti-ethnic" campaigns, but is because the negative tendencies that accumulated over decades in the army, as in the entire country, have now begun to be manifested with particular strength.

In the opinion of 13 USSR People's Deputies from Uzbekistan who signed a letter to the Supreme Soviet of the country, "the reason for this situation is the lack of a firm and precise position on the part of the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, which for a long time already have reconciled themselves to the 'd-edovshchina' [harrassment of first year soldiers by second year soldiers] and other anomalies in the army, and do not react to the unceasing instances of deaths of

military personnel." In this letter the People's Deputies asked the USSR Supreme Soviet "to listen to the report by Comrade D. T. Yazov, Minister of Defense, about the measures being taken to bring necessary order to the armed forces, and the work of preparing new laws on military organizational development."

It is entirely obvious that the USSR Ministry of Defense must take a more active and principled position in the preparation of this new legislation, which would entirely eliminate opportunities for manifestation of any kind of non-regulation relations between military personnel, and fairly and precisely regulate all questions of military organizational development.

Estonian Party Conference on Questions of Military Service

*90UM0190C Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII
in Russian 6 Dec 89 p 1*

[Article by A. Kharchenko and V. Khyuva: "Alternative Service and Territorial Forces Are Both Needed"]

[Text] Any sensible person will say that we need the Armed Forces at the present stage of development of our state. It is another matter how to organize them, how and where military service should be performed, etc. This was discussed on 4 December at a meeting of the Communist Party of Estonia [CPE] Central Committee. Examined were questions of the preparation of draft-age and pre-draft age youth and of the problems of humanizing military service. This year's call-up was summarized.

N. Ganyushov, secretary of the CPE Central Committee, opened the meeting. Major-General R. Pyder, Estonian SSR military commissar, gave a report. The audience consisted of party and soviet workers and representatives of Tallinn's garrison and social organizations, and they heard many interesting proposals in the general's speech. The proposals touched on a conscription for service only in the fall when the boys have already found employment, periodic assemblies of reserve servicemen to carry out work for the national economy, etc. The novelty of the military commissar's speech was understandable, given that the question of military construction in the republic is at present a rather pressing one.

The subject was discussed by: A. Rauam, first secretary of the Estonian Komsomol Central Committee; V. Siyrak, head of the department of public health of the Tallinn city party committee and member of the Association of Estonian Women, representatives of the Estonian SSR DOSAAF, representatives of the rayon military commissariats, etc.

Major-General V. Sein, First Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Red-Banner Baltic Military District, also shared his thoughts.

Kh. Eller, head of the State-legal Department of the CPE Central Committee, talked about how the issue is being reviewed by the CPE Central Committee.

In particular, he said that if we wish to create a strong, combat-ready, modern Army with smaller numbers, then first of all we need to direct our attention to its main fighting unit—the soldier. People are justifiably troubled by nonregulation treatment, hazing, window-dressing, and false reporting of figures prevalent in many military units.

One must agree with the opinion that the Army has not yet been affected by genuine perestroika. In the course of a sociological investigation (there were military reservists among the 1,000 polled, half of whom were of native origin), only four percent expressed the opinion that the organization of Army service is not in need of change.

One important innovation would be a reduction in the term of Army service where the conscript had passed all the required performance standards. The time has also come to raise the legal status of the soldier.

The introduction of alternative service was also discussed. Such a method of performing service is widely practiced in many countries. If a young man cannot take up arms for religious or other reasons, it is no longer considered a crime and he must be given the opportunity to perform his service in another fashion. It could be a labor battalion with its own uniform, barracks, etc. Such a proposal could be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet as a legislative initiative. The same could be done for a proposal to create territorial military units in Estonia. The time has come for such an idea inasmuch as the prestige of military service in the Republic has fallen greatly. Another matter is where to serve. Of those polled, 76 percent spoke in favor of serving in the Baltic region. Or another possibility was to give Estonians the opportunity to serve in their own units on the republic's territory. Talk about any sort of danger from such units is groundless, said Kh. Eller.

Summarizing his speech, Kh. Eller named the most immediate tasks from the point of view of the CPE Central Committee. These are the legislative initiatives on alternative ways of fulfilling military obligations, on national and territorial military units, and on basic military training. It is also necessary to design proposals concerning the humanization and democratization of army service and to establish effective command over the military units bearing the names of Estonian cities and other subunits in which a great number of our conscripts serve.

Of course it will be difficult to resolve all these issues. Many obstacles will have to be surmounted, and for this all the healthy forces will have to join together.

Estonian SS Resolution on Organization of Military Service

90UM0209D Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 13 Dec 89 p 2

[“Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic: On the Organization of Military Service of Citizens of the Estonian SSR”—SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA headline]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR, after having considered a report on problems associated with Estonian youths serving in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces, shares with the Republic's populace a great amount of concern with regard to the principle and nature of organization of military service. Democratization, humanization, and the security of personnel on duty in the Armed Forces lag behind the positive changes that have transpired in other areas of society's life. There have been cases of humiliation and use of force in military units, which tends to cause psychological harm to young people and evokes interethnic tension. The conscription call-up at times does not entail an adequate medical examination; it fails to take into account the relatively high incidence of illness among the populace, family circumstances, and convictions held by conscripts. Service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces is suffering a loss of prestige. The present system of military service organization ignores the existence of various climatic zones, national peculiarities, and the sovereignty of the Union Republics. Relatively few youths from the Estonian SSR enjoy the opportunity of serving their tour of duty in their native republic or in the Baltic Military District; the number of officers of Estonian origin has been reduced to several hundred.

Contributing to the general deterioration of the situation are the inflexibility of legislation on the Armed Forces and the failure of this legislation to respond to the needs of the present. Participation of the Union Republics in the organization of defense of the USSR is without a legal basis. The deconstitution of territorial troop units of the Union Republics, including the disbanding of the last territorial troop unit of the Estonian SSR—the 118th Guards Estonian Rifle Division—in the last half of the 1950s is considered to lack merit. Subsequently, the teaching of military subjects in the native language was discontinued in schools where Estonian was the primary language of instruction. In the stagnation period that paralyzed society, the matter deteriorated to the point where the new Constitution of 1977 no longer contained a clause relative to the right of Union Republics to retain their own republic troop units. The trend toward renewal that has encompassed the development of all of Soviet society has not yet given rise, in this extremely significant area, to the changes that are awaited by the people of Estonia.

Labor collectives, social movements, organizations of the Estonian SSR, and private individuals are openly demanding the restoration of the right of Estonian youths to serve their tour of duty in their native republic or at least in the Baltic Military District. They protest the practice whereby for many years military training sessions are actually employed as a forced gathering of labor force to perform various seasonal work and carry out accident clean-up operations in other union republics, with this accomplished at the expense of enterprises and organizations of Estonia. The unhealthy microclimate that exists at times in military units, religious and other convictions held by youths, call for the need to establish in Estonia, in addition to military service for conscripts, an alternative labor service.

Proceeding from the above and guided by the 16 November 1988 Declaration of Sovereignty of the Estonian SSR, the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic does hereby

RESOLVE:

1. To consider the participation of the Estonian SSR in the reform of the USSR Armed Forces, in the organization of the country's defense, and in the development of Union legislation on the Armed Forces to be a factor essential to the attainment of sovereign rights of the Estonian SSR. Proceeding from this principle, it is necessary to restore the right, as provided for in the Fundamental Law of the Estonian SSR of 1944-1978, of territorial Union Republic troop units; and to draft the necessary republic legislation on defense of the state.

2. To support society's demand that youths of Estonia serve most of a peacetime compulsory tour of duty within the confines of Estonia, the Baltic Military District, and the Baltic Fleet; if they so desire, in other military districts, including military units which have been awarded an honorary designation for liberating cities of Estonia.

3. To restore Estonian national military traditions and Armed Forces prestige in the eyes of the local populace. With this in mind, to consider it to be proper and extremely necessary for the USSR Council of Ministers to review its decision of 18 March 1956 and give its approval to the restoration of the 118th Guards Estonian Tallinn Red Banner Rifle Division, to be permanently stationed in the Estonian SSR.

To petition the USSR Council of Ministers for the reorganization of the Tallinn Higher Military-Political Construction School into a Higher Combined Arms School, with the graduates of the latter eligible for primary duty in the Estonian SSR and the Baltic Military District.

4. To establish Republic stipends for Estonian youths who intend to acquire a higher military education in the Estonian SSR and in other military schools of the USSR.

5. To support the initiative of Estonian SSR leaders relative to manning mainly with Estonian youths the MVD militia unit stationed in Tallinn, the military escort unit, and the Tallinn Special Secondary Militia School.

To petition for transfer of the Tallinn Special Secondary Militia School to Republic jurisdiction.

6. To request the USSR Committee for State Security to assist in arranging for local youths to be given preference in assignments to Border Guard units stationed in the Baltic Border District, including Estonia.

7. To propose to the USSR Ministry of Defense that Estonian youths who have been subjected to humiliating experiences during their tour of compulsory military duty; those who have suffered physical or mental

trauma; or those who find it difficult to serve their tour of duty as a result of poor health, family circumstances, or climatic conditions, be transferred to their native republic or the Baltic Military District to continue serving their tour of duty.

To consider it necessary to the resolution of all legal conflicts in which one of the sides is a citizen of the Estonian SSR who is in compulsory service or serving in a training session for the respective organs of the Estonian SSR to participate.

8. To establish that a conscript from the Estonian SSR who refuses to enter service in the Armed Forces on the basis of religious, political, or moral convictions be considered obligated to perform alternative labor service which is deemed legally equivalent to military service.

Based on the foregoing, to task the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Estonian SSR with preparing by February of 1990 a draft bill: "On the Establishment of Alternative Compulsory Labor Service in the Estonian SSR."

9. To task the government of the Estonian SSR to review a proposal to extend the list of illnesses and physical disabilities (which was approved by USSR Minister of Defense Order No. 260 dated 9 September 1967 and by Order No. 317 dated 1 September 1989) that render youth unfit for military service and for alternative service.

10. To task the government of the Estonian SSR to resolve, in collaboration with Union organs and at the Republic level, problems related to the need to reorganize the Military Commissariat of the Estonian SSR and the Civil Defense system.

11. To consider it mandatory for conscription and training session orders issued by the USSR Minister of Defense to be reviewed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR before they take effect.

12. To cease, under the pretence of a call to military training, the use of personnel of the Estonian SSR, subject to military service, for the performance of seasonal work or accomplish other purposes in other Union Republics.

13. To establish that problems of defense training of Estonian youth be subject to the approval of the government of the Estonian SSR, with Estonian-speaking youths provided instruction in the Estonian language.

That the government of the Estonian SSR review the system of organization of military training for university students, to include the provision of alternative opportunities.

To establish that the issuance of a diploma attesting to completion of a higher education is not to be dependent upon completion of a military training course by a student.

14. To petition the USSR Council of Ministers for release from the obligation of active military duty in the

Armed Forces of all VUZ students enrolled in correspondence or evening study, with all students extended equal privileges with respect to military service.

15. To render the necessary assistance to youths who have suffered a disabling injury during their tour of duty and to family members of those who lost their lives while serving in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces. The government of the Estonian SSR, on its part, is to seek possibilities of increasing the amount of pension or monetary compensation or of extending other privileges.

16. To obligate the government of the Estonian SSR to enter into negotiations with the USSR Council of Ministers, with the intent of effecting significant reductions in troop strength and armaments on the territory of Estonia; and of including Estonia in a Northern European nuclear-free zone with all the consequences attendant to such action.

17. Appeal to the populace, citizens' associations, and organizations of the Estonian SSR to prevent unnecessary excesses with respect to problems associated with the USSR Armed Forces, for the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution of 12 November 1989, "On Historical and Legal Evaluation of Events That Transpired in Estonia in 1940," of and by itself has not caused the cessation of application and legal invalidation of normative acts in force in the Estonian SSR.

[Signed] A. Ryuytel Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR.

A. Almann Secretary, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR.

Drug Use Among Draft-Age Population

90UM0305B Vilnius SOBYTIYA I VREMYA
in Russian No 2, Jan 90 pp 23-24

[Article by Moscow Militia Higher School instructor Boris Kalachev: "Drug Addicts in Uniform"]

[Text] Drugs in the Soviet Army, a problem about which little is known among the many problems of young people serving in the army, are no less dangerous than deformed mutual relations and international tension. Scientists warn us that weapons, powerful military equipment and even that pushbutton upon which the destiny of all civilization rests, may end up in the hands of a drug addict. Sociologists are beginning to study these problems and to publish articles. One of them is Boris Kalachev, an instructor at the Moscow Militia Higher School. The basic propositions of his article published in the journal SOTSILOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA are offered to the reader below.

The army is a part of society. Each year thousands of young people are called up into the armed forces. Unfortunately there are those among them who have had experience (and sometimes considerable at that) in drug use. Servicemen associate with locals from practically all regions of the country, including those in which drug use

has become a widespread practice. In a word, it would be naive to believe that the army has not been affected by a social disease of a scale that is extremely great (over 150,000 users of narcotics have been registered, and even so, for every revealed drug user there are 8-10 unrevealed users). Incidentally, as far back as 20 years ago military doctors did try to raise the issue of drug use by servicemen, but at that time, this attempt crashed into a wall of prohibitions.

Returning to the present situation, we can note that persistent attention is being devoted to the problem of drug addiction in the army in the USA, Canada, Spain, Switzerland and other capitalist countries. Anonymous surveys are being conducted among servicemen, and the results are published in scientific journals. Other methods of revealing drug users are being employed as well—biological tests on conscripts in particular. Any specialist, or simply any person interested in the problem and desiring to do so, may read about the proportion of military servicemen who resort to particular narcotic substances, and about the dynamics of the spread of drug addiction. (Incidentally, according to the latest data of Swiss scientists the number of drug users in the Swiss Army has decreased from 23.7 to 8.6 percent).

What is the situation in our country? The research that will be discussed below was carried out in Moscow, Kiev and Krasnodar Kray with the author's participation in 1987 by the USSR State Inspection Office of Institutions of Higher Education, the Main Administration of Criminal Investigation of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee and the Internal Affairs Administration of the Krasnodar Kray Executive Committee. The purpose of the selective anonymous survey, which embraced over 3,000 representatives of different social strata (young people primarily), was to clarify a number of questions associated with the way of life of the growing generation. But in the course of treating the empirical material we came to understand the military aspect of the drug addiction problem.

Here is some data. Among 1,132 male respondents residing in Krasnodar Kray, over half (53 percent) admitted some degree of drug use. Among them, six percent had their first experience while serving in the army. Among collective farmers, 73.1 percent used drugs, including 5.2 percent who used them for the first time while performing military service; the corresponding figures were 58.2 and 14.1 percent for blue collar workers, 59.8 and 6.2 percent for students in higher education, 38.1 and 18.7 percent for white collar workers, and 42.0 and 14.2 percent for students of vocational-technical schools. We also interviewed persons serving terms in places of confinement (from 25 to 35 years old) and retired individuals (50 years and older). Among convicts, 68.7 percent are drug users, among whom 5.9 percent tried them for the first time while serving their compulsory term in the army. Among elderly people, 16.1 percent may be categorized as users. What is interesting in this case is that not one of the

latter had developed the harmful habit during military service (that is, in the 1940s-1950s).

Let's analyze the pattern revealed. Knowing the upper and lower age limits of the representatives of all categories of respondents, it would not be difficult to determine the initial period of their compulsory term of service. If we compare these data with those presented above, we find that the number of persons who were "introduced" to drugs in the army was least in the mid-1980s and the greatest at the beginning of the present decade and in the 1970s. But this does not at all mean that the significance of the problem is decreasing. In my opinion the contingent of compulsory-service servicemen using addictive drugs has been "saturated." Many conscripts are initiated while still civilians. According to our estimates, which are based on an extrapolation of research results not only in Krasnodar Kray but also in Moscow and Kiev, approximately five million persons tried drugs at least once while students, and around 500,000 of them use drugs regularly. This social woe has assumed an especially large scope in regions where large areas are occupied by narcotic plants (wild and cultivated). Thus, 70 percent of respondents 14 to 18 years old residing in a certain town in Krasnodar Kray in which hemp is grown admitted that they use hashish.

The numbers pertaining to students of vocational-technical schools require commentary as well. It must be considered that the survey encompassed demobilized soldiers, seamen primarily, who entered vocational-technical schools with the purpose of acquiring the junior seaman specialty which would allow them to sail abroad. Thus this problem is important not just to the country's naval forces alone.

The elderly group deserves special attention. On one hand it is typical that no one in this group was initially "introduced" to drugs in the army—that is, in the 1940s-1950s. On the other hand "introduction" to drugs in old age is no less serious a problem, one requiring independent investigation. In the USA for example, elderly persons who abuse medicinal drugs and as a result often become psychologically and physically dependent on them are an object of special study.

As far as those who are to serve in the military in the immediate future (that is, high school and teknikum students) are concerned, considering the state of affairs in the civilian milieu, we can evaluate the possible nuances of "army" drug addiction with a sufficient degree of probability. If the present situation does not change, in a year or two new conscripts from Kuban villages will begin teaching their peers from Moscow how to manufacture drugs from poppy seeds and hemp, while the others will in turn share their experience in using chemical inhalers and pills. According to our research around 70 percent of young persons interviewed from Krasnodar Kray and approximately 16 percent of the capital's schoolchildren have "thrived" considerably as of today—both groups "in their own specialties."

During the research the respondents were asked which drug was the most available to a draftee. Judging from the responses of students from several Kiev VUZes recently demobilized from the Soviet Army, the answer is hashish. This was the answer given by 69.2 percent of respondents who served in our country and by 55.6 percent of former servicemen who served with the Limited Contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The opinion is being circulated that hashish and other drugs obtained from Indian hemp are supposedly harmless, but specialists know quite well that in the overwhelming majority of cases they provoke the use of stronger, so-called hard drugs—opiates and psychedelics. Here is an alarming fact that draws attention: In contrast to those who served in the USSR, most "Afghans" reported availability of heroin (22.2 percent) and LSD (11.1 percent). Heroin is categorized among the most dangerous drugs. It is hardly encountered in the Soviet Union, but in Afghanistan both local production of this and other drugs and their smuggling are widespread. Drug use is a long-standing tradition in this area (traveling through Afghanistan in the 1920s, Academician N. V. Vavilov wrote that the people had a worn-down look about them, brought about by the smoking of opium).

What was the motivation for drug use? The main causes were perhaps the same as in civilian life: curiosity in 59.7 percent of the cases, and a desire to imitate others in 28.9 percent; 3.8 percent of the respondents cited stressful situations; the same number admitted that they were deliberately taught by friends. Among former "Afghans," more respondents indicated stress as a cause of drug use than in the group of persons who served in the Soviet Union.

As a rule drugs were acquired from acquaintances (65.3 percent), and for money in 7.7 percent of the cases. 5.8 percent of servicemen manufactured drugs themselves, and as many acquired them from unknown persons (23.1 percent of the respondents did not answer this question). Thus illegal turnover of narcotic substances doubtlessly occurs in the troops. Evidence of this can also be found in materials of the USSR Supreme Court: Military tribunals are unable to uncover 78 percent of the sources of penetration of drugs into the army.

One other thing: the unpreparedness of our soldiers for communication with local residents and ignorance of traditions, customs and so on doubtlessly had an effect on the appearance of drugs among servicemen in the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Incidentally, specialists have already been warning us a long time about the deleterious consequences of such ethnographic illiteracy on the part of soldiers and officers.

The problem of bringing "military" legislation into correspondence with unionwide legislation also deserves serious attention. The time has come to introduce punishments into the USSR Armed Forces disciplinary regulations for illegal use of drugs, and moreover, punishments that apply to servicemen of all ranks. We need to develop the mechanism of administrative jurisdiction

in cases involving insignificant quantities of narcotic substances, and their voluntary issue. These provisions do affect law enforcement organs as well, by the way. Who is going to monitor the situation in the army from the standpoint of the status of the drug problem is also an extremely important question. I think that associates of the military procuracy and of the political organs could full well accept not only this responsibility but also that of organizing coordination between military subunits and other state institutions and public organizations. It is extremely necessary, for example, for the military to participate in measures devoted to various aspects of drug addiction. For the moment, we do not see any representatives from the armed forces in this effort.

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Discussion of Command Response to AWOLs

90UM0210A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by L. Smertin, Colonel of Justice, entitled: "Authority for an Investigation".]

[Text] Do we need to investigate a soldier or sailor who has left his unit without authorization? There is one answer: We must! Even if it is because the deserter, who has already come into conflict with the law, is capable of committing even other crimes. It is no wonder that we come to [attribute] every tenth crime annually recorded in the Army and Navy to them.

Unfortunately, in practice these arguments frequently do not get our attention. Moreover, certain commanders consider an independent investigation of those who have left their units without authorization to generally be unnecessary. I refer to the article "Who Needs to Look for Deserters?" in the 4 November issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

I think that such a conclusion is caused by an attempt of individual commanders to avoid publicity and to bide their time while counting on the independent return of a subordinate who has evaded service. Alas, as a rule, these hopes are futile. Only a few individuals return. A few more bring themselves to other agencies. Those who voluntarily turn themselves in [to police] are about 17 percent of the total number who have left their units without authorization. Internal affairs agencies detain the main mass of deserters—more than a third—but not based on information from commanders, but after they have committed another crime.

At times a commander, while not troubling himself with an investigation, sends a telegram to the soldier's parents and waits for them to deliver him to the unit. This practice has never proven to be worthwhile.

Sometimes, officers and warrant officers are sent to look for deserters at the location where they were drafted, where their parents and acquaintances live. This is precisely what the author of the article mentioned above

was writing about. His indignation with this practice is quite understandable, but clarifications are needed here. This type of investigation if it is employed after institution of a criminal proceeding at the direction of the commander—the inquest agency or on behalf of the military procurator with the participation of the officer performing the inquiry, produces the best results. This is also understandable. Really the officer is acting officially, on the basis of law, he has the required authority, and the government pays his expenses.

The so-called "private investigation" is another matter which they resort to in order to try to get the deserter to return to the unit, without causing the attendant publicity, without reporting according to orders, and without informing the military procurator. In short, in order to hide the crime. And envoys travel at their own expense since expenditures for such trips are not provided for by the budget and the commander who has permitted them can be held materially responsible. Furthermore, while hiding unauthorized absences of subordinates, they are not removed from [military] allowances which also causes material damage to the state for which the commander is also responsible. Do we need to say that the organizers of "private investigations" also demean their commander's dignity and their officer's honor when deciding to resort to arbitrariness and an unlawful act.

The author of the letter published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is undoubtedly correct about one thing: Special services, provost subunits, and staff inquiry officers should be engaged in investigating those who are avoiding service. Other officers have too many of their own duties for training and educating their subordinates.

In short, it is impossible to just exclude the deserter from the unit's rolls and to limit it to notification of an all-union investigation. He needs to be sought, not on individual initiative but, as prescribed by law.

Comment on Ministry, GLAVPU Response to Discipline Problem

90UM0210D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed Article, entitled: "Mark The Period Early"]

[Text] That was the title of Lieutenant Colonel O. Vladynkin's article that was published 18 November 1989 on the results of the discussion conducted by the newspaper on the responsibilities of officers for subordinates' violations of the law.

In the official reply of the Chief of a Directorate of a General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Lieutenant General B. Yermin states that since the beginning of 1988 methods and evaluation criteria on the state of military discipline, legality, and law and order in units and subunits that take into account the different aspects of Army and Navy life are being developed in the

Ministry of Defense and in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The Center for Research of Social and Psychological Problems under the Main Political Directorate and the Military Red Banner Institute are heading this work. Scholars from a number of military academies, members of the council of the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate on legality, law and order, and legal education in the Soviet Army and Navy are taking part in it. Upon completion of this work, preparation of an appropriate Minister of Defense order is proposed that permits objective evaluation of the state of military discipline, legality, and law and order.

Taking into account the comment set forth in the reply that called the article's comments incorrect and groundless, that "no one is planning to revise the document that defines, through our own contradictions, the distortions in the system of officer administrative responsibility for the crimes of their subordinates."

Alternative Service Debated

*90UM0247A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 4 Jan 90 p 2*

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent Igor Chernyak and Colonel Valeriy Astanin, Chief of a Ground Forces Main Staff Department, entitled: "Alternative Service: 'Pros' And 'Cons'".]

[Text] Note: Alternative service ("service without arms") is compulsory state service that is established by law and replaces active military (compulsory) service. It is introduced for those who object to military service ("service with arms") for religious or other convictions of conscience.

Laws on alternative service are being discussed and drafted in the Baltic region today. This question was also raised at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the All-Union Officers' Conference, and during the drafting of the USSR Law on Defense. However, by no means everyone has greeted the proposal with a "hurrah!" What is at issue, and what are the sides' arguments?

The democratization of society has not left the army untouched. We are learning about the revival of Officers' Conferences, which have not been held since the time of the Czarist army, and about the establishment in the Armed Forces of elective organizations (and this under sole command system!) and councils of Communist Youth League organizations. Our military leaders are beginning to heed public opinion, albeit not all at once. And how could they do otherwise, for life compels them! Meanwhile, "from below," there is impatience and demands for further changes.

In favor. By Igor Chernyak, Special Correspondent for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

"Do you know how the Afghans got recruits for their army?" I was recently asked by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Tyurin, Military Commissar of Moscow's Cheremushkinsky Rayon Military Commissariat. "They cordoned off a square, checked documents, and most men of draft age were sent straight to the units. The situation in our country, of course, is far removed from that, but you remember it from time to time."

It is a fact that induction into the army is becoming more and more difficult, and that the number of those who make every effort to evade military service is growing. There are many reasons for this, and we have written about them on the pages of this newspaper many times. What is the solution? Yes, compliance with the existing Law on Universal Military Service must be strictly monitored. But when this law is being violated by thousands of people, the question arises: Hasn't the time come to reconsider it?

It is possible, of course, if you close your eyes and plug your ears, to stubbornly adhere to the following position: I served my full term, so let young people have a taste of the rigors, every last one of them, period. But first, the Supreme Soviet has exempted students from the army—albeit not all, for better or worse. And second... But wait, perhaps we should try to listen to the other side. Still, consider this: Is there much good in having a defender of the motherland who is taken into the army under guard and then watched for two years to make sure he doesn't desert? And who benefits when a procurator sends him to jail for a year or two?

Why can't a Soviet person be given a choice? If you don't want to serve, you don't have to. You won't see a machine gun, a military uniform, orders, exercises, or other attributes of military life. But let him work, say, for three years, at some place where the country needs him—on a construction site, repairing a railroad, in a psychiatric clinic, or in a "futurless" village.

I foresee military objections: we already have alternative service, so why go to all the extra trouble? As one staff document says: "If religious or other convictions do not allow a young person to perform active military service, he is to be given the opportunity to fulfill his constitutional duty by serving in military-construction detachments." But what civilian character is there to speak of here when the soldiers in construction battalions take the military oath all the same, and carry out that oath in a military uniform, and undergo military training by order of the Minister of Defense? But this is not the most important consideration. Military-construction detachments today are a mixture of sick people and convicts, most of them people who, for one reason or another, the army is afraid to entrust with weapons. At the recent Officers' Conference, for example, Lieutenant-Colonel Yu. Yashin of the Transbaykal Military District cited the following figure: of 57 people conscripted into a construction battalion from Khabarovskiy Kray, 32 had criminal convictions, and 17 suffered from mental deficiencies. Who needs these kinds of recruits for the Soviet

Army? It's not surprising that dedovshchina [hazing], ethnic conflicts, and a kind of general lawlessness that you don't even find in a colony—that all these things are permanent fixtures of life in military-construction battalions.

God save us from that kind of alternative service!

I propose that the military-construction detachments of 20 ministries and departments be liquidated, leaving only the construction battalions of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which build military installations. That conscription of people with criminal convictions, health limitations, believers, and also those who are reluctant to put on a military uniform into the Army be reduced to a minimum. That they all be given the right to alternative service. That local Soviets be charged with conscription for alternative service, oversight of its implementation, and the selection of work sites, and that military commissariats be given an opportunity to staff only military units—that they not be charged with finding free manpower for ministries. All this would free the army of functions alien to it, such as harvesting, working in vegetable processing and storage facilities, and civilian construction.

I risk hearing the following retort: 'Now you're really going overboard! With that kind of volunteer arrangement, the army will quickly collapse; for given a choice, few people are going to become soldiers.' I don't think so. First, by no means would all people prefer three years of laying railroad ties in Siberia to two years in an assault landing force or on the border. Second, this will help to improve the army and compel it to show concern for people.

I am not so naive as to offer alternative service as a panacea for all problems—this is just one link in a chain of measures to restore the prestige of our Armed Forces. I know that many questions remain. For example, where would "objectors" live, how would they be paid, who would be responsible for their work? Should they be compelled to do alternative service, or should this be a voluntary affair? But I think the main thing today is to establish the principle, and once this is done, to draft a law on alternative service for the country as a whole and to submit it for nationwide discussion.

Note. The introduction of alternative service for all U.N. member states is recommended by the decisions of the Conference on the Human Dimension (the 1989 Paris Conference). According to the conference's recommendation, the various forms of alternative service should be of a civilian character, be socially useful, not be used as a form of punishment, and not be linked with service in military units. Alternative service does not exist in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and Luxembourg—there's no need for it, since those countries have volunteer armies, or in Turkey, which, like our country, has no provision for it.

But in most NATO countries, conscripts have a choice! In the FRG, for example, a law on "non-military service" was

adopted back in 1960. West Germans can object to conscription into the Bundeswehr for religious, philosophical, ethical, and other reasons. And this right is exercised each year by 60,000 to 70,000 people. The state has created over 90,000 jobs for "objectors"—albeit low-paid jobs with little prestige, but I don't think anyone has demanded to be made a bank director. And the alternative is this: if you don't want to go into the army, submit a petition, substantiate the reasons for your unwillingness, and, after your petition is granted, go work in a psychiatric hospital or a facility for the elderly, go care for handicapped people, or cut firewood in a forest. If your petition is refused, you can appeal to the courts.

There is also something similar in the socialist countries. In Poland, believers have the right to refuse to put on a military uniform—they work in the national economy, somewhere away from home. In the GDR, a law that envisions compulsory "civilian social" duty has been drafted for "objectors." If you object to military service, take the "civilian" oath instead of the military one and choose between working a year and a half on a construction project, during which you will live in a barracks and wear a uniform with a shovel on the shoulder straps, or working two years at an enterprise that will provide you with housing; if you want, you can wear a smoking jacket to work.

Against. By Colonel Valeriy Astanin, Chief of a Ground Forces Main Staff Department.

The mass media have recently carried many discussions about revising the USSR Law "On Universal Military Service" and introducing "alternative service" and raised many other questions concerning the army and navy. Who isn't expressing his opinion on this now "open" subject? A professor of medicine discusses army strength levels and the principles for manning the army, an old woman on pension talks about eradicating the sinister dedovshchina about which her neighbor told her...

I think that for an outsider to give advice to true professionals is tactless, to say the least. I don't want to cite facts and figures on the pages of this newspaper, nor are they the point. As for the problems involved in building the armed forces, we have had ample opportunity to become convinced of the aptness of the ancient wisemen's saying: "He who is reluctant to see will not see, he who is reluctant to hear will not hear." And any arguments here are powerless. For this reason, I do not expect you readers to immediately become our allies.

I shall begin with the question of reconsidering the USSR Law "On Universal Military Service." I think it would be more correct to speak not of revising the law but of refining a number of articles and provisions in light of changes and amendments that have been made over a period of more than 20 years, and also of removing from the USSR Armed Forces the Border, Internal and Railroad Troops. At the present time, work is being completed on a more precise wording of the USSR Law "On Universal Military Service" that includes all the changes and amendments.

As for the introduction of alternative service in our country, these documents provide for such service in principle. Citizens who are not drafted in peacetime for active military service in combat forces for health or other reasons (religious convictions, etc.) are conscripted into military-construction detachments. The term of service for military construction workers is the same as that for soldiers on active military duty. The period they serve counts toward the total number of years on which their pensions are based and toward their total labor service. Let me emphasize that military-construction detachments engage primarily in building various installations and in other economic activities and operate on a cost-accounting basis. Military construction workers are paid cash salaries (which are often sizable) based on the volume of work they perform. You will agree that the principle of service without arms and, of course, their social usefulness, is fully observed here.

At the same time, it would be possible, it seems, to consider the question of military construction workers taking a work pledge or something along these lines in place of the military oath. The question of form of dress also merits attention.

The question of the need to conscript youths who have health-imposed limitations has been raised in the press on several occasions. The Central Military Medicine Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense has examined the possibility of lowering the medical indices for youths during conscription, and this past fall an order of the USSR Minister of Defense took effect that significantly reduced induction into the army of young recruits with health-imposed limitations on their service. Unfortunately, we are unable to fully lift all limitations, above all because of the unfavorable demographic situation in the country—the acute shortage of conscription resources.

Regarding the conscription of citizens with criminal convictions. For your information, I can report that persons who have two convictions, and also people who have been convicted of grave and especially dangerous crimes, are not conscripted for military service. To extend this measure to the rest would be simply antihumanitarian (for we cannot deprive a person who has made a mistake of the opportunity to fulfill his constitutional duty).

As for liquidating the military-construction detachments of civilian ministries and departments, here my opinion is unequivocal: I am for this. However, the resolution of this question depends entirely on the USSR government.

In conclusion, I don't think that a young man who is seriously preparing himself for life would choose so-called alternative service. For serving in the combat forces is first of all an opportunity to test oneself in extreme conditions, to find out what you are capable of.

Report on Conditions of Draftee Construction Troops

*90UM0239A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 7 Jan 90 p 2*

[Article by Leonid Nikitinskiy and Mikhail Pasternak, entitled: "The 'Penal' Battalion"]

[Text]

Social Portrait of a Phenomenon

The Military builder. It is clear why they say "military." The uniform is misleading. But why "builder"? After all, he does not so much build as drag things around, sweep, carry out pots, sort rotten cabbage—in general, all sorts of the most thankless work. Our newspaper has spoken out many times and will continue to speak out in defense of this fellow, guilty of nothing, and for the abolishment of slavery hypocritically disguised by the uniform.

He surfaces from an alley like a thief out of some of the pits eternally dug in the clay, with bottoms of squelchy clay. Another, just like him, sits like a dozing crow on a slimy dump by a small, smoky fire with an terrible stench. He approaches you with the hesitation of a downtrodden cur drawn by hunger and asks with gestures for a cigarette.

Now you get a closer look at him, if there is anything to make out. It is as though he has no face beneath the cap with the ear flaps pulled down against the cold. Certainly not from the greasy all-weather quilted jacket which has no shape at all, but only from the belt buckle do you conclude that before you apparently stands a soldier.

And then, noticing with his sharp eye that your hand does not hold a stick but has even dipped into your pocket for the cherished pack, he suddenly becomes bold, as though having overcome something within himself, and asks for "maybe three?" And his claw with its dirty, broken nails reaches of its own for the snow-white cigarettes.

Do not ask him who he is, because he himself does not know. He is "STROYBAT" [Construction Battalion]. There are in the world, that is within the borders of the USSR, slightly less than a million of these people. They are outside of the law, without rights, because the peace conventions of the Geneva International Labor Organization (to which, incidentally, we too were signatories) were long since laid to rest, as was the leftist-barracks utopia about the use of military labor for the construction of peacetime projects.

The screen is set up not in some underground video studio but in the Main Office of the Military Procuracy of the USSR.

Before the lens of the video camera stand toylike soldiers in well-ironed uniforms and garrison caps (apparently cleaned up and spruced up for a high-level inspection), performing a dashing, almost circus-class number: two

plastic bags of reddish cement weighing 50 kilograms each are placed parallel onto two rusty metal bars. Two soldiers take hold of the shaky structure and—"Quick March!"

"Wouldn't it be easier on a litter?" a puzzled voice asks from behind the frame. "But we don't have a litter..." the junior officer answers dejectedly. "Just where are we to get one?" "And why don't you issue gauntlets?" "They tear, you see, the gauntlets. And there is no way to get new ones." "What do you mean, you can't get new ones!?" Lieutenant-Colonel Krykov, Chief Engineer for the project, standing right there in front of the camera, asks angrily. "You need to strike...." (We would mention parenthetically that strikes and hunger strikes are nothing new in the construction battalions).

The camera, following the script, is now moved to the office of Lieutenant-Colonel Katunin, responsible for safety equipment in this subunit of the All-Union labor army. Lieutenant-Colonel Katunin is imposing and cold: he does not perform circus tricks with metal bars. At the end of the year he receives several bonus payments for the shock-labor pace of construction.

"Tell me, Lieutenant-Colonel, why don't you have helmets?" "What do you mean, no helmets!?" Katunin says with great surprise. "We have three and a half thousand helmets lying there at the depot"! "Then just why are the poor soldiers running around in garrison caps?" "Just issue them helmets and see what happens," the Lieutenant-Colonel answered with feeling. "All of them will be broken, lost or traded for alcohol.... This is a construction battalion. Do you understand?"

We understand. What is there not to understand? This is a construction battalion. Give a helmet to one of them, and he will not figure out where to wear it. He will commit some sort of inanities right in the helmet. And a helmet is property entrusted to one, after all. [It is] The people's property. And he is a blockhead. If you break his skull with a brick, that is ok. You can write it off somehow. This is a construction battalion....

This was the Ministry of Construction in the Eastern Regions of the USSR, somewhere on the horns of the devil in the very Far East. Let us take a closer look: Astrakhan, the Astrakhan gas-processing plant, the city of Aksaraysk.

The first unit is already emitting smoke all around; a second is under construction. Who but a soldier is going to trek there to build it? There are two detachments there, more than a thousand men. Free men also work there, but strictly according to a schedule, in shifts. They receive special milk, special leave and decent wages. And those who are not up to it or for whom it is contraindicated can take their labor book and move on. Free men can do as they like.

But not the soldier in the construction battalion. He is chained there, as it were, by the Law on Universal Military Obligation. Furthermore, he spends all the

months of his service in the plant's medically restricted zone. He eats and sleeps there too. Some of the officers and their wives have been moved to the rayon center, to be sure. Even then, the wives abort every third pregnancy. And the young officers—excuse the expression—become impotent.

How does all of this appear on the screen? The flues send out multicolored smoke. It is pretty. The sanitation doctor points his finger at a distant flue: another ejection of something. A bright column is visible against the bright heavenly background. You breathe deeply. You are troubled. A total of 200 accidents occurred at the plant in 1987 and 1988, the doctor narrates monotonously, during which the pollution level, already above the limits, exceeded the standard by 100-400 times. How do the pathetic soldiers feel in this environment? Just ask them. They will tell you themselves....

And the poor soldiers tell from the screen how one feels approximately as though one has stuck his head into a gas oven. One is nauseous and has headaches. One feels like a fool. In the classification of toxic substances hydrogen sulfide is listed as a nerve gas. We were taught this.

At Cherepovets more than a thousand soldiers are housed in a former [prison] colony from which the convicts were moved because of the intolerable living conditions. One hundred men from a Perm detachment are on temporary duty in the city of Gubakhu, where they live in a prison. The wards there still have grating over the windows. The convicts were moved because the air pollution exceeds the permissible level by a factor of 50.

And what about Novgorod?! And Prokopyevsk?! The same kind of films are kept at the Main Military Procurator's Office on six 3-hour video tapes. Watching them, one's hair does not just stand on end; it gets so tired of standing it falls out. The construction battalion's geography is as unfathomable as that of the Archipelago Gulag scrupulously described by Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn. We did not take the analogy off the top of our head at all.

The first military construction detachments for civilian departments began to be formed in 1955. This was at the time when the famous Gulag, the most powerful support of the Stalinist economy, began to come apart once and for all. The Gulag died from loss of blood. The infamous Article 58 began to recede as the terms expired and then rehabilitation came about. There were no plans for replenishing that army.

A perceptible warming took shape in the area of policy, but the changes in the superstructure did not touch the foundation; the economy, essentially based on the system of administration by decree, remained inviolable. Even then, in 1955, the logic of the economical barracks dictated that this method of conducting the economy was simply impracticable without slavery in some form. Just as the alcoholic's system requires ever increasing

amounts of alcohol, the sick economic system was similarly not in a condition to get by without more and more infusions of forced labor.

What does the alcoholic do when the store is closed? He drinks anything he can get, until he dies or finds a more or less reliable substitute. The economy, nurtured by the "father of the peoples" with the fodder of forced labor, hopelessly sick and doomed, grabbed by the throat whomever it could, both thousands of students like Colorado beetles for the potato fields, and hosts of school children for the cotton crop, engineers for vegetable bases, and on and on, without end.

But the country's highest management settled on the Ministry of Defense as the most reliable "still" capable of reviving the concept of labor mobilization embodied by Stalin. At first, to be sure, the military construction detachments were ostensibly formed to build facilities "important to defense." But just what did this mean? It is a loose concept. For a long time we were accustomed to believing that behind every pole sat an agent of imperialism, and according to this siege logic every pole was a "facility important to defense."

The clouds thickened and then dispersed over the world arena, the "cold war" was replaced by detente, but the perimeter defense and the battle went on for us. The military construction detachments were first formed by joint decrees, then simply by decrees of the Council of Ministers, then by thoroughly vague "instructions" and even "orders." Actually, any ministry undertaking another colossal project like that of replacing the Arctic Ocean with the Indian Ocean in places, could insert things into it unnoticed against the background of such a scale of construction—and assign so many military construction detachments for those purposes. Signed and sealed.

In fact, those hoards of serfs did have and still have nothing to do with military service. They take an oath for some reason, but they never hold a weapon except for a pick. There is not even a precisely defined plan for what to do with them in case—God forbid—of a real military mobilization. The military construction units, numbering 327,000 men today, work at projects of 20 civilian ministries, which there is no point in listing and an absolute majority of which are as far removed from defense as a spade from a bayonet.

When the next "order" falls upon the Ministry of Defense like a bomb, the generals at the General Staff first grab their heads and swear. They soon calm down. It's ok. After all, the function of the army, totally reminiscent of a still [peregonnyy kub] in this case, consists in calling up the next thousands ostensibly for military service, to pump them through the Military Commissariats, provide them with shoes and clothing and foist them off on the clients as rapidly as possible in order not to have a headache from them later.

What kind of money does the Ministry of Defense have to spend on this transit operation? No one can precisely

answer this question. The rigid defense budget is simply being robbed by the unarmed peaceful departments.

Relations between the military construction section and the management agencies involved are presently governed by a statute passed in strange haste on 7 July 1983 by the Ministry of Defense and the State Construction Committee of the USSR. Apparently no agencies higher than that could bring themselves to take on this transgression, because the higher it is, the closer it is to a law, and the status of the military construction detachment is absolutely and deliberately proscribed by law. This kind of service is not mentioned either in the Constitution of the USSR or the Law on Universal Military Obligation. Despite this, in principle, any 18-year-old citizen can end up as a serf. It is a lottery. We have already mentioned in passing that the use of forced labor is contrary to the convention of the International Labor Organization of 10-28 June 1930 (!) "On Forced or Compulsory Labor," which the USSR joined (also a significant date) in 1956.

In 1987 N.P. Negreba, director of Ekibastuz GRES [State Regional Electric Power Plant]-2, attempted to refuse a military construction detachment assigned to the project. He believed that it would mean nothing but a headache for him. The leadership of the Ekibastuz Energostroy Trust did not permit him to take this reasonable step, literally forcing the detachment upon the GRES. It was then only 50% engaged in construction work in 1988, 40% in the first quarter of 1989 and since then, only 7% during individual periods.

The figures are a stubborn thing, albeit fairly boring. But let us take a close look at them anyway. The association of the Ministry of Construction in the Urals and West Siberia Regions of the USSR in Sverdlovsk Oblast; fewer than half of the personnel are employed on construction projects, and only 13% of the military construction workers in the military construction detachment assigned to construct the Bulanash plant are employed in their field. Fewer than half of the military construction workers are working in their field in the Altaykok-sokhimstroy; 26% of the personnel of the military construction detachment are working in their field in Rostovstroy; more than 2,000 soldiers annually work in outside organizations in Ulyanovskstroy.

Another military construction detachment is assigned to build the Tobol Oil Refinery, but only a fourth of its personnel are employed on the construction project. The commanders are forced to "sell" the others to 28(!) outside organizations: a meat combine, a fruit and vegetable base, a transportation agency, a hospital and even a hotel. Soldiers from the Altayvodstroy detachment have been loaned... to a prison.

The infamous "economic accountability" and "economic self-sufficiency" force the commanders of the military construction detachment to sell or rent out their

serfs. Despite all their wiles, however, many detachments, if not most of them, are still unprofitable and suffer need.

In many places the pay of military construction workers is 12-15 rubles a month. It can be assumed that part of it is pocketed by unscrupulous civilian colleagues by juggling volumes and norms and also by out-and-out cheating. In the construction of the Astrakhan Gas Refinery (where gas masks have still not been issued) the military construction workers have earned an average of 58 rubles per month, while the free men have earned 17 rubles—a day, however—on the same projects and with the same volumes. The economic organizations which own the serfs frequently hold up their pay, and the soldiers do not have a penny even for crackers.

How does all of this conform to the Basic Labor Laws of the USSR and Union Republics, which, among other things, set a guaranteed minimum wage of 70 rubles? This is purely a rhetorical question. The laws are written for civilians, after all. And who are these people? This is a construction battalion!

Are the military construction detachments actually needed or not? Lower- and mid-level leaders of construction organizations, for whom the military construction detachments are more a strain on the nerves than a benefit, believe that they are not needed. They refuse to sign their names, however, to avoid getting flak from the leadership. Warrant officers and officers assigned to command military construction detachments for who knows what sins express their attitude with action. They run away to anywhere they can at the first opportunity. It is actually so bad they would rather be at the front.

A completely different position is taken at both military and civilian headquarters, however. Lieutenant General Chuyko, Deputy Minister for Construction in the eastern regions of the RSFSR, recently requested reinforcements from the Ministry of Defense, for example. He was apparently unaware that most of the fightingmen in his multi-thousand-man Far East army were in forced idleness and living in poverty.

It is undoubtedly advantageous for the higher- and mid-level management leaders—that is, those who do not have to deal directly with the construction battalions—to have a reserve work force “in case of an emergency.” It is practically a free work force. They are not a part of the official strength; payments do not have to be made into the budget for the use of the labor; and dormitories do not have to be built and furnished. A stable will do. Nor is it difficult to understand the position taken by the leaders and the staff personnel in shoulderboards in the construction battalions. A reduction in the size of the military construction detachments would entail the automatic elimination of many sinecures, in which officers have dug in according to all the rules of military science and will not give up their positions without a battle, of course.

When all is said and done, if we consider even the purely economic aspect, aside from the legal and moral ones, we can boldly conclude that military construction detachments are not useful. This is clear even by definition, because slave labor cannot be effective. Its organization in the military construction detachment is beneath any criticism, its quality is still lower, and the volumes are nothing but fluff. And no sort of holes can be plugged by using them.

Something else is also a pity, and let us, therefore, change the names, while the facts will remain inviolable. On 3 July 1989 “young” Samoylov was working on the construction of another defense project, a vegetable base at Barnaul, under the supervision of PFC Nigmanov. “See that meat combine on the other side of the fence?” Nigmanov asked him. “There is a hole in the fence. Crawl through it, pick up a piece of meat, bring it out, sell it and bring me 25 rubles. If you do that I won’t beat you.”

Samoylov obediently set out to do it, but he returned with empty hands. He explained that there was a guard. “OK,” PFC Nigmanov said seethingly. “Then take in my service blouse for me. I hear you are good at that. Here you are!” Samoylov, already driven to desperation by the nagging and beatings by the “old man,” refused to take the service blouse. Nigmanov struck him in the face with his fist and knocked him down. He fell in just the right place, however, ending up with an iron pipe right under his hand. He managed to jump up and let his tormenter have it over the head with the pipe. Nigmanov collapsed, dropping a sharpened awl. Samoylov stabbed his former private first class and finished him off with the awl. He dragged the body into a shed, nailed the door shut and left.

Samoylov’s case is now being taken to the court under Article 102 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR: aggravated murder. I do not know who was particularly brutal to whom, but to us the construction battalion was inhumanly cruel to both fellows.

Thousands of crimes are recorded in the military construction detachments each year. They account for more than 40% of all the crimes committed in the Soviet Army and Navy. Their number is growing. Military crimes predominate within their structure, and every fifth one involves violations of regulations governing relations. The number of murders, the infliction of heinous bodily harm and rapes has grown 1.5-fold.

The number of participants in criminal acts has increased by 60%, and the portion of crimes committed “while drunk” has increased by the same amount. The number of criminal attacks on civilians, including murders, is growing. The number of suicides and attempted suicides is not dropping. The number of “fightingmen” in the construction battalions who have died as a result of crimes or incidents has grown by 80%.

Frequent crimes caused by inter-ethnic dissension is a typical aspect of crimes in the construction battalions.

Inter-ethnic exploitation and bloody battles between different "fellow-ethnic" groups were known in the construction battle long before the events in Sumgait and Fergana.

We are convinced that it is not so much the specific features of the group as much as the economic and legal status of the construction battalion which accounts for the high crime rate. It has forced many of those who were only recently just boys to resort to crime or to run away, which is itself a military crime. A 10-15% desertion rate is considered normal in some detachments. And why would they not run away?

...Lt Col P. Kushnir, Commander of a military construction detachment based at Novgorod to build the Azot combine, decided to straighten out the unit entrusted to him with some severe measures. A "ward for the temporary detention of arrestees" was hastily built at the traffic control point there, where the soldiers languished up to 25 days for going AWOL and without even the right to wash. They slept without bedding on the bare concrete floor, as many as 11 people in a three square-meter area.

Privates Tupichkin, Moys and Klimenko knocked a hole in the wall and broke out. They roamed Novgorod and its environs for a total of six days, but during that time they committed eight robberies, including breaking into the dacha of the First Secretary of the Party Obkom. One can only be glad that the runaways did not have time to mature to the point of committing more heinous crimes. They are now on trial: Privates Tupichkin, Moys and Klimenko.

But perhaps Lieutenant-Colonel Kushnir should be tried first. Or he who first thought up the inhumane construction battalion. The fact is, however, that no one thought it up. It was born of itself in the bowels of our society, like a cancer cell in a predisposed organism, and metastasized.

The nature of the disease is understood very well also at the Office of the Main Military Procuracy. It has not been provided with the means of removing the tumor surgically. The procurator's office has done everything within its power, conducting a large-scale inspection of the military construction detachments, summarizing an enormous amount of information and discussing it at a recent, expanded board meeting. A.F. Katusev, Main Military Procurator and Deputy General Procurator of the USSR, does not flatter himself with the hope that these steps can radically rectify the situation.

It cannot be done by the Main Military Procurator's Office but will have to be done by the nation's highest agencies of power and control. After all, the construction battalions are precisely and mainly unconstitutional. This is an appropriate area for testing the strength of the Constitution Oversight Committee of the USSR. Will it cope with the task? This phenomenon has become firmly rooted in the economy. One can even fell with the axe of the law the strange and deformed tree of the construction

battalion, but who is to say that something else equally monstrous will not sprout from the stump which remains.

With respect to sanctions, the military procuracy was not stingy with these at the board meeting. Even Lieutenant-General Chuyko, Hero of Socialist Labor and Deputy Minister for Construction in the eastern regions of the RSFSR, was himself favored with a personal prosecutorial warning from Lieutenant-General of Justice Katusev. Could this be internecine warfare? General against general, the military procuracy against the army? No, the military procuracy is for human rights and, in the big picture, for the army's honor.

Continued Influx Of Psychologically Unfit Draftees

90UM02284 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Jan 90 First Edition Edition p 4

[Article by V. Shirokov and G. Gordiyenko: "We Drafted Them—You Cure Them... Certain Military Commissariates Are Guided By This Principle"]

[Text] "How long is this going to continue?" Major-General of Justice V. Savin chairman of the Pacific Fleet Military Tribunal, took the folder containing Seaman N. Khnykin's case and pushed it aside.

What was in there that could have surprised a military judge with his experience?

During a relatively brief period of time Seaman Khnykin had been absent without leave several times from his military unit, hiding in basements and barns. You must agree, this is somewhat unusual behavior and Khnykin explained it by saying that he was unable to endure the burdens and deprivations of the service and had decided to die. Nonetheless, a specialist who conducted an outpatient forensic-medical examination did not discover any abnormalities in the seaman's mental state or behavior. The military tribunal of the Vladivostok garrison convicted Khnykin. True, because of an amnesty declaration the seaman was released from the disciplinary battalion before the end of his sentence and returned to his unit. Absolutely nothing changed in Khnykin's behavior. Once again there was a string of absences without leave and instances of insubordination. The seaman's reaction to disciplinary punishment as before was quite strange, beyond the bounds of a normal mental state. Again, criminal charges were pressed against Khnykin. This time a more thorough examination of the defendant was conducted in a hospital. Experienced doctors were included in the commission. The experts concluded that Khnykin suffered from psychopathy accompanied by emotional instability (shortly thereafter he was declared unfit for military service and discharged to the reserves)...

During just nine months of 1989 the Military-medical Commission of the Pacific fleet declared 960 individuals unfit for military service (approximately one-third of

them suffered from some kind of mental disorder). However, before being discharged to the reserves due to their illnesses, many of these seamen and soldiers managed to commit military crimes. Who then is supposed to post the "health" sentinels on the path of these draftees who are incapable of carrying out the complex duties of today's soldier? Of course, the military Commissariate. In Khnykin's example (drafted from the Rostov oblast) we had the unfortunate opportunity to convince ourselves that the military-medical commission in this case did not carry out the job for which it was designed—in essence it mistakenly shipped a man off to the army. It took great efforts and material expense to correct the error.

This year the Military Commissariates in the Amur oblast drafted into military construction detachments more than 20 young men with various functional health disorders (among which were mental disorders), in the Khabarovsk kray—14 men, in the Sverdlovsk oblast—eight men, in the city of Frunze—three men. How large would this statistic become, reflecting human suffering and material losses, if it were to encompass all of our regions?

You might object and raise the point that mental disorders are difficult to diagnose: in-depth examinations in hospitals are necessary for their diagnosis, highly qualified psychiatrists are needed and much more. That is all true but even existing capabilities are far from being utilized completely. We can cite an example which confirms this. Even before Private A. Kuligin was drafted into the service, certain anomalies were noticed in his behavior by school teachers and his fellow classmates. The cause of this was brain damage from an injury which Kuligin had suffered previously. The organs of military justice found out about this without particular difficulty as soon as it became necessary. But back during Kuligin's examination by the induction commission the residual symptoms of his mental illness following the injury remained undetected by the doctors and personnel of the Commissariate.

Many errors are committed even in those cases when the medical history of the draftee obligates the doctor to be especially careful. Evidently, there is a certain cause-and-effect relationship here, brought about by the "residual principle" of filling the ranks of the Armed Forces in recent years. The mass draft in conditions of demographic fluctuations at times begins to resemble a rushing river, sweeping along everything in its path. It is not surprising that the medical commissions have gradually lost their main function—to identify at the induction centers individuals suffering from illness. The effort to spot mental illness has been especially unsuccessful. There have been cases when psychiatrists were not even included in the VVK [Military Medical Commission]. The commission itself is made up of doctors from city and village hospitals recruited for the job on the spur of the moment. The VVK does not bear any kind of responsibility for the results of its work. This reminds us of the criminal case of Seaman A. Levinskiy who

assaulted and robbed his commander. How could a mentally ill person, moreover a drug addict, wind up on a war ship?

Drug Use Claimed as Draft Evasion Ploy

90UM0220c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Jan 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Senior Lieutenant N. Dolid, Volga-Ural Military District, and commentary by Colonel of Medical Services G. Mironychev, chief psychiatrist at the Main Military Clinical Hospital imeni Academician N.N. Burdenko and deputy chief psychiatrist of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Fake Drug Addicts"]

[Text] I recently overheard a conversation between two draftees. They were talking about how to evade service in the army. They had selected what they believed to be the most certain option: to declare themselves to be drug addicts....

...The commander brought Private B. Murzaabdulayev, a young soldier, to the district military hospital. When he spoke with the doctor the soldier stated that he had been taking drugs since childhood and could not get along without them.

His statement seemed to be confirmed by an explanatory note from Sergeant K. Mindiashvili, Section Commander: "He behaves strangely, illogically. He frequently isolates himself. One sometimes notices the soldier's hands shaking...."

The same was indicated, it appeared, by another official document signed by Captain Med Service Bukharov, OIC of the medical unit, and Lieutenant-Colonel Turukov, the unit commander.

I spoke with Murzaabdulayev. He was unconstrained and willingly answered my questions. Personally I did not notice any deviations in his behavior.

"I was born in Frunze," the soldier told me, among other things. "I began getting high while still in school. I had a business in the upper grades. I would go with my friends to the hemp plantations located near Issyk-Kul. These friends promised to get the 'grass' into the army. How? There are many ways. In a cigarette package, for example, in nuts...."

I thought to myself: This is a real "present" for the unit.

Later I spoke with Colonel of Medical Services L. Pilipenko, the Chief District Psychiatrist:

"According to the clinical profile, our Private Murzaabdulayev does not have a clearly defined addiction," Leonid Konstantinovich said. "What we have is only occasional use of marijuana. This does not indicate, however, that the individual is a real drug addict."

Incidentally, such patients are not a rarity in the district hospital. Private A. Chibishev was recently returned to the unit after a thorough examination. His self-diagnosis,

extreme addition to a toxic substance, was not confirmed. After serving a year Private R. Bulygin announced that he was a drug addict. The soldier suddenly began complaining about sharp pains, weakness and aching joints, symptoms of the use of drugs.

Bulygin was placed into a hospital. He spent almost 20 days there. Considerable funds were spent on examining him, and the most highly skilled specialists were called in. No significant changes in the soldier's organism were detected, however.

"Leonid Konstantinovich," I asked the Colonel: "could this case be classified as a fake?"

"Yes, it could, but with certain qualifications," the psychiatrist explained. "There exists a certain percentage of so-called hypochondriacs, people with a tendency to exaggerate their illness...."

I thought to myself: Does this mean that fake drug addicts and fake addicts of toxic substances could have immunity, so to speak, from public and disciplinary action?

From the editors: We asked Colonel of Medical Services G. Mironychev, chief psychiatrist at the Main Military Clinical Hospital imeni Academician N.N. Burdenko and deputy chief psychiatrist of the USSR Ministry of Defense, to comment on the article.

"Certain servicemen do indeed claim occasional use or even misuse of drugs or toxic substances for purposes of evading the service," Gennadiy Nikolayevich said. "In such cases we ordinarily send them to psychiatric facilities for expert examination. The hopes of these poor excuses for soldiers begin to collapse there. After all, in the situation of the hospitalized examination the medical specialists have everything they need to determine unequivocally who is a drug addict and who is a fake. And although such fakes are generally not typical—and I want to stress this—I believe that what has been said will force those who are planning to make their lives easier in this way to give it some serious thought."

More Draftees Seek to Avoid Military Service

90UM0234A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major-General V. Bespalov, Moscow city military commissar, entitled: "On the Legal Status of the Draft"]

[Text] Colonel V. Kostin, military commissar of Riga's Moskovskiy Rayon, touched upon an issue at the All-Army Officers' Conference, that workers of all other military commissariats also believe to be important and urgent—that of organizing the call-up of youngsters for active military service.

The trend is such that the number of conscripts attempting to evade military service under any excuse and failing to appear when scheduled at the military commissariat is growing. Even in Moscow. You can imagine the difficulties

that must be dealt with by the military commissariats of the Baltic republics, where they cannot count on the support of local government organs, and where various sorts of legal acts inconsistent with All-Union laws, including the USSR Constitution, are continually being announced.

As far as law enforcement organs are concerned, they are allowing draft evasion to go unpunished more and more often. Incidentally, Article 80 of the RSFSR Criminal Code does not even define with sufficient clarity how long such evasion can continue without punishment.

The USSR Law on Universal Compulsory Military Service has lost its authority for a number of reasons, and it is openly recognized to be obsolete. Life demands acceleration of the drafting and adoption of the USSR Law on Defense. This is a law which affects the interests of the state, the people and each individual taken separately more than perhaps any other.

I completely share the opinion that has already been stated by some USSR People's Deputies as well as readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: The legal status of drafting youngsters for military service must be raised. What we are talking about is the kind of army we should have. Much has changed in recent years. For example, Border, Internal and Railroad Troops were removed from the USSR Armed Forces. Why, then, should people be called up into forces outside the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Defense on the basis of an order of the Minister of Defense?

Furthermore, some draftees find themselves in military construction detachments transferred, if I may use that term, to purely civilian ministries. Does everyone realize that they are transferred there not at the will of the minister of defense but in accordance with decisions of the country's supreme executive organ—the USSR Council of Ministers? And how does the legislator view this interpretation of active military service? A persuasive answer cannot be found in legal acts.

This is why it seems to me that we need to organize matters in such a way that it would be clear to everyone that at the moment of call-up (and discharge into the reserves), the citizen enters into legal relations not with the Ministry of Defense but with the state, with the Soviet government. This would be helped along by announcing regular call-ups and discharges into the reserves not through orders of the USSR Minister of Defense but through decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet or decisions of the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Seven Estonian Draftees Refuse Induction

90UM0293B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 4, 22-28 Jan 90 p 6

[Article by O. Payde, in the newspaper NOORTE HAAL: "In NOORTE HAAL (Tartu)"]

[Text] In Tartu, only half of the draftees were sent to serve in the Army.

By yesterday morning, 14 young men had been called up by the Tartu Military Commissariat to complete their military service in the Soviet Army. However, only half of the draftees boarded the bus. The remaining seven young men who, it is true, arrived at the assembly point, refused to serve in an occupation army and were sent home. With the Geneva-49 Movement acting as an intermediary, they returned their draft notices and wrote statements addressed to the USSR Ministry of Defense about their refusal to complete military service. Aleksey Lotman, a representative of the Geneva-49 Movement, sent one copy of each statement to the Tartu Voyenkomat [Military Commissariat]. Military Commissar Colonel Ants Laaneots said that he was obliged to carry out [the provisions of] the law and would submit a petition to the procurator about the crimes committed by those who are refusing to complete military service.

Until the present time, more than 500 people, using the Geneva-49 Movement as an intermediary, have surrendered their military service cards or draft notices. Their numbers are increasing with every passing day. How are the authorities planning to repress such a large number of people? On the contrary, we would expect the ESSR Supreme Soviet to finally be compelled to carry out the decision of paragraph 51 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 which says that the occupying state cannot draft people residing on occupied territory into its military and auxiliary units. And that any propaganda about voluntary entry into the Army is forbidden. The Geneva Convention along with a number of other international agreements is a part of our legal system in accordance with the Constitution of the ESSR. We need to actually begin following that. First of all, this signifies recognition that paragraphs 78 and 189 of the Criminal Code are null and void.

([SOYUZ] Editor's Comment: Geneva-49 is an organization that is aggressively conducting a boycott of service in the Soviet Army.)

PVO Rear Services Chief on Improvement of Food Services

90UM0256B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel-General A. Voblikov, Rear Services Chief of the Air Defense Forces, by Colonel A. Yurkin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the heading "Social Sphere: Signs of Renovation", entitled: "Take Part of the Burden on Yourself". The first paragraph is an editorial introduction.]

[Text] *The Army and Navy have begun implementing a program of improving food services and organizing the diet of personnel. The Deputy Commander in Chief of the Air Defense Forces for Rear Services, Colonel-General A. Voblikov, Chief of Rear Services of the Air Defense Forces, talks with a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent about this.*

[Yurkin] Anatoliy Alekseyevich, what brought about the program and what does it envision?

[Col Gen Voblikov] Of course, it was brought about by the desire to provide a full-value meal for Army youth, and on a scientific basis and taking into account the capabilities, both present and future. For example, we are examining the question of introducing milk into rations. The portion of meat and fish will also increase. Somewhat earlier, as you know, we already added meat and sugar. In short, the structure of the diet is changing, corresponding more and more to the workloads which are placed on the shoulders of soldiers.

[Yurkin] Of course, a question arises with readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: how can the diet be improved if there is not enough food in the country?

[Col Gen Voblikov] The improvement in soldiers' food rations is envisioned by internal resources. For example, we should be able to supply our own milk the year round. Subsidiary farms of military units and schools are to supply the mess halls with potatoes and vegetables for six months and with meat for three and one-half months. The task, to be sure, is difficult, but it can be done if we put our hands to it properly. You see, there are units in which the indicators of self-supply of food products is now considerably higher than what is called for by the program. Thus, in one of the polar garrisons, the livestock raising complex has 80 cows and 300 pigs. There is enough milk for everyone, including the kindergarten and the families of service members. And they always have fresh meat there.

[Yurkin] Who works on this subsidiary farm? I was told that in the tundra they cannot find people who wish to become reindeer breeders, although the monthly wage is R1,500.

[Col Gen Voblikov] Well, in that garrison there are four soldiers who look after the animals, and they are supervised by a warrant officer. Major Yu. Aroyan commands the battalion. Naturally, all our "livestock breeders" take their places in the combat crews when necessary.

To be honest, such an arrangement is not to my liking personally. Amateur management of the subsidiary farm, when everything is supported exclusively by enthusiasm, self-taught persons, and amateurs, is becoming an impediment in implementing the program of self-support.

Moreover, by taking the soldier away from normal combat training, we are by no means influencing in the best way the state of military discipline, observance of regulations, and combat readiness as a whole.

[Yurkin] Can you suggest something different?

[Col Gen Voblikov] I believe the regiment should have an authorized work team to perform the farm work. Namely an authorized team—legal and manned by those, say, who for health reasons cannot perform line duty. By the way, Bulgaria has experience in this. And we

have now begun talking about alternative service. Why not send those who cannot join the service to the Army as rear services specialists.

Then you also have the argument that a considerable amount of meat is delivered to garrisons of the Far North each year. This is expensive, and the quality also decreases from the extended storage. But if a subunit commander starts up a small farm, the people will have milk and fresh meat. However, it is rare that he would go to such troubles: there is no feed and people are few and far between. But if he had three rear services specialists on his staff, all the problems could be easily resolved, and self-support would become more effective.

[Yurkin] Let us assume that the people problem were resolved, but another problem arises: Where do you get equipment for developing a subsidiary farm, and how do you store the produce raised?

[Col Gen Voblikov] These problems are difficult, but not impossible. Many aviation units have both tractors and trailer equipment; they are authorized for maintaining the airfields. Finally, the funds obtained from selling the products in the established procedure can be put to use. Economic savvy will suggest how to get out of a situation if you approach the matter with an interest. For now, neither commanders nor rear services specialists have enough of this interest.

I once had the opportunity to visit units of the Czechoslovak People's Army. There, if the subsidiary farm was managed in an exemplary manner and produced a large profit, at the end of the year every commander, right up to the division commander, involved in the operations work is certain to receive material compensation. And it sometimes is several times more than the monthly pay and allowances. This experience, I think, can also be applied in our conditions. In the future, I believe, leasing will also be possible in subsidiary farms. For the time being, we are very cautious....

Recently I traveled to a northern garrison and saw this: They were being fed goby fish caught in the Black Sea, while right under their nose, as they say, the coastal waters are swarming with the splendid loach. I served in the north when I was a young lieutenant. We were fed excellent fish the year round. You do not pull the fish out of the pond without difficulty. Initiative is needed, and the program for improving the soldier's diet is counting on it.

The Army is fully capable of assuming part of the burden for implementing the Food Program. Is this difficult? Certainly. There will be considerable work, but the goal is worth it.

Krasnodar Reservist Call-up Reversed After Opposition

90UM0267A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 28 Jan 90 p 1

[Interview with I.K. Polozkov, Party Kraykom [Kray Committee] first secretary, by Z. Yeroshok: "In Krasnodar After the Mobilization"]

[Text] January and it is already Spring in Krasnodar. It is warm, rainy, and fog covers the ground like steam from a boiling teapot.

It is late evening. The city is animated. Summer cafes are operating. Here and a sign is dimly gleaming. But anyway, I immediately detect that there is life with a nearly muffled sound. Like when they lower the volume of the television when there is a sick person in the room.

The Party Kraykom is like the Smolnyy [Committee] as it is presented to us in our films about the revolution. Only there are no rifles or machineguns, of course. But people, people, people are everywhere—in the foyer, on all of the floors, in all of the offices, and in all of the corridors. Certainly, throughout the history of its existence, this building has not seen so many so-called simple people (alas, we have such a term and, if you use it, everyone knows what and whom you are talking about).

I know what has happened and what is happening these days in the city.

A decision was made to conduct a reservist call-up from Krasnodar Kray (just like the one from Stravropol, Rostov, etc.) in the Transcaucasus. More than 9,000 men—mainly Russians—were called-up almost simultaneously without any explanation whatsoever from certain rayons of the Kray where more than a hundred nationalities reside. People arrived at the Party Kraykom and demanded an answer from its leaders. The decision was made in Moscow and local leaders were held responsible for the answer.

I know that Ivan Kuzmin Polozkov, Party Kraykom first secretary, conducted a continuous two-day communications "marathon" with the CPSU Central Committee, the Government, and the USSR Ministry of Defense. Three very important decisions were made. First: the reservist call-up from the Kray was terminated on 18 January. Second: at the end of the day on 18 January, shipments of mobilized soldiers were suspended to the combat operations area. Third: a decision was made to immediately bring the reservists back home. The first planes from Kirovabad had already landed on Kuban soil during the second half of 19 January.

[Yeroshok] Ivan Kuzmin, you immediately took the side of those who attended the rallies. Why?

[Polozkov] We saw what the political consequences could be at the present and in the future. The Kray's population is really multinational....

We knew: We had no other course of action. Lately, people are displaying coldness and distrust toward Party committees.

And then, there is this call-up. A massive call-up. Purely along national lines. And the people's indignation with the hastiness of the call-up decision, the people's indignation with how it was conducted, and precisely: Secretly, hurriedly, and at night.

[Yeroshok] But certainly the Party Kraykom and the Krayispolkom were notified about the planned call-up?

[Polozkov] No! We found out that a mobilization was already being conducted when people came rushing to us for help. The phones had been ringing since morning. Women were crying and screaming. No one knew just where the reservists were being called up to. They could only assume that it was to the Transcaucasus. They even used every means possible to hide this information from the reservists at the Voyenkomats [military commissariats]. Krayispolkom Chairman Comrade Kondratenko and I attempted to change the minds of the military men. People had to be prepared for a call-up. Explain [to them] that we are talking about preventing a fratricidal war and also about aid to people, including Azerbaijan, Armenian, Russian and others. They would have to speak on television, radio, and in newspapers to convince wives and mothers of the need for this measure, to work with people at call-up assembly points and prepare, teach, arm, and ship reservists to designated areas once again without that unimaginable haste.

Of course, Kuban residents knew that a war was going on in the Transcaucasus. And a large number of career service lads from Kuban are there today.

Refugees have already been arriving here for a long time. On the day of the call-up, Kuban provided refuge to 19,000 citizens of Armenian nationality or mixed families (Armenian-Azerbaijani).

I am certain: If the military had prepared their action with publicity, openly, and systematically, they would have found volunteers (and there would have been quite a few) and there would have been greater understanding by the reservists and their families.

This did not occur in the current situation.

In their haste, they permitted many violations of Ministry of Defense directives that were issued in connection with the call-up: Let us say that we do not call-up those who have many children, those who are the only bread-winners in their families, those who have helpless parents or elderly people as dependents, etc. But we very often ran into just such people among the reservists. There were even those who themselves were on doctor's certificates [certifying inability to work] and there were people with industrial injuries. During the call-up, Voyenkomat employees often treated these reservists and their families rudely. Yes, no one wants to die.... But that does not mean that people will have that same reaction to any mobilization. And once the mobilization was exactly that, there could not have been any other reaction to it. Moreover: It was heated up and became surrounded by rumors and cock-and-bull stories. And that is why the mobilization, this specific one, had to be stopped, ceased, and every last reservist had to be returned home. Incidentally, there were cases when men wanted to remain where the battles are being fought and they said: People are suffering here and they need to be

protected. But we said: Return home, convince your relatives and dear ones, and afterward....

Incidentally, we do not have anything against military units in connection with the call-up but as for the Voyenkomats....

The question for the Voyenkomats must not consist of whether or not they were carrying out an order. But just how were they carrying out the order. Today, these are different times and the people are quite different.

And once again I repeat: You need to know the specific features of our region. There is a high density of a multi-national population. Adygei, 200,000 Armenians, many Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Turkish tribesman, Assyrians, Crimean Tatars, etc. live in the Kray. But mainly Russians were called up. I am in no way calling for brother to fight brother or that only Armenians and Azerbaijanis should be sent to the Transcaucasus. But imagine when there are Russian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani families in one entryway and only the Russian is called up and the remaining live as if nothing is happening. What are the mother, wife, and relatives of the reservist going to feel? Who can insure that their indignation is not brought down on the heads of their neighbors, on all people of Caucasian nationalities? And if something else occurs to the reservist there? It would be grounds for anti-Caucasian feelings and grounds for nationalists to once again call Russians butchers and occupiers right now.

Incidentally, during the days of the meeting in Krasnodar, many men of Armenian and Azerbaijan descent were immediately removed from military lists.

At the market, a man with a Caucasian complexion is selling carnations and he has a placard on his chest: "I am not Armenian—I am Georgian."

[Yeroshok] Ivan Kuzmin, I just drove by the Kraykom and saw an enormous shield from which these exulting words burst forth to meet the people: "The People and the Party are one!" On Thursday evening 18 January when you went out to meet the crowd of 20,000 that was chanting: "Po-loz-kov!" to the crowd with the placards that read "Bring back Daddy!" to the crowd that was directing the most angry words at you and the CPSU, did you feel that everything that was occurring would intensify to a crisis of Party interrelations with the people?

[Polozkov] What did we run into on the very first day? The people did not believe us. I appealed to the crowd of many thousands and proposed: Select 20-25 people and we will work together.

Thus on Thursday evening, 18 January, an initiative group was born that was also made up of men but mainly there were wives and mothers.... We immediately established the fullest contact. The staff of the Party Kraykom and the initiative group began to act.

During those days, together we were able to resolve the one problem in the shortest possible time period just as

our people demanded. In Moscow, they met us halfway in spite of the extremely serious situation and the combat operations that were unfolding in Azerbaijan.

People began to return. However, at the meeting, they nevertheless told us: We do not trust you, you are lying to us. Of course, this painfully offended us. But as a communist and a party staff worker, I understood the people who were brought here by alarm about their relatives. They had that right to not believe me and my comrades until the last Kuban resident returned home from the Transcaucasus. But I told them: Be patient, relatives, your men will also be home in a very short period of time. I did not doubt this for a minute and this is the only thing that gave strength to me and the rest of my comrades, secretaries and other workers of the Party Kraykom and the Krayispolkom who maintained communications with military units of the Transcaucasus and who organized transport, medical service, provided the equipment to broadcast the meeting, they spent a lot of time with specific people, answered their requests, found information for them, yes and simply talked to them, explained things to them, and calmed them.

During the joint activities, people became acquainted with Party committee work. This was more convincing than plenums, meetings, reports, or resolutions.

[Yeroshok] What was the hardest thing for you personally during those days?

[Polozkov] To live through the provocations. "An aircraft with our boys on it was just shot down and they are hiding it from us...." "A train load of wounded soldiers just arrived at the station...." "They have brought coffins to Yelizavetinskiy Station (station nearest to Krasnodar, located directly in the center of the city—Z. Ye.) and they want to hide them." "A massacre of Armenians is occurring on Red Street." In each of these cases, we gave people a vehicle and the capability to drive by (to Yelizavetinskiy Station, to the train station, to the airport) to see for themselves that it was not true. I brought people into my office, called military district commanders in front of them, called commanders in front of them and connected them with soldiers.

During those days, not one serious incident occurred in the Kray, furthermore, on "normal" days about 200 crimes are committed daily.

Polozkov basically spent the entire week on the square. He admitted that he slept no more than two hours per day.

On the day when the last aircraft landed with reservists from Kirovabad, they took Polozkov to the hospital.

Narcotics use in Barracks Continuing

90UM0276A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Feb 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by Maj Yu. Klenov, NA STRAZHE RODINY correspondent from the Leningrad Military District, entitled: "A 'Grass' Cigarette".]

[Text] Drug addicts and narcotics continue to find their way into the barracks.

A package of marijuana was found behind a radiator in the training subunit's barracks. They did not know at first that it was drugs. Many officers and warrant officers had never actually seen such poison before. It seems that today this knowledge is essential to all commanders and political workers. Drug addicts and narcotics continue to find their way into the soldiers' barracks and the seamen's quarters.

Captain Yu. Cherkashin, commander of the training subunit, showed me an envelope containing grey-green straw, one variety of marijuana, and a bright package of imported tablets which stimulate the central nervous system.

"We confiscated it from the new replenishments," Yuriy Aleksandrovich explained. "They brought an initial 'supply' with them. They will then replenish it by the most diverse means. It was brought in to one man by his brother, for example; another 'stocked up' while on leave; a third received it concealed in a package; a fourth bought it in town...."

"According to the police," Col A. Zhidkov, political worker, told me, "a certain Lesha showed up in the town where our unit is stationed. A furtive and cautious young man, he sells marijuana at 15 rubles a matchbox. He has also been seen at the unit traffic control post...."

I visited the hospital where young soldier, S., from Capt Cherkashin's subunit is undergoing treatment. In our conversation he repeated several times that deep-down he cursed those who gave him his first "grass" cigarette. And for each drug addict detected and repentant, how many are there who continue craftily to seek the "stuff" after donning the military uniform? And what kind of personnel and means will it take to detect them in the subunits? The conclusion is automatic: We need to equip the commanders and political workers with at least the "professional minimum" enabling them to recognize drugs and drug addicts.

Common sense tells us that this is essential at the present stage, but the spirit protests. How many times have military personnel had to engage in work not their own? During the fall induction I visited the city assembly center in Leningrad. I saw how, before they were shipped out, one of the military teams began "to break down" an addicted conscript. And this was several weeks before the taking of the oath and the assignment of a weapon! Just how do we draft people for the service? How are the medical commissions staffed? Do they include the right kind of medical specialists? Why do the internal affairs agencies and local soviets frequently divorce themselves from the conscription campaign, placing it entirely onto the shoulders of the military commissariats? These and other questions give one no peace.

Construction Troops AWOL from Armenia

90UM0291A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 7 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by I. Chernyak, entitled: "The Minister of Defense Is Aware".]

[Text] On 21 January, more than 20 soldiers of one military construction unit fled to Moscow from Armenia where they were working on rebuilding facilities destroyed by the earthquake.

"This morning a group of parents of the soldiers who had fled demanded that we provide them with normal service conditions," Major General V. Navaznov from the Ground Forces Main Political Directorate told us. "In the words of the lads themselves, their unsettled living conditions in the earthquake zone, bad food, and also the total indifference of commanders to their problems drove them to despair. Those who fled include Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians but there was nothing said about conflicts on the basis of nationalities. We sent the soldiers to a unit in Moscow where they will be until we make a decision about them."

"The lads arrived here at 17:00," reported Subunit Commander Lieutenant Colonel A. Bubnov. "We had them shower and dress in military uniforms and we will send those with health complaints to the hospital."

The USSR Minister of Defense was informed about the incident. Representatives of the Ministry of Defense have departed for the Transcaucasus Military District.

THE ARMED FORCES AND THE NATIONALITIES

Interethnic Clashes In Army Denied By Azerbaijani Commissar

18310042c Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri 18 Oct 89 p 4

[Interview with Major General A. A. Gasymov, Military Commissar of the Azerbaijani SSR: "The Army's Concern Is Our Common Concern"]

[Text]

[Correspondent] Comrade Gasymov, recently various rumors and distortions have been spread in our republic about interethnic conflicts in the army, especially conflicts which have resulted in death. It is claimed that Azerbaijani soldiers are most often subjected to these attacks. To what extent do these rumors correspond to the truth?

[Maj Gen Gasymov] It would be incorrect to say that the interethnic conflicts occurring in every part of our country have not touched the army to one extent or another. The Army is a union of people, and the children of the people serve in it. Thus, none of the processes occurring in our society can be sidestepped by the army. Along with this I will state most definitely that there has

been no event resulting in death the cause of which was an interethnic conflict. It is very unfortunate that I cannot say with as much firmness that Azerbaijani youth, like those from other regions of our country, have not died during their service in the armed forces. Let me give an example; this year alone 65 military personnel conscripted from our republic died in the army from various diseases, or because they disregarded water safety rules, or in automobile accidents in the course of fulfilling their service duties. Criminal investigations of these events were and are being conducted.

[Correspondent] What concrete measures are being taken so such saddening events do not occur? After all, they are our children.

[Maj Gen Gasymov] Measures are being taken; you can believe it, the strongest measures are being taken. Often our youth are unprepared for the trials and difficulties they meet in the army. It is important to teach them from childhood to be persevering, to be brave in the face of difficulty, and to stay in good physical condition. Just take a look at our stadiums; I will not even mention that the majority of them are in terrible condition, but that in general no one even goes to the stadiums. Many draftees cannot swim—this is another cause of unfortunate events.

[Correspondent] Now, you are one of the three active Azerbaijani generals. We would like to know your opinion on the realistic possibilities of establishing a [minority] nationality army.

[Maj Gen Gasymov] You just said yourself one of the reasons why it is unrealistic: who would command it? But the main reason is economic. One could not even contemplate it at a time when the republic is making the transition to cost accounting and self-financing; maintaining a modern army demands an enormous amount of money. I would propose something else—we could try to establish [minority] nationality units or organizations because once there was an Azerbaijani division, then national cadres could be trained in this division.

In connection with this I want to mention another idea. The USSR Ministry of Defense has authorized the retention of up to 25 percent of the draftees within their own Republics. We are organizing special commissions—rayon, city and Republic commissions. Other than representatives of the Military Commissariats, representatives of Party, Soviet, Komsomol and Trade Unions as well as representatives of public organizations and soldiers' mothers will be included in these commissions. They will decide who of the draftees will be kept to serve in Azerbaijan. I will inform you that draftees who are heads of families, children of single mothers, youths from families who lost children in the Soviet Army during peacetime (primarily in Afghanistan), children of refugees from Armenia or Ferghana—if they still have no permanent residence or if the material conditions in the family are difficult—, youths selected for service outside

the ranks, and individuals recommended by public organizations or local Soviets (for example, orphan children) will use this right.

[Correspondent] Recently cases of being absent without leave from the Armed Forces have proliferated. Most youths state that they are escaping persecution because of their nationality. What would you say about this?

[Maj Gen Gasymov] Unfortunately, one comes across Azerbaijani deserters from the Soviet Army. We inform the Military Procuracy about each of these cases. For example, recently civilians from the ranks of the Armenian nationalists inspired by Warrant Officer Asatryan began to threaten Azerbaijani soldiers in a construction unit in Stavropol Oblast. As a result 22 soldiers deserted and came to Baku. At the recommendation of the Republic Military Commissariat the Main Military Procuracy raised criminal charges against Asatryan. But the obvious question is that we cannot allow the fact of desertion to go unpunished. We are talking about a state of law, and there is a law about general military duty which none may disregard. I wish to note that no amount of pressure can compel me or those under me to neglect our obligatory duty: we fulfill our obligations before the Fatherland and people.

[Correspondent] A final question: there is an idea going around that all Azerbaijani draftees are sent to serve only in construction units. To what extent is this idea true?

[Maj Gen Gasymov] Until the beginnings of the 1980s 60 percent of the draftees were sent to construction units, and 40 percent to fighting or training units. Now the situation has changed considerably. Suffice it to say that 70 percent of the draftees are sent to fighting and training units, and 30 percent to construction and railroad forces. One has to recognize that often we have to refuse to send some draftees from Azerbaijan to, what should I say, effective units. According to documentary data one could have sent them to these units. The whole problem was in their weak general educational preparation and poor knowledge of Russian.

Finally, it would be proper for me to turn to the parents, especially because the fall draft is over: do not prevent your children from turning into men. There are shortcomings in the army as there are in all other sectors of the life of our society but perestroika and glasnost are changing the situation. The republic Military Commissariat will take all steps so that parents will have accurate knowledge about the progress of their children's military service. Do not panic or be provoked.

Naval Zampolit on Military-Political Situation in Latvia

90UM0281A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 89
(Signed to press 02 Nov 89) pp 24-26

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank A. Riskin, political worker, under the rubric "Opinions, Suggestions, Responses": "Who Will Protect the Army?"]

[Text] The honor of the uniform.... How sad it is that this concept has become banal. And the honor of the military uniform is my honor, the honor and dignity of many of my comrades who are performing their sacred duty to protect the homeland.

We must defend our honor. Not just in parliamentary discussions, but also in the press. This is not easy to do, though. Carefully studying the republic press in recent months, I have identified one pattern. The flow of slander against the army has increased considerably. And one has the impression that the subject of the military is sometimes of interest to the journalists only with respect to gaining cheap popularity from the sensationalism of "cooked-up" facts.

It is not surprising that a new term, "anti-army syndrome," has come into being among the career military men. The wholesale accusation of the officer corps of all kinds of crimes is the most obvious symptom of this "syndrome." It has become customary to assert that the army is the society's most conservative, routine-oriented institution, a source of dogmatism, which naturally produces resistance to the restructuring. There is nothing surprising about such arguments.

"Attacks on our nation and on our army," writer Karem Rash believes, "have a long history, and there is no basis for hoping that they will end. Sometimes, however, the very first hostile attacks on or unjust drubbing of our army evokes painful bewilderment on the faces of our officers. This is not becoming to the military. The army should be prepared to defend its dignity both in writing and orally."

A justified reproach. The attack on the army began long ago. In my opinion, we have maintained a silent defense. Is it not time to take action? In Latvia, for example, the signal for the offensive against the "man with the weapon" was given in decisions adopted at the founding assembly of the NFL [Latvian People's Front], the leaders of which revived the concept of territorial military formations. Literally within months the concept "territorial military formations" was transformed into "national-territorial." The NFL Duma is bombarding the Ministry of Defense with "open letters" demanding that conscripts from Latvia be permitted to serve in the republic. In the opinion of the NFL "strategists," "performing the compulsory military service within the republic would have a beneficial effect upon the health of the servicemen: the number of illnesses caused by the changing of climatic and [time] zones would be drastically reduced," they say. (ATMODA, No 12). A "weighty" argument. I would note in passing that the Duma administration does a far poorer job of seeing to the health of its leaders: Emissaries of the movement roam the entire world to publicize their ideas, paying no attention to the climate or the [time] zones of nations or continents.

The following is quoted from a letter from Yu. Lykov published in the Latvian Komsomol Central Committee's newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH (6 May 89): "I am personally inclined to attribute all the blame

(for the "mistreatment by superiors"—A.R.) to the passivity of the officers...." Everyone has the right to his own opinion, but where is the opinion of the military ideologues? Where is the truth about the situation in the army? Why is it acceptable not to respond to the army's enemies in the press?

Incidentally, when I decided to express my opinion about that article, which, to put it mildly, distorted the problem of nonregulation relations, I was unable to do so. K. Zagorovskaya, in charge of such articles, informed me with a nice smile that the editors were "closing" this subject. And your stringer departed with nothing.

It is strange that as soon as a "cooked-up" fact against the army appears, the newspaper "opens up," but one only has to try to speak out in defense of the man in the shoulderboards, and "there is no space" in the newspaper, "the subject is being closed," and so forth.

Is this accidental? I believe it is not. One can practically identify three topics presently subject to constant criticism in the republic press: socialism, the party and the army. And this is being done with a purpose. Our army, loyal to the ideals of the party and socialism, cannot in this situation avoid the carping and malicious attacks of certain unscrupulous journalists and unofficial bodies striving for power, which, in the situation of the restructuring, have been given the opportunity openly to express their convictions and views.

A typical example was the regular congress of the "Movement for Latvia's National Independence," held on 28 May of this year. Appeals were repeatedly made by newly found national liberators for people to refuse to serve in the Armed Forces of the USSR—an "army of occupation," they called it. Such appeals are indisputably in open conflict with articles 60 and 61 of the Constitution of the Latvian SSR and Article 3 of the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty. Why did the Lithuanian Communist Party CC, the republic's Supreme Soviet and the mass media fail to respond in any way? What is more, the Presidium of Latvia's Supreme Soviet recognized the Movement "as being within the bounds of constitutional standards" and merely reproved it mildly for the attacks on the army.

Who gains from turning the youth against serving in the army? Who gains from the creation of fertile soil for the poisonous seeds of nationalism, ready to sprout even now?

It has become clear since the founding congress of the NFL, since the publication of the 31 May 89 appeal from the Duma board, which proclaimed the republic's separation from the USSR, that the NFL's recognition of the concepts and decisions coming out of the 19th party congress was merely oratory.

The NFL's attempt to assume political power by establishing "civilian committees" as alternatives to the local soviets is an extremely typical indication of the front's new strategy. In this situation the republic's Communist

Party is not an ally by an enemy, a rival, of the front. And the army, which undeviatingly supports the party is enemy number 2 of the NFL. The NFL cannot lure it over to its side. This means that it has to seek a different way: to slander the army and drive a wedge (forgive me for the hackneyed analogy) between the army and the people.

It is no accident that the concept of territorial military formations is still in effect for the NFL, despite its naivete and the fact that it cannot be achieved. And there are many literate and intelligent politicians who understand this among the front leaders. Their positions are inalterable, however, and there is nothing strange about this. It is a trump—albeit not the very largest—in the complex political game. The same as the establishment of NFL volunteer patrols for the protection of public order. Say what you like about the purposes of such "volunteer patrols," but for me, a military man, it is clear and unambiguous that a formation is being established which is capable in an instant of becoming the nucleus of a combat organization. And this is dangerous.

The strongest trump card of the army's enemies are the events of 1940, pertaining to the introduction of individual Red Army units onto the territory of bourgeois Latvia. It seems to me that this is a marked card. V.I. Lenin stated that one should view "history" from the standpoint of those who make it without the possibility of unerringly weighing the chances in advance, and not from the standpoint of the petty bourgeois intellectual, who moralizes that "it was easy to foresee... should not have been taken on...." (PSS, Vol. 14, p. 379). Indeed, one cannot implement overall policy while remaining on the sideline....

Attempts have recently been made to give a legal basis to ideological attacks on the army in Latvia. In the published draft Law of the Latvian SSR "On Changes and Amendments to the Constitution of the Latvian SSR" (adopted by the republic parliament at the first reading), servicemen are openly acknowledged as outcasts of society. The allocation of 12 slots at the congress of people's deputies of the Latvian SSR (why precisely 12?) for military units stationed in the republic, plans for establishing separate electoral districts and eliminating their right of legislative initiative are a clear attempt to remove the army (loyal to the ideals of the party and the Soviet state) from the political arena.

The army's enemies are not satisfied even with this, however. Poet Yanis Peters, one of the leaders of the NFL and member of the Duma board, announced at the last session of the republic's Supreme Soviet that all provisions pertaining to the army must be totally removed from the Constitution and laws on elections, extending the right to elect and be elected only to citizens of Latvia. The fact that the draft Law "On Citizenship of the Latvian SSR" calls for a 10-year residency requirement deprives servicemen of an opportunity to participate in the republic's political life and also of any hopes of protecting their social and political rights.

In addition, as though flouting basic logic, Ya. Peters asserts that by extending to servicemen the right to participate in elections, "we are suddenly singling out the army, raising it above other parts of life, attempting to establish for it some sort of totally new privileges...." Speaking at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, he once expressed fear that a "mentality of a citizen of the military district and not of the nation" might develop among servicemen stationed in the republic. Yes, it could, but why facilitate this so vigorously?

Deputy V. Avotinsh went even further in the matter of developing "democracy," proposing establishing in the Constitution a provision that "...members of the military council of the Baltic Military District cannot be deputies of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, with the exception of the district commander and certain officers in the district political directorate."

This is the sort of "constructive" proposals generated by "Baltic pluralism." And all of this against the background of the latent anti-army campaign in the press, on radio and television.

Legal expert Yu. Boyars, people's deputy of the USSR and one of the authors of the draft laws published in the press for discussion, writes in his article "On Directions for Democratizing the Political System of the USSR" (RIGAS BALSS, 1 Aug 89): "...I am extremely perturbed by the fact that reactionary forces of our state are attempting gradually to give the intelligentsia the image of a class enemy...." I am in accord with this. But why do attempts by individual members of our intelligentsia to give our army the same image not evoke indignation in Comrade Yu. Boyars? What is more, the author does the same thing even in the article mentioned. Yes, life in the army is not the best. Like our entire society, we have deficiencies enough. The army is our common concern, however. It is my life and that of my comrades, my and their love and pain. And I shall defend it.

I would like to remind those who slander the army that throughout the centuries and in all nations the army has been, is and will continue to be the backbone of the state system.

New creative unions, public organizations, independent movements and so forth are springing up like mushrooms after the abundant rains of the restructuring. These fronts and societies are promoting their own views and defending the interests of their members and supporters. And this is only natural. What is not natural is the fact that the military have been left out of the action, as it were, in this situation. Theoretically, we are united into a powerful, ramified structure (the Armed Forces of the USSR), with its organizing center (the Ministry of Defense) and an enormous ideological apparatus (the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy). Unfortunately, these "three giants" have become locked into themselves and, in my opinion, lack a broad

field of action. Yes, we do have army and navy magazines and newspapers. They are a drop in the bucket in the enormous flow of information inundating the people, however. Why is it that we are eternally justifying ourselves? Why does TsT [Central Television] allocate to the army only 1 hour a week—and that at a "less desirable" time? Why is it that appearances by military ideologues are a rarity on television and in the newspapers, and the presentations themselves abound in general statements? Why does the USSR Ministry of Defense not enjoy the right of legislative initiative to establish a law protecting servicemen from attacks and the army against slander? How many times have we seen that one cannot be sparing with ideology and military-patriotic indoctrination, but we do not derive conclusions or lessons!

There is a folk saying that there is no such thing as a sacred vacuum. When we make even the slightest error, it is immediately exploited by the army's enemies. This makes it all the more inadmissible to commit errors in the ideological struggle. And that struggle continues.

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Officers Polled on Interaction with Different Nationalities

90UM0209C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Jan 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel V. Deynekin in the column: "Military Sociologist's Column", entitled: "A Word in One's Native Language".]

[Text] Of a large number of officers canvassed by workers from the Research Center for Social and Psychological Problems at the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, a third answered that they encounter no difficulties in the area of interethnic relations. Is this possibly an indication of a superficial evaluation of the problem on their part as it relates to themselves?

Let us look at the statistics. In various units, no interpersonal problems whatsoever are experienced by 67 to 70 percent of those surveyed in their dealings with soldiers of Russian origin; by 76 to 78 percent in the case of Ukrainians; and 70 to 96 percent in relations with Belorussians.

Consider another fact. A rather large number of officers are engaged in the systematic study of the culture and history of USSR peoples. However, this still has little effect on the general situation. For example, the data indicate that the officers easily establish personal understanding with soldiers of Georgian origin in 15 to 17 percent of cases; in 8 to 14 percent with Armenians; and in 2 to 5 percent with Azerbaijanis. The same situation obtains in the work of commanders and political workers involving other nationalities. Statistics indicate that the interethnic problem in the Army is rather acute and that not all officers possess the same degree of qualification

relative to educational work with service personnel of various ethnic backgrounds.

Also calling attention to itself is the lack of a consensus among officers with respect to a need to take into account ethnic peculiarities of servicemen. For example, 23 percent of officers surveyed share the opinion that it is not necessary to "handle each nationality in a special manner," since it is "impossible to know everything about everyone."

Almost half of those queried are convinced that it is necessary not only to study the history, psychology, and culture, but also to strive to master the languages of the peoples in whose territory one is serving and become active in organizing circles and courses in officers' clubs. In this connection, local specialists, scholars, and teachers are to be invited to participate. Other interesting thoughts were expressed.

The fact is obvious: It is a rare officer who does not travel from one Republic to another during his tour of duty. People who know several languages are presently held in high esteem in the interethnic collective in the military unit or aboard ship, of course. Yes, there is a need for professionals who could carry out educational work, especially with young soldiers, in their native language. It is notable that a significant number of officers (31 percent) did not express their personal opinion on this problem.

That is an alarming number. It is no accident that practical steps are being taken to provide moral and material support to those who know and apply in educational and combat training activity a knowledge of languages of USSR peoples.

In this short analysis of sociological research, let us not take up the causes of why many native groups are not represented in the command and political makeup in a number of subunits and units. They vary. This is obviously not a problem that will be resolved in a short period of time. However, as shown by experience, this gap can be partially filled. How can that be done? For example, many officers of Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, German, and Uighur origin possess a mastery of the Kazakh language. They have no difficulty understanding Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Tatars, Bashkirs, and, to some extent, Azerbaijani servicemen. Let this be food for thought of officials that decide who is to be assigned to the various subunits for duty.

It is no secret that there are cases where VUZ graduates suffer doubts relative to the wisdom of mastering languages of USSR peoples. This must be overcome.

It seems to me that support should be given to an initiative that originated in the Gorky Higher Military Construction Command School, where for more than a year a department dealing with the study of the history and culture of Uzbekistan and other Union Republics has been active. There is more. LENINSKOYE

ZNAMYA—the newspaper of the Transcaucasus Military District—has been publishing lessons in Armenian, Azeri, and Georgian. The information is compiled by experienced philologists.

The problem of interethnic relations is hardly limited to communication difficulties, of course, but it is of fundamental importance. We are all concerned with finding the most complete understanding between representatives of the various peoples that are carrying out the sacred duty of defending the Motherland.

Increased Minority Tensions In Kiev MD Units

*90UM0245A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Jan 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Colonel N. Gusarov, Chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department and Deputy Chief of the Kiev Military District Political Directorate: "Ideological Work—The Nationality Aspect: "Readiness For Dialogue"]

[Text] A number of events prompted me to reflect on problems that, in terms of their urgency, have assumed top priority today and on whose solution much in the success of perestroika in the army depends.

In a combined-arms unit commanded by Major-General A. Antonov, several young soldiers who were representatives of one of the Union Republics reacted in a very unique fashion to the very first order their unit commander issued. If you are going to oppress us, they declared, the people back home will stage an insurrection in our defense.

Another incident. Two soldiers got in an argument. Each believed in his national superiority over the other.

Quite a few such examples can be cited. For many years, we didn't want to have a concept of the processes under way in society, we shut ourselves off from them, relying on the high fences around our military compounds. But you can't shut yourself off from life. We are thousands of kilometers away from Transcaucasia. But the echo of events in that region is to be heard in each of our military collectives. Not a day passed since the imposition of the state of emergency in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and in certain other rayons when, in a communications regiment, some Azeri soldiers requested that their commander immediately allow them to return home. Their motivation: blood is being shed there, and we must be there; after all, Armenians were released when the earthquake struck their republic.

In saying this, I want to stress that the new conditions have spawned a multitude of new problems. Only a year or two ago, those young soldiers' attempt to assert themselves would have been viewed in the unit as an ill-considered childish escapade. But today it is a fact of social psychology. And it must be treated as such. A good deal of work had to be done with those soldiers. For the stormy processes taking place in society, especially in the

sphere of interethnic relations, are also taking a toll on the moral atmosphere in military collectives.

In analyzing many incidents—in particular in the units and subunits in which officers I. Abdulkarimov, B. Izhitskiy, and V. Provorovskiy serve, and in other collectives—one comes to the conclusion that it is the limited opportunity to gain a good understanding of one's comrade or commanding officer that creates the basis for nonregulation conduct in certain multiethnic subunits. Soldiers themselves often admit this.

There is one solution: every negative incident must become the occasion for a candid talk with young people and teach a kind of lesson in political assessments. But assessments that must be based, of course, on in-depth analysis of the question. Only competence and balance in one's position and respect for people produce the needed effect.

And another thing. Incidents must be dealt with immediately, hot on their trail. Prompt ideological influence ensures a good result, as a rule: the young men gain confidence.

In our political directorate, we devote special attention to these questions, testing a whole series of methods that have been devised to prevent nonregulation conduct of ethnic origin. The present situation is complex. Seventy percent of yesterday's conscripts had occasion to find themselves in the ranks of demonstrators, and not infrequently under signs and banners that by no means call for unity of the USSR's peoples. Every 10th comes from a family that holds nationalistic views. There are also former members of unofficial groups of decidedly extremist leanings. These are the kinds of people that must now be molded into a single army family. To say that this is not easy is an understatement. It is always difficult to persuade a person to be frank, even if he has complete command of the Russian language. And if he does not?

Add to this most officers' lack of serious training in questions of ethnic relations—something that was discussed, not without anguish, by participants in the All-Union Officers' Conference—and their lack of knowledge about social psychology, the political economy of the new time, and culture in its far broader, applied sense, as opposed to what is currently taught in higher military educational institutions.

To fill in these gaps, the party organizations and officials of political agencies are making considerable efforts to fashion an ideological mechanism by which to improve internationalist education.

They began by amassing materials from numerous surveys, studies, observations, and polls that were conducted on a regular basis with the help of the district military newspaper. The data obtained were summarized in groups and commissions for internethnic relations, in political departments, and in party committees and bureaus.

And here is what immediately became apparent. There were few specialists in education, psychology, and sociology. The

people had no training in survey methodology. Some surveys had 20 or more questions, questions that were not always reasonable and that sometimes offended the respondent's national pride. This amateurish effort sometimes produced an effect opposite the one intended. Much had to be reorganized. The specialists were provided with the necessary methodological and reference materials. A series of special lectures was set up, and plans for practical training were devised. Incidentally, the training sessions took the form of role-playing.

We gave serious thought to a "cultural program" in the units and to nontraditional forms of ideological measures. Incidentally, it was at this point that we regretted the fact that the cultural universities, with their general-education faculties and lecture bureaus had been neglected. Some things had to be restored.

Circumstances also required that we regroup the capabilities of the Marxism-Leninism universities, whose curriculums had in a literal sense lagged behind real life. We also drew on the experience of others. Based on a study of the best experience in educational activity in the Republics and in a number of other districts and troop groups, the district political directorate's Commission on Interethnic Relations devised its own approaches. Let me cite the following concrete example. Some of the district's units were visited recently by a delegation from Namanganskaya Oblast, Uzbekistan. The delegation consisted of soldiers' mothers, young people, and party and trade union officials. We hid nothing: go see and speak with your compatriots, we told them, both in the presence of their officers and without them. Go wherever you like. And then we sat down for a round-table discussion, so to speak. The discussion greatly enriched all of us.

I want to emphasize something right here. It is very important to clearly define one's specific regional conditions without waiting for prompting or recommendations from the center. This makes it possible, in one's work, to keep ahead of events to a certain degree by promptly reacting to any fluctuations in the "ethnic equilibrium" in military collectives.

And take the Commissions for Interethnic Relations. What happened when we took a closer look at their work? In one tank regiment, for example, there was no such group at all. The reason being, a political officer explained, that there were no nationality conflicts in the regiment's subunits. In my view, such a position is downright harmful; for a unit's political officers are called upon to see life's rapid pace.

Old approaches to the organization of groups for interethnic relations have also taken a toll. At the local level, such groups have often been formed according to the old scheme that calls for a political officer or propagandist, an activist, and an exemplary soldier. This has also shaped attitudes toward the groups as yet another campaign. Many members of such "teams" have taken a position of openly biding their time.

Meanwhile, practice shows that such groups should consist primarily of people who command respect among the members of various nationalities and who are well prepared. People who know the practical aspects of interethnic relations and their specific features. Just such people were the first to call our attention to imbalances, for example, in subunit staffing.

We began studying the situation. And here is a typical picture. Quite a few Moldavian soldiers serve in a company commanded by Captain N. Levchuk. But there is only a handful of Sergeants of Moldavian nationality. In one of the tank battalions, the Komsomol bureau had no representatives of the nationalities that accounted for no more and no less than 60 percent of the subunits' total personnel. Needless to say, such a "breakdown" hardly promoted effective internationalist education.

In the regiment in which Lieutenant-Colonel N. Malkov serves as Deputy Commander for Political Affairs, nearly half of the soldiers and sergeants are from Belorussia and Moldavia, while there is not a single officer of that nationality and just one warrant officer who has a good command of the national language.

Nor can we shy away from direct debate on nationality problems with the most active adherents of non-traditional views. Recently, for example, at assemblies of political officers, we gave the floor to several leaders of Rukh who are known for their extreme views on the nationality question. And I will say outright that the discussion proved difficult, a discussion in which the officers immediately tried to take the initiative. The peremptory tone characteristic of rallies and a tendency to speak in generalities were countered with businesslike reasoning and the real picture of life. And this Bolshevik active and forceful position taught an object lesson to all: where army communists and political officers do not retreat to the shadows or wait for directives and recommendations, success is assured. And the party position becomes firmer.

We have long said that the "army is a school of internationalism." This is all very true. But the time has come to admit that there are far more unresolved questions than achievements in that school. And the entire instructional process requires constant renewal and perestroyka.

Glavpur Statistics on Nationalities in Armed Forces

90UM0293A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 4, 22-28 Jan 90 p 6

[Interview with Colonel N. Borodin, Candidate of Historical Sciences one of the Heads of the Social and Psychological Problems Research Center, by V. Litovkin, entitled: "From a Demonstration to the Voyenkomat".]

[Text] The Social and Psychological Problems Research Center has been established under the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy [GlavPUR]. It is engaged in scientific analysis of issues for strengthening military discipline, improving political education

and party organizational work, and formation and development of close friendly relations in multi-ethnic military collectives.

Our correspondent talked with Lieutenant Colonel N. Borodin, candidate of historical sciences and one of the center's heads.

[Litovkin] Nikolay Ivanovich, as far as I know your department is engaged with the inter-ethnic relations problem. Lately, inter-ethnic relations have abruptly worsened in our society and must be having an impact on order and organization in the Armed Forces.

[Borodin] Of course. The echo of events in the Baltic, Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Moldavia, and the Ukraine are affecting our units and subunits. The Army is really a part of our society and an integral element. And if there is no ethnic unrest, rallies, demonstrations, or strikes in the Armed Forces, this does not at all signify that all is peace and harmony. If there is trouble in the country, then there cannot be calm and good-nature in the forces. The acuteness of inter-ethnic problems is affecting us in many ways. On one hand, the Army along with other law enforcement forces participated and continues to participate in stabilizing the situation in ethnic regions and, on the other hand, it accepts young people into its ranks who are well acquainted with the tactics of the street rally and strike struggle, have absorbed the slogans of the informal nationalist movements, and are drunk with the elements of complete license and the overthrow of all kinds of authority.

Here is our research data. If in 1988 only 14 percent of young men among the draftees of various republics participated in informal movements, organizations and groups, last year's Autumn draft, depending on the region, produced a figure of 30-40 percent. All of this compels us to seriously reflect on the processes taking place in society and directly impacting the Army. It is still early to judge all trends but we can say one thing accurately: The work of the officer, commander, and teacher that has already never been easy has become many times more complicated.

I will list several cases. If at the beginning of the 1970's (sociological research has been conducted in the Armed Forces precisely since those years) violations of discipline or crimes based on nationality totaled an insignificantly small number that was not taken into account by scholars, today even the data of the Main Military Procurator confirms that every fifth crime and from 40-70 percent of gross violations of discipline, including relations not in accordance with regulations, are acquiring a clearly expressed national [ethnic] complexion. And what is particularly alarming is that a large number of those convicted for such crimes are representatives of the indigenous populations of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.

The demographic situation that developed in the country by the end of the 1980's is also directly affecting the ethnic structure of the Army and Navy. If in 1975 the

portion of servicemen of indigenous nationalities of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus was 20 percent, in 1988 it was already around 30 percent and, by the year 2000 if current population growth rates are maintained, it will reach nearly 35 or more percent. All of this must impact the situation in the Armed Forces.

[Litovkin] And how do you react to the proposal that is being all the more persistently heard today from the podiums of the Supreme Soviets of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, and other republics: about the establishment of national formations, about young men of local nationalities completing service within the borders of their republics.

[Borodin] I cannot agree with this. The research that we have recently conducted in units and subunits of six military districts—Transcaucasus, Turkestan, Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, and Moscow, and also in sub-units and on ships of two fleets—the Baltic and Pacific Ocean [Fleets] will result in the opposite conclusion. Even now, the substantial pressure of the situation in the republics is undoubtedly influencing the work of our manning agencies and has produced the following results: For example, in certain companies, batteries, and subunits of equivalent size in the Carpathian Military District, the ratio of Ukrainians among compulsory service soldiers and sergeants exceeds 45 percent and, in the Transcaucasus Military District in certain units servicemen of local nationalities total up to 60 percent, and there is also a similar picture in the Baltic [Military District].

And if you consider that in 1980 there were 7-12 nationalities in companies and equivalent sized subunits and up to 30 in units due to the ethnic heterogeneity of the nation's population in all of its regions, now these figures look like this: 9-18 and 35, respectively. There are up to 60-90 nationalities in a military district. It is not difficult to imagine the discomfort that representatives of ethnic minority groups must sense with the rapid increase of the number of local boys. Under Army conditions with the availability of weapons while performing guard duty and other duties and while considering certain omissions in educational work, all of this can result in undesirable friction and conflicts.

The conclusion is obvious: Only improvement of the force manning principles and emphasis on extraterritoriality, on proportional representation of all nationalities in all military districts and in all fleets, in all units, subunits and on ships will help avoid many undesirable excesses.

I am not at all saying that even transferring people to remote locations provides an economic advantage in comparison with what we will have to pay if a narrow nationalistic and egotistical approach prevails during formation of the Army and Navy. Ponder this fact. Currently, the Armed Forces needs about 600 types of specialists who are not trained by the national economy. This means that we need to establish nearly 600 training

subunits in each republic and in each region. Where do we get the funds?!? And so many officers?!

It is no secret that today's officer corps is comparatively, if we can express it this way, "narrowly ethnic" in comparison with the entire population of the nation. It consists of representatives of only 43 nationalities and only 22 nationalities among company and platoon commanders. And really they are the closest teachers of soldiers and sergeants and they will be commanders of units, large units, and ships, and generals and admirals in the future. Who will train and teach the young men from Estonia, Turkmeniya, Georgia, Kirgiziya, and certain other republics if the contingent of cadets of these nationalities is being reduced from year to year?

[Litovkin] Shortcomings in officer education work certainly also depend on the fact that some of them (I am judging this based on my journalistic experience) poorly present the national psychologies of different peoples, their traditions, customs and temperaments, and do not master the culture of inter-ethnic relations or the languages of the peoples of the USSR. There is also a similar picture in the families of many officers and (naval) warrant officers who reside on the territories of the republics....

[Borodin] Yes, the stagnant "no problem" times in inter-ethnic relations left a serious mark on the quality of officer training. The History of the USSR course that was simplified to primitivism and that was taught at schools and institutes and the taboo on conversations about ethnic peculiarities, psychology, customs, and temperaments of various peoples were also reflected in the academic programs of military academies and schools. They are only beginning to turn to life's requirements now.

And meanwhile our surveys indicate: Almost 70 percent of commanders and political workers self-critically note their inadequate level of training to lead multi-ethnic military collectives.

The problem of the language barrier is becoming particularly acute today. In many republics, the intelligentsia is sounding the alarm that young people are forgetting or do not want to study their native language, laws on a state language are being adopted, and we are concerned with the phenomenon of a directly opposing characteristic. Our research and the experience of military commanders demonstrate that the number of draftees who have a poor knowledge of or do not at all know the Russian language, the language of inter-ethnic intercourse, is growing at menacing rates.

In the Ground Forces alone the portion of such young men increased by almost 45 percent from 1983 until the present time and the number of lads who have a weak knowledge of the Russian language, for example, from Armenia has increased by more than a factor of two in recent years. Approximately the same situation is also taking shape throughout the other republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia and Estonia. From 10 to 30

percent of soldiers assigned to companies and equivalent size subunits do not speak Russian and a significantly greater number do not speak Russian in military construction units that are not part of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The Army and Navy frequently complain that the majority of military construction personnel are young men from the Transcaucasus or Central Asian republics. But how can we avoid this when it is difficult to select a lad who will be able to rapidly and clearly understand a command directed at him and skillfully act under an officer's guidance at a responsible post in the Missile Forces or Air Defense Forces, on a military vessel, or on a tank, infantry fighting vehicle, or at an artillery piece? And if it is under the strain of training or combat when each second can have decisive significance?

[Litovkin] What methods are being proposed by the Center's scholars to resolve the problems of inter-ethnic relations? What kind of contribution are they making to unite multi-ethnic military collectives?

[Borodin] We can tentatively divide our proposals into three levels. Problems of the entire society, problems at the junction between society and the Army, and problems inside the Armed Forces. I would like to emphasize the dialectics and the interrelationship of these relations and to separate the cause and effect relationships. Excuse me for such a, maybe, trite and not very apt comparison but it is impossible to treat a headache without knowing what caused it.

I think that the Law on Defense will help eliminate many inter-ethnic relations problems. I know that it is being prepared right now in the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense Issues and State Security, in the Ministry of Defense, and in other agencies having jurisdiction. We are also participating in this work.

But as for purely Army problems, we are constantly conducting studies of inter-ethnic relations which are developing in various regions of the nation and ground and naval force deployment areas and we are preparing recommendations for commanders and political workers to improve organization of duty [conditions], combat training, living [conditions], everyday services, and political education of servicemen while considering the ethnic factor. We are providing advice to consolidate professional and friendly ties of soldiers with local government and economic agencies, party and Komsomol organizations, and society, and we are involving members of officers' and warrant officers' families in this work.

Our center has also been tasked to develop systematic teaching aids for commanders and political workers of low echelon [units] for work with soldiers of different nationalities. We are helping to summarize and disseminate the latest experience of inter-ethnic education of soldiers through the press, radio and television. We are

participating in the explanation of the entire servicemen's history, traditions, culture, and the national-psychological peculiarities of the peoples of our nation and their achievements to soldiers and sergeants. Incidentally, now military schools and academies have begun to graduate military sociologists and psychiatrists for practical work among the troops and this undoubtedly will produce its own results.

The main thing is that we are attempting to avoid yesterday's self-satisfied patterns of thinking and stagnant formulas like the sad banner: "The Soviet Army is the school of patriotic and inter-ethnic education." We will strive to make our Army the Army of friendship and brotherhood not in words but in deeds. And to do this we need to know the real picture and I would say the "x-ray" of its condition. To know in order to act.

Dependents Continue Flight Despite Assurances of Safety

*90UM0263B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 27 Jan 90 First Edition p 6*

[“Refugees Continue to Arrive”—KRASNAYA ZVEZDA headline; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] In spite of assurances of safety addressed in the last several days by leaders of the Azerbaijani Popular Front to representatives of other nationalities and military dependents, people do not want to live in fear. Their evacuation is continuing. The entire country is welcoming the evacuees.

ALMA-ATA. Functioning here is an operations group organized by the post authorities to receive and house military dependents that are to be evacuated from the Transcaucasus. The group chief of staff, Alma-Ata garrison commander Major V. Gorevoy, related the following:

Mainly women and children are arriving. Eleven persons were promptly transported to relatives residing in other cities and populated places. Those remaining were given temporary quarters in the post hotel Raketa, where another 100 places have been set aside. A reception area has also been designated in the Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev.

The following are the telephone numbers by which servicemen can contact their wives and children that have arrived at Alma-Ata: 33-03-50 and 33-34-55.

A. Ladin, Colonel

NOVISIBIRSK. Military dependents evacuated from Gyandzha have been flown here by a Military Transport Aviation aircraft. The people were fed and provided quarters in a hotel immediately upon arrival.

N. Fedoseyev, Lieutenant Colonel

SEVASTOPOL. In the past 24 hours, more than 600 persons, including 310 children, have arrived here from

Baku. They were all provided living quarters aboard the hospital ship "Yenisey," the motor ship "Kuban," and a fleet auxiliary vessel.

Many persons having relatives departed after a brief rest aboard the ships of the Black Sea Fleet. Thirty-four families were transported to the Central Tourist Base "Sevastopol" and the "Yalta" Sanatorium.

S. Negmatdzhanyov, Senior Lieutenant

Evacuees Housed in Moscow MD Barracks

*90UM0263D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Jan 90 First Edition p 3*

[Article by unnamed KRASNYA ZVEZDA special correspondent: "Problems Coming Under Control: Evacuees from Baku Temporarily Housed in Moscow Garrison Barracks"]

[Text] In yesterday's KRASNYA ZVEZDA, we ran the story of the difficulties facing evacuees from Baku that had been provided living quarters in Moscow Garrison barracks. What has transpired in the last 24 hours?

One of the major problems was that the people, who had abandoned their residences and belongings, possessed only small sums of money (with some of them completely without personal funds). They were facing the prospect of having to pay for the use of rest homes, hotels, and pensions to which they were to move after vacating the barracks.

"Today we received an order," said Lieutenant General V. Titov, who is responsible for evacuating the military dependents, "which authorizes us to offer the evacuees the use of sanatoria, rest homes, hotels, tourist centers, and USSR Ministry of Defense dormitories without cost to them. The order also covers meals—they will also be cost-free. Buses are being made available for the persons living in the barracks, which will be readied for the return of garrison servicemen that are housed therein."

Thus, one problem has been dispensed with. In addition, it is natural that military dependents transported to other military districts should be treated in the same manner, on the basis of facilities available to local command authority. Major General V. Matveyev, who is deputy chairman of the commission for organizing temporary housing of military dependents evacuated from the Transcaucasian Military District, requested that this be disseminated via the newspaper.

It should be noted that a decree issued by the USSR Council of Ministers authorizes the granting of financial assistance in the form of a lump sum of 100 rubles, with 200 additional rubles for the purchase of basic necessities. As explained to us by Colonel A. Ulyanchuk, deputy department chief in the TsFU [Central Finance Directorate], USSR Ministry of Defense, the money will be disbursed by finance organ personnel operating in military commissariats. We hope that this will be accomplished without delay.

Now about evacuees other than military dependents. Lieutenant General V. Titov informed us that about 1,800 persons still living in barracks are awaiting action on the part of municipal authorities. The vast majority of these people are from the Russian-speaking population.

RSFSR Goskomtrud Administration Chief V. Matusyak offered an explanation of the situation. He assured us that on 27 January all evacuees located in Moscow will be taken to sanatoria and pensions of the USSR Council of Ministers, Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Metallurgy, and Ministry of the Defense Industry. All will be granted cost-free housing and meals for two months. Permanent representatives from the respective republics located in Moscow will assist representatives of other nationalities to travel to their republics.

On Relations Between Baku Residents, Soldiers

*90UM0303A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Feb 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Capt 2d Rank S. Turchenko, special correspondent: "Toward Mutual Trust: Baku Residents and Soldiers Have Begun a Difficult Path"]

[Text] "The citizens of Baku have always treated the military with love and respect. Even when the year before last a curfew was imposed, the military were literally met with flowers," was what I was told by Ya. Rustamov, the leader of the People's Front at the Baku Machine Building Plant imeni Shmidt; but then his tone suddenly changed abruptly: "However, the residents of Baku will never forgive them for 19-20 January. And no dialogue of any kind is possible between the population and the military!"

At that same moment the two officers who had come with me to the plant were surrounded in the hallway by workers, among whom there were many representatives of the People's Front, and they were already engaged in an interesting dialogue with them. Whatever Rustamov and other leaders of the People's Front might say, life is taking its own course.

Much has already been published in the central press about the events of 19-20 January 1990 in Baku. It is completely understandable that what has been written is not complete, and that the essence of the tragedy was reflected one-sidedly in some respects (the conditions under which the reporters had to work are unknown). But the main thing is obvious: A state of emergency was established by a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, but the troops were met by organized resistance, they were shot at, and they did some shooting themselves. The blood, pain and grief on both sides opened a deep chasm between the population and the military. Like it or not, it does exist. Why did all of this happen? Who is to blame? Specially created commissions of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet and the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee are called upon to answer these questions. But right now I

would like to talk about something else. About the fact that we need to go on living, and like it or not, side by side with the military and the local population. And not just live, but restore order, and organize the economy. Of course, it would be difficult to expect that the relatives of the Azerbaijani who died in the crossfire and the friends and comrades-in-arms of the soldier who was ripped apart by a homemade grenade would take sincere steps toward each other immediately. But we must take such steps, even with our teeth clenched, since they would be in the common interest, and primarily in the interest of the Azerbaijani people. And no matter what the leaders of the extremist wing of the Azerbaijan People's Front might say, no matter how they might try to widen the split between the army and the population, positive processes toward mutual trust are already under way.

For several days I was able to observe the work of the commandant's office in the portion of Rayon imeni 26 Baku Commissars, encompassing the central part of the city itself. I was astounded most of all by the line of Baku residents waiting to see the commandant, Colonel I. Rubtsov. Igor Nikolayevich refers to himself in jest as a "native of Baku," even though his permanent place of service is in the Moscow area. The fact is that he became the section commandant in this very same rayon the year before last, and that he has a fabulous knowledge of all of the city services and of the customs and character of the Azerbaijani people. He is also known by many citizens of Baku. What is it that they seek from "their" commandant?

An elderly, intelligent-looking Azerbaijani woman came to request protection from a neighbor, also an Azerbaijani by the way. Capitalizing on the turmoil he was frightening her, and attempting to throw her out of her room in the communal apartment. The commandant immediately sent an officer of the militia to arrest the man.

The next woman visitors were a Russian and an Azerbaijani. Their friend—an Armenian woman—had left Baku back before the pogroms of 13 January, leaving the apartment and her belongings in their care. Someone illegally occupied the apartment. What were they to do? The commandant helped the women draw up a petition. He promised to resolve the matter together with the rayon internal affairs department.

An elderly Azerbaijani man entered. He spoke Russian with difficulty. It took Igor Nikolayevich a long time to clarify the essence of the problem. As it turns out, the apartment occupied by this person, who had worked 40 years for his enterprise, had been in disrepair for a long time. No one wanted to even listen to him, but perhaps the military could help....

"In the beginning there were just a few isolated visitors," Rubtsov said. "Now I have to receive them practically the entire time that the curfew is not in force. One hundred to 120 persons a day. We resolve all of the problems jointly with rayon and city authorities. Though

solving most of them requires a long time. There is too much chaos in the city's administrative and economic mechanisms. Sometimes I would very much like representatives of the NFA [Azerbaijan People's Front], former Azerbaijani executives, and even the ones presently in power to sit here with me during my office hours, so that they could hear and be horrified by what they have done to the citizens of Baku!"

One evening after leaving the commandant's office I decided to talk with some people in a family atmosphere, so to speak. I selected a little house at random and rang the bell of the first apartment. The door was opened by a graying 60-year-old Azerbaijani who stared at me apprehensively. I introduced myself, telling him that I was a reporter, after which he hospitably invited me into his home. It was also occupied by his sister, his daughter, his daughter-in-law and a tiny grandson. A table was set immediately with traditional Azerbaijani hospitality, and it was only then that the interview began flowing, though unfortunately with much sadness. I also came to wish that someone from among the extremist leaders of the NFA were sitting beside me, listening. Here is what was told to me by these people, whom I cannot identify for reasons that will become clear in a moment.

The tragedy of this family, which is very typical of Baku by the way, is that it has turned out to be a mixed family: The husband is Azerbaijani, the wife is Armenian, and the children are naturally half-breeds. When the pogroms began, the wife was miraculously able to disappear and leave. But soon after, someone rang the bell of the apartment in which they lived. Three persons with NFA armbands on their sleeves entered impudently and said: If they did not vacate the apartment in 24 hours, they would be slaughtered. What were they to do? They gathered their belongings together and found refuge among different friends. And so they lived, one night here, one night in another place. Until they found this vacant room and occupied it without authorization. They live in fear: On one hand of being visited once again by extremists who would chase them out or do them harm, and on the other hand of the militia, which would also ask them to leave. It was a dead-end situation. But something had to be done.... I would go to the commandant tomorrow, I told the head of the household, I will tell him everything, and whatever he decides, will be.

Note that the man never even thought of going to the party raykom or the rayispolkom, or even to the committee of the People's Front, which trumpets for all to hear that only it expresses the dreams of the people, and that the military are supposedly the antipopular element in Baku.... The people are going to the military for assistance. And although it is not within their competency to resolve most of the matters that have accumulated, all of this is evidence that the common people are beginning to trust them, despite everything else.

I would like to make one qualification at this point. In telling the story about this family, it is in no way my

intention to belittle the role of raykoms and rayis-polkoms to any degree whatsoever. They are presently doing an extremely large amount of work. But the loss of faith in them in the recent past is now producing its fruits. These days, workers of the raykoms and rayis-polkoms and of the party city committee and the Baku City Soviet are going to the enterprises and the military units in an effort to consolidate all of the healthy forces in order to surmount the crisis. And this is also a highly important process, one which is proceeding both from the top and from the bottom. I for example was able to attend a meeting Baku City Executive Committee deputy chairman K. Shcherbakov called with staff officers stationed in Baku. It was a painful meeting, and it lasted for several hours in succession. There were mutual reproaches and complaints. But the main thing is that steps were taken toward mutual understanding, and places of convergence were noted. Such meetings are being held in many military units with Azerbaijani executives of different levels. And the soldiers are traveling to the enterprises and institutions, where they talk with the people, and also seek the ways to come together.

I recently visited a military unit under the command of Officer Ye. Morozov. This unit accommodated itself in Narimanovskiy Rayon, in an indoor light athletic complex. They told me in the political department that personal conditions were difficult. But local government authorities and the population were already actively helping the soldiers. In the evening for example, the personnel were invited to see some videos. One Azerbaijani living in an adjacent house brought over his own video tape player for the soldiers. The telephone rang during our conversation. Bus Pool No 2 asked soldiers to come over. The day before, it turned out, extremists had begun frightening the drivers, and they were afraid to go out on their routes. Captains S. Lyubarskiy and G. Pak and Senior Lieutenant I. Ashirov—a native of Baku incidentally—left immediately. They talked with the drivers for an entire hour. They agreed to have a serviceman escort each bus to protect it from extremists.

In that same unit I was shown numerous notes brought to the headquarters by the population. They report anonymously (a fear of the extremists still exists) where armed men were hiding and where they had their ammunition stockpiles concealed. It was on the basis of one such note, for example, that the unit's soldiers seized a cache of 1.5 million small-caliber cartridges.

Such that processes oriented on restoring mutual trust between the army and the population are under way. But it would be wrong to believe that they are going on easily and simply. What obstacles are there?

First there are the rumors being spread by the extremists about "atrocities" by servicemen. The fact is that, as I

myself noted, the common Azerbaijanis are very trusting in rumors and have less faith in the official press. I spent a long time talking with people on the streets of Baku. Here is an example of a typical discussion with young Azerbaijanis. Abbas had recently been an officer. He left the army on his own volition, and now he is making women's earrings in a cooperative. Azer works with him. Neither was out in the streets on the night of 19-20 January, but they are deeply convinced that soldiers fired on unarmed people. I asked Abbas: "You are a former officer, and you know quite well that no one would ever incite soldiers to fire on civilians." "I know," he replied, "but they told me...."

I heard this "they told me" dozens of times as an irrefutable argument, but I never encountered a single witness to "atrocities" by the soldiers. Though of course, many servicemen themselves confirmed that they did fire, but only in response to brutal fire that was bringing down fellow soldiers.

The fight against rumors is presently one of the most important tasks. This was the topic of discussion at a recent press conference in the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee. USSR People's Deputy A. Melikhov, a composer, said that he checked some of them out as part of a special commission, and they were not confirmed. He is deeply certain that each of them must be carefully checked out and immediately commented on in the press and by radio. Otherwise a dangerous inconsistency develops: We reporters often maintain a silence about the events of 19-20 January, fearing to pour salt onto the people's wounds yet another time. On the other hand the extremist forces of the NFA are worrying these wounds more and more, feeding false information to the people and evoking antimilitary sentiments. The full truth about the tragic events must be told as soon as possible. Only then will these wounds begin to heal.

The process of seeking the paths toward mutual trust are also blocked by unceasing attacks by extremists upon sentry posts and servicemen, which forces them to use their weapons.

The state of emergency does of course make restoring good relations between the army and the population difficult. But the population is beginning to understand more and more that this is a forced measure, one directed at protecting the interests of the common people. Because the extremists still have a very large quantity of weapons. They have gone underground, and they are simply waiting for the state of emergency to be called off in order to once again embark upon their black deeds. For the situation to normalize completely, they need to be disarmed. Who would be able to accomplish this? The people know that this is what the military are actively doing.

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